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

MEMOIRS

OF THE

WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

IN

HUNGARY.

BY

GENERAL KLAPKA,

LATE SECRETARY-AT-WAR TO THE HUNGARIAN COMMONWEALTH, AND COMMANDANT OF THE FORTRESS OF KOMORN.

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT BY

OTTO WENCKSTERN.

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HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

THE first germs of the late Hungarian War of Liberation were sown as early as three hundred years ago. When, in 1526, the Hungarians instituted Ferdinand I. of Habsburg with the crown and the cloak of St. Stephen, they created the necessity of a violent rupture of so unnatural a connexion. The elements thus joined together, were too heterogeneous to admit of a lasting union. On the one hand stood a people which, by some strange freak of historic fate, had brought a free constitution from Asia, the home of despotism, and which, ever since it settled in Europe, had become so closely wedded to the principles of civil liberty and tolerance, that their loss would have entailed the loss of national, and indeed of all existence. On the other hand, we see a family of princes, who, since they took their place

among the sovereigns of Europe, felt so strong and cordial an antipathy to civil rights and religious liberty, that they came to be the voluntary and persevering champions of absolutism and intolerance, and who attacked and intrigued against the hereditary and old-established rights of the peoples under their sway. For it ought not to be forgotten, that when Rudolf of Hapsburg, after defeating Przemisl Ottokar, on the Marchfield (1278),* took possession of the heritage of that unfortunate prince, he found the countries under his command in the enjoyment of representative and municipal institutions. These institutions were their birthright, of which they were robbed by the Hapsburg family. Even in our times, the generous burst of popular feeling, in the year 1848, was of no avail to the inhabitants of Austria Proper; and nothing is left to them of all the rights which they believed they possessed, but the wretched fabric of provincial Diets, with their boisterous loyalty, and their ready assent to all the impositions of their Imperial Master.

The nations of the Austrian provinces, when once fairly under the yoke of the Hapsburgs, had

* That battle was gained chiefly by the assistance of the Hungarians.

their patent of privileges torn and thrown at their feet; their rights were abolished by Imperial decrees; in other instances, insurrections were fomented and used as a means of oppression. No matter whether factious or loyal, the same fate awaited all. Austria, Styria, Carinthia, Krain, Silesia, and the Tyrol, were in turn the tools and the victims of an uncompromising despotism. The history of Bohemia and the Netherlands furnishes the most striking example of that oppression, its successes and its failures, from the battle on the White Mountain (1620), down to our time. Bohemia has most readily subjected itself to the Austrian yoke; it has never at any time made an attempt to re-conquer its liberty: her sons are fit tools of oppression. The Netherlands broke the yoke of the Spanish and Austrian Hapsburg. Their example was followed by the American colonies, which were depopulated by the Hapsburg Inquisition, and which still look back with disgust and fear upon their brutal attempts at conversion. Even Spain, though afflicted with the Bourbons, has reason to rejoice in the change; for even the simoom of the African desert cannot boast of such destructive powers as belonged to the shadow of the sceptre of the house of Hapsburg.

The liberty of Hungary alone held out for more than three hundred and twenty years; and this period was one uninterrupted contest between tyranny and a spirit of independence—between low cunning and noble firmness—between hypocrisy and honesty.

To enable my readers to judge of the points at issue between Hungary and Austria, I mean to go back to some of the leading features of our national history.

Warlike courage and unbounded love of liberty stand most prominently forward amongst them. The Magyars had scarcely made their first appearance in Europe, when their predatory expeditions filled the neighbouring nations with fear and astonishment. A strange race, unconnected in language and traditions with the other nations —a people of horsemen, numbering three hundred thousand soldiers—they pass through the most extraordinary adventures, and perform incredible feats of arms. In 894, we see their Duke Arpad assisting the Emperor Arnulf against Swatopluk, Prince of Great Moravia; he conquered the Wallachians of the Prince Gelon, in Transylvania; he routed the Petshenegi; and immediately afterwards, in 895, he defeated the Bulgarians, under their prince, Menumorut, and the

Sclavonians, under their prince, Glad. After Prince Swatopluk's death, the Hungarians conquered part of the grand Moravian empire, and commenced a series of fabulous expeditions into Germany, France, and Italy. They conquered Austria, up to the city of Mölk; they ravaged Bavaria; they fought battles at Augsburg (910), and on the banks of the Ems; they defeated the German emperor, Henry I.; they conquered Pannonia, from the right bank of the Danube to the Moare; they invaded Italy; they fought a battle on the Brenta, and twenty thousand Italians remained on the field. Their expeditions were not always attended with success: while they fought Swatopluk, the Petshenegi broke in, and took possession of their homes; but on the return of the Magyars they were partly expelled, and partly enslaved.

In 943, the Hungarians made an attack upon the Byzantine empire; but the edge of their sword was blunted by a rich tribute. In 944, they broke into Carinthia, and were routed. But other Hungarian armies made their way into the Alsace and Lorraine; they sacked the city of Basle, and took away the treasures which the Germanic nations had taken from the Romans. At a later period, they besieged the German towns, Städersburg

and Merseburg. Many of their expeditions were undertaken in a thoughtless and hasty spirit, and consequently they were, in 955, subjected to a total rout on the Lech-field. This did not, however, prevent them from continuing their expeditions against the people of Byzantium and Austria.

The predatory expeditions of the Hungarians ceased with the introduction of Christianity. The Duke Geisa endeavoured to promote the prosperity of his country by the arts of peace and civilisation. His son, King Stephen (1000 after Christ), commenced to constitute the Hungarian state according to the principles of the European law of nations. Still the leading features of our history are wars and leagues with the neighbouring countries; while, at home, an incessant contest raged against the extension of the royal prerogative, which the Hungarians opposed by words and force of arms, until they wrung from Andreas II. (the unfortunate leader of the second crusade) the *Magna Charta Libertatum*.*

After the extinction of the family of Arpad (1301) commenced a period of various reigns; and kings, some of whom were pre-eminent in

* See the Appendix, I.

power, brought Hungary to her culminating point of strength and prosperity.

Charles Robert, of Anjou, improved the administration of home affairs and the resources of the country, while his son, Louis I., incorporated Transylvania, conquered Naples, and refused to accept the Lordship of Rome, which was offered to him. In the north, he carried the Hungarian arms into Lithuania; he grappled with the Khan of Tartary; next he conquered Dalmatia, Moldavia, and Bulgaria, and was elected King of Poland. Under Louis I., Hungary was the most powerful country of Christendom.

The King Matthias Corvinus (1458 to 1490) added to this power the weight and strength of civilization. Imitating the example of his glorious father, the governor, John Hungadi, he fought gallantly and victoriously against the Turks; he defended the dignity and independence of the Hungarian crown against the omnipotence of the Roman Pontiff; he routed the robber hordes of Bohemia. Having thus conquered peace for his country, he raised Hungary to a high state of civilisation. The Library and the University of Buda were the best of the time, and the king's court was the meeting-place of learned men and philosophers. After conquering Frederick, he was

poisoned in the Imperial palace of the Hapsburgs. The people mourned his loss: for they said—"King Matthias died, and justice with him."

The Hungarian cannot forget the greatness of his nation: its recollection saddens his mind the more, from the contrast our national glory presents to the wretchedness of an Austrian colony.

But never, even in the case of this mightiest and most beloved of kings, did the Hungarians submit to a violation of their constitution. The Golden Bill of Andreas II. remained always uncurtailed.

Wladislas II., who succeeded this great king, was so incapable and weak of intellect, that the crown lost its power and influence. The provinces of Rama, Servia, Gallicia, Lodomeria, Bulgaria, and Dalmatia having been lost by mismanagement; the Estates of the country, assembled in Parliament, on the Rakos field (23rd July, 1505), resolved as follows:—

"If our present Lord and King, Wladislas, who not only left us in our rights and liberties, but who also renewed and extended them, were to depart this life without leaving male issue, we all, from the highest to the lowest, agree and decree,

that from this time forward, to all times to come, whenever the Hungarian throne shall be orphaned, and without a male person who should be legally entitled to the succession, we will not elect any foreign prince, no matter of what people or tongue such prince may be, but that we will always make an election on the Rákos field, and elect a Hungarian who is fit and proper for the throne, and will appoint him to be King and Lord of Hungary."

This Resolution was confirmed by an oath. They enacted that any man who should propose a foreign prince to the Hungarian throne, should be guilty of treason, and condemned to perpetual servitude, even so that neither the Parliament nor the elected king should have it in their power to show him grace. The bill was assented to and signed by ten prelates, thirty-five magnates and high dignitaries, and one hundred and twenty-five representatives of the fifty-two counties, while the members for the Szeklers and Transylvanian Saxons received it with loud cheers and shouts of defiance against the enemies of the kingdom. Copies of the bill were impressed with the seal of the *Judex Curiæ*, and sent to all parts of the country.

No Resolution of the Hungarian Parliament was

ever enacted in so solemn, impressive, and unanimous a manner.

Wladislas' son, Louis II., died in the battle of Mohats, (29th August, 1526); he left no issue, and the Hungarian throne was vacant. Under these circumstances, it was fortunate that Suleiman was prevented from following up his victory. A few days after the battle, he was informed of an insurrection in Natolia. He repaired to that province with the whole of his army, without occupying or garrisoning any of the Hungarian cities. His departure left the Hungarians at liberty to provide for the occupation of the vacant throne.

For this purpose, the estates of the country assembled on the 5th of November, at Stuhlweissenburg. Maria, the Queen Dowager, and sister to the Roman king, Ferdinand of Hapsburg, sent agents to the Parliament, and Sigismund of Poland was represented by an ambassador. The election came off on the 11th of November. Ferdinand's pretensions to the throne were defeated, and the Woyewode of Transylvania, John Zapolya, the mightiest man in Hungary, was elected, and crowned with the crown of St. Stephen. The news of this event was at once forwarded to the kings of Poland and France.

Ferdinand, thus defeated, assembled his party at Pressburg. It consisted chiefly of the families of the Queen Dowager, and of some Hungarian magnates, who had been bribed by Austrian money. Ferdinand of Hapsburg was by them requested to sign the act of coronation; and having done this, they proclaimed him King of Hungary.

On the 19th of January, 1527, Ferdinand addressed a proclamation (in the German language) to the inhabitants of Hungary. This document, which breathes the spirit of the traditional Vienna policy, sets forth :—

"Let no man believe that we desire, by the fear and the troubles of war, to exact obedience and loyalty. We, as it behoves a good, pious, and Christian king to do, intend not to enter upon our government in Hungary without the goodwill and the love of our liege subjects. But we mean earnestly and mightily to move our hands, so that Belgrade and the other border fortresses be freed from the enemy; and that, protected against Mahometan usurpers and spoilers, you may peacefully and tranquilly enjoy your rights and liberties. And we exhort you to be most surely convinced that we mean to use the noble, and for the Christian commonwealth, highly deserving,

Hungarian Nation, and your language, after our best powers and affordings; and that the Prelates, Counts, Barons, Knights, and other Nobles, whatever their names or denominations may be, and the free Cities, and all other Estates of the Hungarian kingdom, shall be upheld in all and any of their Liberties, Privileges, Lordships, Laws, Rights, and Properties; and that they shall find protection in them as aforesaid; and likewise that we will not employ the services of any Foreigners, in administering the affairs of Hungary; nor shall any Benefices, Offices, and Escheats be given to the said Foreigners, so that you shall never have cause to fear any Danger in your Possessions, Properties, Rights, and Persons. But from out of our great love and affection for you, we advise you earnestly to be intent on providing all various kinds of provisions; in return for which, we mean to instruct and recommend our Captains and men-at-arms, whom we intend speedily to send to Hungary, and to the frontiers, against the Turks and Disturbers of peace within the Hungarian kingdom, that they shall not harm you in your properties, but shall obtain their supplies in consideration of moderate payment," etc., etc.

The Estates of the country, assembled in

Parliament at Buda, replied on the 24th of March:—

"That they could not understand by what Right or by whose Advice the Emperor Ferdinand dared to call himself the King, and addressed them as his Subjects. That he (the Emperor) had been disgracefully deceived by some Hungarians, who, though once the Replicants' friends and brethren, had since become their enemies; and who, forgetful of their honor, their duty, and their country, were now leading the life of vagrants in and around Pressburg. That they would never consent to accept and recognise Ferdinand as their king, inasmuch as it was John who was their king, whom they had elected and crowned. Nor should fate, chance, and misfortune, ever separate them from their rightful Sovereign. And further, that his (Ferdinand's) appeal to his pretended hereditary right was vain; that the Hungarian kingdom, Free, Tributary to no one, Subject to no foreign prince, could not be obtained by marriage, nor could any of their crowned kings, in contempt of their public liberties, promise to grant the same in hereditary succession to living man; not to mention the immutable law which excluded

foreign princes from the throne. They therefore exhorted and entreated him that he should, for the future, eschew the title of a 'King of Hungary;' that he should not call them his subjects, nor presume to arrogate to himself any jurisdiction within their territories. But if he wished to live in amity with John, their king, and league with him against the arch-enemy of Christendom, they would gladly hope that His Most Gracious Majesty, John, King of Hungary, would be willing and prepared for all friendly services."

The war of succession between the rival kings continued for thirteen years, and ended scarcely with Zápolya's death; for, even after this event, it was partially continued by his son and his widow, until the dispute was at length settled by a treaty. The house of Austria was recognised by the nation, when this recognition was the only means to save Hungary from ruin; for it was the contest with Austria which opened a door to the Turkish invasions. The Turks conquered almost the whole of the kingdom: they established themselves at Buda, and advanced to the walls of Vienna.

I cannot, in these pages, pretend to give a

detailed account of the fate of Hungary under the House of Austria. My purpose is, to give a general view of the ways and means of government of the Hapsburg dynasty, as shown by the history of the last three hundred years.

My former general remarks on the aversion of all the Hapsburgs to civil liberty, receive a special corroboration by the history of Hungary in this period. In the case of Hungary, too, there were a variety of circumstances which did not exist in the case of the German hereditary possessions of the House of Hapsburg, and which contributed, to a great extent, to make the Hungarians impatient of the yoke of Austria. Ferdinand I. was most unmindful of his promises. So unconscientiously did he neglect the administration of Hungary, that, nine years after his coronation, the Estates of Hungary, assembled in Parliament at Pressburg, found it necessary to draw up a long list of their grievances. This remonstrance (1535) sets forth that the king's absence from the country is the prime cause of all the evils they complain of. Hence the irruptions of the Turks,—hence the atrocious cruelties practised by petty tyrants within the confines of the country. Hence, too, the insufferable extortions of the king's foreign Captains, who, instead of

protecting the country, drained it to ruin, and betrayed it into the hands of its enemies.

For three hundred years, this Austrian system remained faithful to its original evil principles. And though, at intervals—for such there were, though few and far between—a more legal and enlightened administration seemed to prevail; still the cabinet of Vienna returned to its fatal endeavours to oppress and colonize Hungary.

The kings of the time, before the advent of the Hapsburg race, had for two centuries battled against the Turks, gallantly and often victoriously; and though, under the reign of the two last kings of this period, the power of Hungary seemed to decline, and though various provinces seceded from the kingdom: still the great territories of Hungary, Croatia, and Transylvania remained intact, and the House of Hapsburg, upon their advent, obtained a free and uncurtailed possession of a great and beautiful empire.

But scarcely had Ferdinand I. received the crown of Hungary for himself and his family, when he, and his descendants after him, neglected the country and the sacred duties of their office. They all pledged their words to reside in Hungary for a part of the year, but not one of them remained true to his word. Whenever the

Hungarian nation expressed their wishes in this respect, they received evasive answers, based on the most futile pretences: the command of the Hungarian troops was given to foreigners, to the signal detriment of the native generals, who were better versed in the ways and means of warfare against the Turks than the Austrian officers could be. When the House of Austria was a suitor for the Hungarian crown, great stress was laid on its hereditary power and the Imperial dignity of its members, as giving a promise of an efficient protection against the Turks. But their reign in Hungary was a direct contradiction of their promises. Large provinces were left to the Turks. For one hundred and forty-five years did the Crescent rule over more than one-half of the country. The chiefs of the malcontents in 1667 were fully justified in protesting, that—

"It was an open question, which was worse—Turkish or Austrian sovereignty. The Black Sea and the Adriatic were at one time the confines of the kingdom of Hungary. Ever since the advent of the first Hapsburgs our power has decreased, and our frontiers receded; one hundred and forty years have sufficed to make Hungary a narrow strip of land, near the Carpathians and the Styrian Mountains. The Danube, the Theiss, the Drave,

and the Save, flow for the benefit of the Turks; three-fourths of Hungary, viz. the provinces of Transylvania, Croatia, Sclavonia, Dalmatia, Servia, and Bosnia, are tributaries to them, if not subjects. It is better to make a voluntary surrender to the Porte, and to have liberty of conscience, such as Transylvania enjoys."

The successful encroachments of the Turks were chiefly owing to the want of skill of the foreign generals; to the venality of the foreign commanders in our fortresses; to the cowardice of foreign hirelings; to the dilatory measures of the Vienna Hof Kriegsrath, and to treaties of peace which were concluded without the advice and consent of the Hungarian Parliaments. When the country was reconquered, the Hungarians took the post of danger in all battles and assaults. They monopolized the danger and the victory. The Estates of the country were lavish in their votes of money (large though the king's income was), and no less than 100,000,000 of florins were granted as "special subsidies" in the period from 1683 to 1706. Still, when, in 1699, the peace of Karlowitz was concluded, no reference was made to the Palatine or the Estates of the country. In that treaty of peace King Leopold is spoken of as "His *Imperial* Majesty,"

and any allusion to his *Royal* dignity is carefully avoided. This is but one trait among a hundred.

The Hungarian nation has never known more hateful enemies than the German generals and their men-at-arms, who oppressed and ill-used us, who drained our coffers, and who threatened to destroy our national liberty. The most conspicuous among these foreign tyrants were Heister, Caraffa, Cob, and Strasoldo. Often, though vainly, did the Parliaments insist on the immediate removal of the foreign mercenaries; and frequently, though to no purpose, did they appeal to the fundamental statutes and treaties. Every remonstrance was defeated by a Vienna promise. At times a partial improvement took place, especially in seasons of danger for the Hapsburg family; but when the danger was over, the old rule of oppression commenced afresh. Such being the case, it is but natural that the Vienna cabinet should at all times have been eager to prevent the meeting of Parliaments, or to maim their influence by the vilest intrigues, by corruption, and intimidation.

To such lengths were these malpractices carried, that the notorious Parliament of Neusohl (1667) met, under the presidency of two foreigners,

Rothal and Heister, although Francis Vesselényi, the Palatine, was present. The members entered a protest, and dissolved the meeting. Still the politicians of Vienna could not help being aware of the fact, that the Estates take their oath of allegiance *only* under the condition that the king shall respect and obey the laws.

Under Ferdinand II., Rudolf, and Leopold, these evils had reached the worst stage. In the reign of Ferdinand, religious persecution was added to the list of Hungarian grievances. The principles of the Reformation were readily received throughout Hungary, but the Hapsburg princes sought to extirpate them with the stake and the sword. The nation had not, therefore, any other resource but the dangerous means of armed resistance—an expedient which the *bulla aurea* legalises in the case of every individual Hungarian. The just indignation of an outraged, and all but despairing people, led to the fearful civil wars under the leadership of Boczkay, Bethlen, and the two Rákotzys.

The root of these wars was the same in every instance. The sufferings of the Hungarians of the last two centuries were what they are in this time of ours. Formerly, and in these latter days, the fundamental laws of Hungary were attacked;

their rights and privileges were annihilated; the offices, emoluments, and honors of the kingdom were given to foreigners; the natives who resolved to leave the country were robbed of their properties; those who remained were doomed to hopeless poverty and slavery. But the causes of the insurrections, though essentially the same in all cases, assumed a more threatening aspect in every instance, until, under Leopold I., the plans of the Vienna cabinet were avowed to tend to "an extirpation of the Magyar race," as it is clearly shown by the measures and proclamations of the adventurer and Austrian Chancellor, Hocher. But neither he, nor Caraffa and Heister, nor, indeed, any one of the numerous hirelings of the same stamp, succeeded in accomplishing the task through which the Messrs. Bach and Haynau are at this moment blundering. On the contrary, good sense and justice were in every instance found to triumph over the evil passions of the Hapsburg faction; and so signal were our victories, that almost all our insurrections had a peaceable termination. Amnesties, indemnifications, and, in many instances, solemn treaties of peace, under the guarantee of foreign powers, were wrung out of the reluctant grasp of the Austrian. Such, for instance, were the treaties of Linz,

Vienna, Nikolsburg, and Szatmar. In the latter instance (1711), and in spite of the advantages which he had obtained over the malcontents, it was the Emperor Joseph who made the first move towards a reconciliation. But so often had the confidence of the Hungarians been grossly abused, that they would not, and could not, listen to any propositions, until their execution was guaranteed, not only by England and Holland (whose mediation had in former instances been accepted by the king), but also by Sweden, Poland, and the Venetian Republic. And in the terms of the treaty of peace, the Insurgents are recognised as the "*Federal Estates of the Hungarian Empire.*"

The brutal phrase, "*There is no treating with Rebels,*" is a new invention of the Austrian officers, which they were careful to apply in such cases only in which they were sure of their success; for in the case of Komorn, that principle was not put in requisition. As for its expediency, the future will show its merits on that score.

I have repeatedly said, and I say it again, that the principles of the Austrian Government, in its relations to Hungary, remained the same from the first to the last. The constitution was not respected. It was violated to the largest extent

of possibility. The position of Hungary, between Austria and Turkey, prevented our throwing off the yoke of our oppressors, but it likewise prevented them from going the whole length of their intentions. The present rulers of great, united, and mighty Austria, cannot therefore pretend to originality in their plans: they are but clumsy imitators of former felons; and the only singular feature in their character and behaviour is, their utter want even of a pretence of equity and political reason, their blindness to the signs of the times, and their antiquarian leanings, which prompt them to store their stock of maxims with the leavings of the Crusades and the grand Migration.

But it is just possible that Prince Schwarzenberg and his friends—for all that their thoughts are deep, and their calculations nice—might be as grievously mistaken as Lobkowitz, Martinitz, Gonzaga, Nostiz, and Rothal, their betters, were before them. The sapient gentlemen of the Emperor Leopold's time, flattered themselves that the defeat of the malcontents at Györke (1672) had broken the national spirit of the Hungarians. They, too, thought that the time had come to unroot the last remains of the Hungarian constitution, to abolish the dignity of the Palatine, and

to do away with the control of the Estates. They, too, believed that they had it in their power to make the king's pleasure the law of the land; to place persons, rights, and properties at his mercy; to instal a foreigner as the king's lieutenant, and to give all dignities and offices into the hands of foreigners. A letter which Martinitz wrote the king's lieutenant, Szelepcseny, might any day be claimed by either Schwarzenberg or Haynau:—

"The duty of the magnates and nobles," writes Martinitz, "ought to be subjection; that of the people, servitude. It is, therefore, a high crime and misdemeanor to inquire into the legality or illegality of the measures which it pleases the king to take in the country which has been reduced by the just force of arms. You ought not to contradict—you ought not to oppose the will of the just, fortunate, and glorious victor. Curious and impertinent inquiries into the alleged limits of the royal power, are hateful in the eyes of kings. The chiefs of the insurrection are at rest(!); others are fugitives; the fortresses are in the hands of faithful troops; the king is surrounded by a large army, and the Turks * have their hands full

* Schwarzenberg or Martinitz, writing in 1849 or 1850, would say, "the *Cabinets*."

at home. There is no resisting the Emperor's will," etc. etc.

I need not say more, to prove the illiberal and despotic spirit of the Hapsburg race. Every page of their history bears witness to what I have advanced. But their perseverance, at all times and under all circumstances, in this system, is only to be equalled by the sturdiness of Hungarian patience, and the credulity which induced that nation, at the smallest seeming concessions of the Vienna cabinet, to follow the bent of their natural loyalty, to forget the most revolting ill-treatment, and to believe in new promises in the very face of their repeated and flagrant violation.

This national weakness is now being atoned for by the greatest sufferings. Fate, which is just to those who are just to themselves, has twice of late years offered an opportunity for the Hungarian nation to regain their original liberty and independence, and, after so many trials and so much dearly-bought experience, to constitute themselves as an organised and civilised state.

The first of these opportunities offered in 1741. After her father's death, Maria Theresa was a prey to the attacks of her German and

Spanish relatives, each of whom pretended he had a right to the inheritance of the Hapsburgs. One half of Europe was leagued against her. King Augustus of Poland, her sole ally, left her to her fate. The principal pretender to the crown, the Elector Charles Albrecht, took, in 1741, possession of Upper Austria. At Linz he received the oaths of allegiance of the Estates of Austria *ob der Enns*. From Linz he proceeded to Prague, where he was crowned as King of Bohemia, and finally he was elected to the Imperial throne of the Holy Roman Empire. Frederic II. of Prussia was in possession of Silesia and of part of Moravia. Spain prepared to invade the Austrian dominions, and the French troops had already advanced to the centre of the empire.

The Queen, with her young child in her arms, appeared before the Estates of Hungary, who were then in Parliament assembled at Pressburg. She came as a fugitive and a suppliant. And the Estates of Hungary forgot all the insults, perjuries, and oppressions of centuries. Their enthusiasm (which was worthy of them as cavaliers, though derogatory to their political understanding) carried them to the length of their promising, "*Vitam et sanguinem*." They re-

mained true to their word, bad though the example was which the Hapsburgs had given them in this respect. Preparations on the largest scale were made within an incredibly short space of time, and but a few months afterwards, the Hungarian armies were at Prague: they conquered Bohemia and Austria, and, as if mounted on the very steeds which in early ages bore their ancestors into Bavaria, they conquered Munich and all the pretender's hereditary domains: and Charles Albrecht, Elector, King of Bohemia, and Chief of the Holy Roman Empire, was, by the agency of the Hungarians, literally speaking, a prince *de Sans-Avoir*.

Maria Theresa and her family were saved, but the Hungarians had lost an opportunity of acquiring their liberty and independence.

Verily they have had their reward! Maria Theresa was indeed compelled, by the better feelings of her heart, to eschew any open and bold-faced oppression of her liberators; but her intrigues, and her silent and restless aversion against the constitution, proved more ruinous than an open warfare would have been. Imitating the example of all her predecessors, she could not, on any consideration, be induced to a periodical residence in Hungary. But two Parliaments were convoked in a reign of

almost forty years; no palatine was appointed; the Protestants were persecuted or wheedled over; and, as a last means, recourse was had to fomenting an insurrection in Croatia. Gentle, but most effectual, measures were taken to suppress the nationality, and to disarm the opposition, of the Hungarians. The magnates of the country were drawn to Vienna, and induced to discard their country's language and all the attributes of their nationality. The new zeal, the vast political influence, and the great wealth of these converts to *Austrianism*, told with a fearful effect upon the moral and the national virtues of their countrymen.

Her son Joseph (the unprotected infant of 1741) showed his gratitude in still stronger features. He refused to be crowned as King of Hungary. He seized the crown by main force, and took it to Vienna. He declared that the Hungarian constitution was abolished. He introduced the German language into the administration of the country. He did this more ruthlessly, and with much greater severity, than the nation employed, when, fifty years later, they enforced the legitimate rights of the Magyar language. His intentions were possibly good, but he lacked experience. He caused the greatest

confusion in all branches of the administration. His cynical philanthropy attacked all the established forms and modes of life—all time-honored institutions and vested interests. And when, at length, he found himself face to face with insuperable difficulties, he, just before his death, disowned and revoked all his measures, not, indeed, from a feeling of right and justice, but from despair, and fear of the French Revolution, and of the consequences of his lawless conduct.

When Leopold II. seized the reins of government, he showed some leanings towards liberty and tolerance. The Hungarians began to hope for a bright future. They believed that this Hapsburg, at least, was a not a true son of his fathers. But the king died in the second year of his reign, before his acts could prove the sincerity of his alleged intentions.

Francis, his son, marked his advent to the throne with deeds of blood. Those among the Hungarians who were pupils of the liberal theories of modern France, and who, with the knowledge and express consent of Leopold, had sought to popularise them, but who wanted the power as well as the will to attack and overthrow the throne, were arrested, tried by a secret tribunal, summarily convicted of some unknown

crime, and executed. A crowd of witnesses and victims speak to the character of the forty-three years' government of Francis and of his "*Hof-* und *Staats-Kanzlei.*" Never did fate contrive a more fatal conjunction than by coupling the heartless and illiberal Francis with the heartless and illiberal Metternich. The miscreant Caraffa, of former days, said, "If one of his pulses beat for the Hungarians, he would cut it out and burn it." Francis and Metternich were worthy of Caraffa. Their unyielding absolutism predominated over the lesser and diverging features of their characters, and bound them together; while Metternich, as the incorporation of the Hapsburg policy, outlived his master's reign, and continued in office, as a disagreeable but necessary part of the machinery. But enough! History has already pressed her stigma on their foreheads, and branded their memory with everlasting shame.*

In all his proclamations Francis addressed our nation as the "*percara gens Hungara.*" Indefatigable as he was in his attacks upon popular liberties and institutions, his necessities did not, at the same time, permit of his dispensing with the assistance of Hungary, and his attacks upon

* Vide Appendix II.

that country were therefore cunningly tempered to the times. When Napoleon's armies threatened his throne, he became a zealous advocate of Parliaments. From 1802 to 1812 he convoked the Estates of Hungary not less than six times. But when his treason had wrought the overthrow of the hero who had spared him in the hour of his weakness—when the danger was over—when his throne was supported by the foreshadowings of Russian bayonets, he convoked not a single Parliament during a term of thirteen years. Nay, more! in 1823, he attempted by force to subvert the Hungarian constitution.*

Under his reign fate again stretched forth a helping hand to show the Hungarians out of the dungeon-keep of their Austrian oppressors. Napoleon, the victor of Wagram, and the conqueror of one-half of Austria (1809), summoned the Hungarians to secede from the House of Hapsburg, and to elect a king on the Rákos field, as their fathers did before them. But the unrequited loyalty of the Hungarians declined to profit by the opportunity thus held out to them. They stood by the house of Hapsburg, and by so doing they worked their own ruin, and endan-

* Vide Appendix III.

gered the liberty of Europe. For Austria was, and ever will be, the fiercest antagonist of all liberty, no matter where it is to be found, and what its forms are.

It requires but a very moderate degree of political sagacity to imagine the consequences of an inverse line of action to that which the Hungarians really did take. If, following Napoleon's bidding, they had conferred their crown on the Viceroy of Italy, or some of the French Emperor's Generals, they would by this step alone have caused the dissolution of that heterogeneous and unnatural mass of countries and nationalities which is generally known by the name of "Austria." They would have overthrown a dynasty, which from time immemorial has been the stronghold of absolutism, and by so doing they would have protected the infancy of constitutional liberty on the Continent. The secession of Hungary and its crown-lands, and of Gallicia, and the incorporation of part of the German provinces with Bavaria, would have reduced Austria to the level of a power of the second rank. Her voice would have been silent among the nations. The liberty and independence of Hungary would have led to the liberty of Poland, and an enthusiastic army of 100,000 Hungarian auxiliaries, with their splendid

horse,* and with the large Hungarian stores of grain in the rear, would have prevented the retreat from Russia, and if not, they would have at least turned that retreat in a safe and advantageous direction. Two mighty kingdoms would have formed a barrier against Russian encroachments upon the affairs and interests of the west,—liberated Italy would have bridged the space between Hungary and France, and the aspect of Europe would be much more satisfactory than it now is, with its general state of siege.

Hungary left undone what she ought to have done, and our present sufferings were in a great measure brought upon us by our own agency. But it is to be hoped that the period of repentance and atonement will be followed by a brighter and happier time.

* Instead of the 30,000 Austrians, who, after all, manœuvred rather *for* than against the Russians.

II.

The crumbling edifice of time-worn absolutism has of late years shown evident symptoms of its approaching downfall. The restlessness and the convulsive movements of the nations, could no longer, by any degree of human impertinence, be interpreted as "the intrigues of a few malcontents." Francis and his chancellor felt that something must be done to prop the crumbling edifice. Armies were created—armies unequalled in numbers, *esprit de corps*, and blind devotion to the principles of legitimacy. An army of another kind was put on a war-footing—a dark-robed legion of civil functionaries, whom egotism and interest bound to the system which oppressed them, and which they were called upon to defend. An absolutistic

propaganda was formed, under the ubiquitous protection of Austrian influence, and by means of Austrian money, to the signal detriment of her public funds. Prince Metternich drove the affairs twice into the gulf of a bankruptcy; and Francis, while he sighed and groaned about "the injuries of the Exchequer," amassed an incredible sum of money as his own private property. When he died, he left his ill-gotten wealth to his family—to the ruined nation he bequeathed the purer gift of his *love*.*

Another, though a more dangerous means, was found in the motto of tyranny: *Divide et impera!* The various nationalities, which for many centuries had lived in peace, were excited by diabolical arts; and secretly at first, but afterwards openly, they were hurried into the excesses of the jealousies and animosities of race. The peculiarities of the Emperor Ferdinand's mental condition gave the whole power of the state into the hands of Prince Metternich, who strained every nerve to uphold the old system, at least to the end of his days. Hungary was a stumbling-block in his path. Curtailed though their constitutional rights were, the Estates were still

* "Populis meis *amorem* meum." Will of Francis II.

powerful enough to oppose an arbitrary direct taxation. In the later times especially, all demands of supplies on the part of the crown were met with counter demands for a statement of the income and expenditure of the last years. The Austrian Government could not and would not comply with such requests! In return, the system of indirectly taxing the Hungarian countries in favor of the German provinces, was carried to an extent and enforced with a severity which threatened to destroy the first fair promise of our commerce and industry. None of our remonstrances, none of our complaints, were heeded.

Prince Metternich's Government was chiefly annoyed by the opposition of the Hungarian counties and Parliaments. He made frantic efforts to undermine these bulwarks of constitutional liberty. I grieve to say that venal Hungarian writers were found, who, in so-called *liberal* publications, were induced to attack our ancient county institutions (the most efficient bulwark against arbitrary government) with all the rancour of pettifogging dialectics. Their success was not equal to their zeal, and their very declamations directed the attention of the Estates to the impending danger. All the energies of the true patriots were henceforward directed to a measure

which they had long advocated, but in which they had uniformly been foiled by the intrigues of the Vienna Cabinet, viz.: to the liberation of the peasantry from feudal burdens; to the legal equality of all; and the right of every citizen to acquire and to hold landed property.

In the Parliament of 1847, before the outbreak of the great European Revolution, the Hungarian peasantry were emancipated and relieved from all *urbarial* burdens. This grand, just, and voluntary measure strengthened the nation to such an extent, that, although overpowered in the last war, they fell with greatness and glory. The future will show the justness of the example, which stands unparalleled in the history of class-legislation.

In the contest which preceded the final consummation of the justice which the nation did to itself, the Austrian absolutistic rulers were reinforced by the party of the "Old Conservatives"—by that faction which, at this moment, invokes Austrian absolutism to run the full length of its tether in Hungary, provided always that the great luminaries of Vienna will please "to place them (the Old Conservatives) at the lately so disgracefully mismanaged helm of the state."

After the Revolution of March, 1848, it was but

natural that the Hungarians should endeavour to obtain possession of their rights, which had never become extinct, inasmuch as they were sworn to by every one of their kings. *Hungary acquired no new rights in March* 1848; *she re-obtained possession of her ancient and hereditary rights and liberties.* The Revolution of March, 1848, established the legal and rightful constitution of Hungary, even under the house of Habsburg. The country was entitled to an administration of its own. If it had not, up to that time, enjoyed such an administration, it was not because the Hungarians had either lost or relinquished their rights; it was because the princes of the house of Habsburg were perjured.*

Hungary, now standing on the foundation of her old right, had the means to proceed in the path of justice and civilisation, and to heal the wounds which the oppression of three hundred years had inflicted. The means of domestic prosperity and power abroad were within her reach, while the Austrian cabinet stood trembling on the brink of ruin.

A third and most terrible bankruptcy was at hand. The public debt exceeded two thousand millions. The public resources were exhausted.

* See Appendix IV.

Hungary was independent. She might be expected to ask for financial statements, and to audit the Government accounts. What had become of the millions of secret-service money which had gone into the coffers of Francis and Metternich? The gentlemen of Vienna, though by no means deficient in generous boldness, recoiled from the confession, that of the enormous contributions of the past years, not one penny had been employed for the benefit of Hungary. That country had at all times defrayed the expenses of its own administration; it had always made a liberal and even splendid allowance for the royal house, and paid its quantum for the maintenance of the army. But that country had also uniformly and energetically protested against paper-currencies, loans, and speculations in the stocks; and nothing was more certain than that it would protest against any attempt to burden it with the liability of the state debt. Nor was it to be expected that Hungary would for the future admit of a one-sided, partial, and extortionate tariff. Our country could not allow its industry to be sacrificed to the interests of the Austrian market.

The Hungarian regiments had taken their oaths to the constitution. For the future they were not to cross the frontiers of the country, unless it

were at the command of their own Parliament. They could not henceforward be employed to enforce absolutistic intrigues and doctrines, or to serve as places of refuge for the Austrian squirearchy.

Such prospects were terrible, indeed! They all but maddened the Vienna ministerial faction, and reduced it to resort to Metternich's most dangerous means—not for averting, but for *delaying* their doom. Nation was to be armed against nation—race against race. The vilest means were used to promote so vile an end, and the very monarch was wheedled into actions which the criminal codes of all countries mention under the head of "*felony*." * But, as a blind to the nations at home and abroad, Dr. Bach, the Minister—the Iscariot of his former party—took the field with a pamphlet, in which he proved, very much to his own satisfaction, that the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary had no right whatever to place the Hungarian nation in the *bonâ fide* possession of what had always belonged to them *de jure* only. Dr. Bach's ingenious publication failed, however, to command that interest in Hungary which, according to the opinion of its learned author, it undoubtedly deserved.

* See Appendix V.

The Hungarian Ministers displayed meanwhile an almost fabulous energy and activity. They set the new wheels of Government into proper working order; they dug down to the pavement of the modern stables of Augias, and they unsealed the locked-up fountains of our blessed country. The people vied with them in patriotism and perseverance. But their devotion was an abomination in the eyes of the Vienna courtiers and informers; and the nations which Hungary sheltered under her wings were infuriated and unleashed against her. The Razen were the first who broke out in an open rebellion against the liberal measures of the Government. The Croatians, and, at a later period, the Germans and Wallachians (of Transylvania), followed their example.

The Servians, or *Razen*, inhabit the Hungarian counties on the Lower Danube, the eastern parts of Sclavonia, and some districts of the Croatian borders. They are descendants of the Slowak nation, which, separated by the intersecting branches of Magyars, Romänen, and Germans, from the bulk of their race in the north, people part of the Thrakian peninsula, and the countries between the Danube, the Save, and the Adriatic. They amount to the number of 800,000, and profess the tenets of the Greek Independents. By

far the greater part of the Razen were, in the seventeenth century, invited over from Servia and Turkey, and promises of rights and privileges were made to them.

The hardy and warlike population which was thus gained for the eastern frontiers, was intended to serve the double purpose of checking the Turks on the one side, and the Hungarians on the other. Ignorant, brutalised, and fanatic, the Servians are a blind instrument in the hands of their High-Priest, the Archbishop of Carlowitz. The election of this functionary depends on the votes of seventy-five electors—viz. of twenty-five military, twenty-five civil officers, and twenty-five members of the clergy. The Austrian commissioner who superintends the election, has, in reality, the power to appoint the Archbishop, whose installation is dependent upon the royal sanction, who takes his oath of allegiance at Vienna, and who receives his secret instructions from the cabinet.

With such institutions it is but natural that, in every contest between Hungary and Austria, the Razen should unconditionally side with tyranny, that they should turn their weapons against their friends, instead of joining with us against their own enemies and ours. In the wars under

Tököly and Rakoczi, their *raids* into the Hungarian counties were unequalled in atrocities. Ever since that time they have had the name of *Vad-Rátz*, or *Savage Razen*. The persecutions which, as a due reward for their services, they suffered at the hands of Austria—Maria Theresa's fanatical attempts to force them over to Romanism—and the manifold oppressions which they were compelled to bear in the last century—induced many of them to emigrate into Russia, where they met with a most hospitable reception. Those who remained in the old country remained exposed to the most vexatious attempts to convert and annex them, and they had by degrees lost even the last remnant of their national privileges. Their sympathies at this juncture turned towards Russia, their kindred country in religion and language. In the commencement of the present century, they made several attempts to regain their liberties; but their risings were dispersed, and their leaders died on the scaffold. Under these circumstances, the more intelligent part of the Razen population became at length convinced of the necessity of an alliance with the Magyars, for the purpose of obtaining the liberty of either race. The more educated among them were, during the last twenty years, almost all of them

members of the Hungarian opposition against the measures and principles of the Austrian Government. Our Parliamentary opposition was at all times a strenuous advocate of the Servian nationality and religion; and in March, 1848, when the opposition carried its most liberal constitution, and when that constitution was sanctioned by the king, it afforded the safest guarantee against the oppression and persecution of the Servian people. By virtue of the new constitution, the peasant of Servia, like the peasant of Hungary, was raised to the rank of a *freeman* and citizen of the state. A voluntary surrender of land and property was made to him. His national existence was guaranteed by a free and independent municipal constitution. The Servian soldiers on the frontier were, according to the despotic regulations of the frontier service, incapable of holding landed, or any other immovable property: they were ill-treated and whipped by the Austrian officers. The new constitution raised them from the lowest depths of misery: the Hungarians received them as friends and brethren, for the character of the Hungarians was at all times a stranger to national animosity and religious intolerance. The Servians were by no means blind to the advantages

of their new institutions. They received them with exultation. The colors of Hungary and Servia fluttered from all steeples. The Servian towns sent deputations to the Parliament to offer their thanks and congratulations. Nothing was wanting but a complete and satisfactory understanding respecting the language to be used in official transactions. At this juncture, the Court of Vienna became alive to the danger which threatened it from a union of the two liberal nationalities. A plan was made for their division. Sclavonian and Austrian agents (the former impelled by a mistaken panslavistic zeal, while the latter were the contemptible hirelings of the *Camarilla*) were sent to the provinces to blast the first fair promise of liberty and union. The Austrian Government bribed the Archbishop Rajachich, and other venal members of the Servian aristocracy, and the people were made to believe that the late liberal measures of the Hungarians were intended to annihilate the Servian nationality and religion.

Untruths like these were advocated by the clergy and promulgated from the pulpits: they soon took root among a fanatic and credulous people. Rajachich summoned the chiefs of his nation to a meeting at Carlowitz, to consider their

grievances and to draw up a remonstrance. The speakers in this assembly expressed themselves in so hostile a sense against Hungary; their demands were so unjust and unreasonable; that we became at once convinced that the language we heard was but foisted on the Servian people, and that it in reality belonged to double-faced and double-dealing Austria. These misnamed "demands of the Servian people" were forwarded to Pesth, when the Government refused to enter upon the merits of the question, on the plea that territorial demands were mixed up with those which related to religious and national affairs. The Government committed a grievous fault. Instead of negotiating with the misguided Razen, instead of explaining the true state of the case, they prevented the possibility of coming to an understanding, and by these means they opened the door to the worst Austrian intrigues. Bloodshed and devastation took the place of the longed-for political blessings. The commencement of June witnessed the first convulsions of an outbreak, in which the Servians behaved with a savage intensity of vindictiveness, which stands unequalled in the history of modern times.

The principal hearths of the Servian insurrection were the districts of the German and Illyrian

borders in the Banat, the south of the Bats county, the Csaikist districts, and the eastern parts of Sclavonia. From here they assembled in the camp at Carlowitz, near the Roman entrenchments, and at Perlász. Thousands of armed borderers, peasants, and bands of freebooters from Turkish Servia, garrisoned these places in the middle of June. They received their instructions from the Central Committee of the Servian nation, which sat at Carlowitz.

The situation increased in dangers, and since further concessions were not to be thought of, the Government ought to have acted promptly and energetically. Instead, however, of doing what necessity and reason compelled them to do, they concluded an armistice, under the protection of which the insurgents managed to recruit their forces and fortify their camps and entrenchments. Only at the expiration of the last armistice, and when the last attempt at a mediation had failed, the Government commenced to take some more serious measures. Troops were concentrated and sent to the Lower Theiss, under the command of Field-Marshal Lieutenant Bechtold. The appointment of this man to the command in the Bats county is the first in a series of mistakes and erroneous measures. Bechtold, Œttinger,

and Szeth, the officers who were entrusted with the fate of the country and the army, were *traitors* at the time; and at a later period, when they openly espoused the Austrian cause, their hate and scorn of the Hungarians exceeded even that of our bitterest enemies. Officers of this stamp were not calculated to promote the success of our arms, or the organisation of our military forces.

The major part of the Hungarian troops was at this time fighting the Austrian battles in Italy. It was therefore necessary to raise fresh forces for the defence of the country, and ten battalions of volunteers were formed, of whom the commanders were appointed by the king, the officers by the Palatine, Archduke Stephen. Their commissions were countersigned by the Hungarian War-office. These troops were called Honvéds or "Defenders of Home," and with the battalions of the line and the regiments of hussars, they formed at a later period the nucleus of the great Hungarian army.

The war, meanwhile, increased in extent. The Hungarian troops fought bravely, and did many brilliant feats of arms, but their operations remained most unsuccessful.

General Kiss, who commanded our troops in the Banat, fought several battles and gained several

victories. But General Piret, his Commander-in-chief, prevented him from following up his success, by ordering him not to pursue the fugitive Servians and to confine himself to the occupation of the Hungarian territories, lest his advance should lead to greater difficulties. Kiss obeyed; the Government was deceived, and sanctioned Piret's measures, who never failed after every combat to send in an humble and hypocritical report to the gentlemen of the War-office.

Bechtold's traitorous intrigues in the Bats county, were, if possible, still more gross of design and awkward in their execution. The forces at his disposal were well-trained and numerous. The Razen who opposed him were his inferiors in numbers and discipline. He had it in his power to drive them across the Danube and to compel them to submission. But he evacuated all the places on the *Franzen's* Canal which were likely to be fortified. The Razen came thus into possession of Sz. Tamás, Turia, Földvár, and other strong positions along the Roman entrenchments.

When they had at length completed their fortifications, and when the country became justly indignant with the inactivity of the army in the Bats, General Bechtold concentrated his troops

(July), and made a pretence of an attack upon Sz. Tamás. He led his battalions within range of the enemy's artillery. He stopped them. He had some men killed and wounded. He withdrew his troops from the fire, and fell back upon his head-quarters at O-Becse. For a term of four weeks he rested on his laurels. At the end of that time he repeated the same demonstration, with more noise and preparation, but with exactly the same success. At the end of August, General Bechtold had cause to believe that his mission was over. The Servians and Jellachich had gained time: the Hungarians had lost it. He left the army, proceeded to Vienna, made his appearance at court, and in recognition of his signal services, the Austrian cabinet appointed him to the command of Linz.

The plans of the Austrian Camarilla were so black, so disgraceful, so revolting, that the mere suspicion of them would have degraded the Hungarian Government. For, by the express command of the Vienna Cabinet, M. Mayerhofer, the Austrian Consul at Belgrade, who pretended to act on his own responsibility, enlisted auxiliaries for the Razen; he (still acting on his own responsibility) sent them artillery and ammunition, gave them his advice, and assured them of the Emperor's

delight in their proceedings. On the other hand, (for the case was not yet ripe for an *open* game,) the Austrian War-office sent for troops from Gallicia, Austria, and Bohemia; these troops were marched off to assist the Hungarians against the traitorous plans of Jellachich and the Servian rebels, and proclamations were addressed to them, exhorting them to devotion and perseverance. The Austrian official journals declaimed against the Servian bandits. Austrian horse, foot, and artillery, under Austrian officers, exterminated the insurgent Razen; while these wretched victims of an unconscientious policy were at the same time exhorted (and by Austrian generals, too,) to persevere and to wait for the time of revenge. Austrian officers in disguise led them into battle; Austrian money paid for their stores; Austrian arsenals furnished their weapons. Thousands fell on either side. Soldiers and subjects were alike sacrificed to the yearning love of the *paternal Government*. Towns and villages were burnt; provinces were laid waste; whole populations were beggared. But the mild and gentle spirit of our sovereigns pursued its ruthless career: murder, rapine, and incendiarism, were grateful, so they were but expedient.

'A variety of measures were invented in the family circle at Innsbruck, and executed with true jesuitical perseverance; and these measures imposed upon the men who held the fates of Hungary in their hands. They were sidled into mistakes. Instead of confronting treason, instead of unmasking it, they lent it new strength and courage by their optimism, by their good-natured confidence and irresolute conduct.

General Bechtold's place in the Bats country was taken by General Eder, who continued his predecessor's system of drawing a *cordon* round the Servian entrenchments. Nor did he attempt to attack their forces at Sz. Tamás until a month after the second attack, and even then it was only from compulsion. Meszaros came from Pesth to enforce the assault. But General Eder resigned his command. He was followed, in the first instance, by General Bakonyi, and, in the second, by Count Esterhazi; and though Kiss and Vetter gained some brilliant victories over the Razen in the Banat, the leaders in the Bats county remained obstinately addicted to the system of a passive warfare. It continued until we were compelled to withdraw our troops from that province.

The Servian insurrection was intended to try

the temper and the leanings of our military establishment. Aided by the treason and the incapacity of our generals, it was likewise intended to occupy the attention and paralyse the forces of our army. In the mean time, Jellachich was to concentrate an army behind the Drave, to break into and invade Hungary as soon as the state of affairs in Italy warranted a bold and open measure.

The Austrian generals in the Banat and the Bats county, where our Government met with such a blindness of confidence, had done their best to give the Ban Jellachich time to complete his preparations.

On the 9th of September, 1848, Jellachich crossed the Drave at Zegrad, at the head of an army of 40,000 men. Part of them were borderers, part were vagabonds. But they were all well armed and appointed. They were reinforced by six divisions of Austrian regulars, which had been sent for from Styria. They had plenty of artillery and ammunition.

Jellachich, with a corps of 15,000 men, advanced by way of Gross Kanisa and Lengyeltóti, along the southern shores of the Platten Lake, to Siotok. Another corps, under General Hartman, marched by Iháros, Berény, and Kaposvár, and joined the Ban's troops at Enying. Rapine and

ruin marked their path—although Jellachich published a proclamation in which he asserted that he was a friend of the Hungarians, and that he entered their country solely because he wished to chastise the demagogues of Pesth.

A third corps of 10,000 men assembled under the command of General Rott in Sclavonia. They were intended to act as reserve, and to follow the *gros* of the army by way of Siklos, Fünfkirchen, and Stuhl Weissenburg.

The forces which the Hungarians had to oppose to this army amounted, in the beginning of September, to no more than 5000 disciplined troops, with a few thousand raw levies. These troops were under the command of General Œttinger; but when that officer left our ranks in the moment of danger, and deserted to Jellachich, they were handed over to the guidance of General Teleki, who was equally weak and a traitor. Reinforcements were marching up from all parts of the country, and, unwilling to engage in a battle before their arrival, our small army retreated to Weissenburg, where they increased to the strength of from 12,000 to 15,000 men. The Archduke Palatine took the lead of the army only to abandon our camp in the heat of the crisis. General Moga, who succeeded to

the command, retreated from Weissenburg to the strong position of Velemcze. A battle was fought on the 29th of September, and Jellachich was defeated. He asked for an armistice, which, when granted, he did not employ for the purpose of negotiating a peace. He broke his treaty and his word, and, leaving his rear-guard behind, and sacrificing Rott's reserve corps, he fled in the midst of night from Weissenburg to Raab, and transferred his line of operations to the highway of Vienna.

The start which he obtained by his breach of the armistice, and by his flank march, prevented the Magyar army from effectually hunting on his track. When our horse, advancing in forced marches, came up with his fugitive rear-guard near Pressburg, they found themselves cut off from the pursuit; for Jellachich and his robber hordes were already in safety in the Austro-German territories, across the Laytha. His reserves, under the Generals Rott and Filipovitz, had meanwhile entered the country from the south-east, where they found themselves isolated and surrounded on all sides by the masses of the general levy. In consequence of the manœuvre of the *gros* of the Croatian army, they (12,000 men and 12 field-pieces) were compelled to surrender to Görgey and Perczel. The rear-guard

which Jellachich left at Weissenburg to cover his retreat, shared the fate of the reserves. Sundry Croatian divisions on the Danube were likewise captured. Previous to his escape into the Austrian provinces, Jellachich sent his "landsturm" back to their own country. He was disgusted with troops which were eager to eat and plunder, and averse to fighting. Six thousand of them were marched back by way of Güns and Styria, and the great Croato-Sclavonian invading army was thus reduced to the modest number of 18,000 wayworn troops, whom Jellachich placed at the disposal of Prince Windischgrätz, who was then preparing to reconquer Vienna.

Never did any expedition come to so wretched an end as the invasion of the great Ban of Croatia, who had boasted that, on such and such a day, he would enter Buda and dislodge the Parliament.

Great events had meanwhile taken place at Pesth and Vienna. These events proved that Jellachich's invasion was not his own plan, that he was not isolated in its execution; but that it formed part of a scheme for the subjection and suppression of Hungary. Official letters from Baron Latour, the Austrian Secretary-at-War, to the commanders of fortresses and divisions of

the army in Hungary and Transylvania, were intercepted by our troops; their contents placed the plans of the conspirators beyond all doubt. On a certain day the fortresses were to hoist the Austrian colors; they were to proclaim the state of siege in the neighbouring cities and districts; they were to oppose the orders of the Hungarian Government, and receive their commands from the Austrian War-Office. Jellachich was to invade Hungary from Warasdin; Rott, from Sclavonia. Colonel Mayerhofer was to take the lead of the Servians in the Bats and Banat, and, acting in concert with the commanders of the fortresses of Arad and Temeshvar, he was to subjugate the counties on the Lower Danube. Puchner was to march in from Transylvania; General Simunich was to bring his troops from Gallicia; the Servians, Ruthens, Slowaks, Wallachs, and Saxons, were to be armed against the Hungarians and those that stood on their side. And if all these forces were unsuccessful in their attempts to overthrow the ancient kingdom of Hungary, a large army of Bohemian, Polish, and Austrian troops was to be concentrated on the March and the Laytha.

The Vienna Revolution of October, the defeat of Jellachich, the refusal of the commanders of

Komorn and Peterwarasdin to hoist the Austrian colors, prevented for a time the execution of these treasonable plans, by compelling the court and its satellites to bestow the honor of their immediate attention upon Vienna.

The Hungarians ought to have assisted the Viennese. If not in their duty, it was clearly in their interest. Our army approached the frontier for that very purpose. At that time we had it in our power to attack and defeat the Austrians, before they had collected their troops round Vienna, and before they could succeed in reducing that city. But the Committee of Defence consisted of civilians who were equally ignorant of military operations and of the detail of Austrian affairs. They delayed the attack almost to the fall of Vienna.

At this point of my narration I find it necessary to recur to some events which happened at an earlier date.

The reactionary party had finally dropped its mask on the 4th of September. In a proclamation which was devoid of the ministerial countersignature, and which was addressed to "My dear Baron Jellachich," the Emperor Ferdinand expressed a solemn, and doubtlessly sincere, recantation of his manifesto of the 10th of June.

He commended the devotion and loyalty of the man whom he had branded with the name of traitor, and whom he had deposed from all his dignities. The farce which had lately been enacting at Innspruck was thus fully and shamelessly thrust into the broad light of day.

A rupture between Hungary and the Emperor seemed now almost inevitable. Still, the Parliament was loth to leave any one means untried which might, by any possibility, prevent the outbreak of a general civil war. A deputation to His Majesty was sent, on the 8th of September, to Schönbrunn. It met with a cold reception, and received an evasive answer. The return of the deputation, and their report, were not likely to conciliate the good-will of the Parliament. The cabinet resigned, to the signal delight of the Court party, and the Palatine came immediately forward and declared that he himself was resolved to reign until the new cabinet had been confirmed by the king.* Kossuth saw the danger; he protested against the Palatine's measures, because they wanted the counter-signature of a minister; and he declared that the country

* The names of the proposed Ministers were: Baron Vay, Ghierzy, Count Erdödy, Szentkiralyi, Baron Kemeny, Baron Eötvös, and Meszaros. The king refused to confirm them.

ought not to be without a government, that the Palatine alone could not be considered as a legal power, and that consequently he intended to remain in office. Kossuth and Szemere were consequently instructed provisionally to discharge the business of the nation.

A last attempt at reconciliation was made about the end of September. A second deputation was sent to Vienna, and, in this instance, to the Austrian Constituent Assembly. It was expected that the representatives of the two nations, acting on, and through the force of public opinion, would put a stop to the disgraceful intrigues of the Camarilla. But those who expected such a result forgot one important item in their calculations, viz., the jealousy and blindness of the Bohemian faction of the Vienna Assembly. The Bohemian members, swayed by panslavistic tendencies, and opposed to an alliance between the Austrians and the Magyars, caused the Assembly to shut their doors against the Hungarian deputation. The University and the popular party of Vienna, who took our side, offered to assist the Magyar deputies by organising a "Sturm petition," that is to say, they offered to escort them in large armed masses, and by physical terrorism to enforce obedience to their wishes. But the

Hungarian deputies could not be induced to avail themselves of these illegal means. They returned to Pesth.

Later events have proved that a "Sturm-petition" sufficiently large in its plan, and energetic in its execution, would have sufficed, without bloodshed, to suppress the intrigues of the Court and of the panslavistic faction.

The next step was, the disgraceful farce in which the Palatine was the chief actor. I have already alluded to his short-lived command, to his promises to stand by and defend the Hungarian cause, to his sham negotiations with Jellachich, and to his cowardly flight.

Another mine was sprung. A royal decree, though in an unconstitutional form, appointed Count Lamberg to the post of Commander-in-chief of the Hungarian army. Another decree instructed him to dissolve the Parliament.

At this juncture the Hungarian Parliament published the first Remonstrance, in which the King's measures are opposed, and declared to be illegal. The Remonstrance to which I allude is, the *Parliament's Address to the Nation*, in which, in the name of the Law and the Constitution, Count Lamberg is prohibited from taking the command of the army.

A fearful excitement prevailed in Pesth, and Lamberg fell a victim to a paroxysm of popular fury.

On the following day, Kossuth moved, and the Parliament voted, an address to the King, expressing the grief which the representatives of the Hungarian nation felt on the subject, and the manner of Count Lamberg's death. They protested that such fearful events are the consequences of neglect of the law in high places, and they entreated the King to oppose the illegalities which were being committed in his name.

The authorities at Pesth were at the same time instructed to inquire into the particulars of the crime, and to arrest the assassins.

But before this event took place, the six deputies of the Transylvanian Saxons had disappeared from Pesth: their departure was owing to the secret intrigues of the Vienna Cabinet, which seemed to be bent upon going any length to widen the breach between the dynasty and the country.

Preparations for war were set on foot on a large scale, and with eminent success; many members of the Parliament hastened to join the military forces of the nation, and auxiliaries from Styria and Vienna arrived at Pesth.

Jellachich was defeated on the 30th of September. On that very day, the Count Eugene Zichy was arrested, tried by court-martial, and hanged on the island of Csepel. Görgey signed his death-warrant, and commanded his execution. The Count Zichy was convicted of having acted in concert with Jellachich, and of having conspired with the Vienna reactionary faction.

The events which took place in Vienna, in September and October, must likewise be brought before my readers; for it is an indisputable fact, that the civil war in Hungary might have been prevented by a series of energetic and circumspect measures at Vienna.

The conduct of the Austrian Court in the affairs of Hungary, convinced the Viennese of the faithlessness of their government. Count Latour, the Secretary at War, had already repeatedly attempted to improvisate an attack upon the University and the Academic Legion. The publication of his treasonable correspondence with Jellachich, and the impertinence of his explanations in the Assembly, left no doubt as to his character and intentions. On the 6th of October, the populace of Vienna opposed the march of part of the garrison, which the minister intended to send to the rescue of the Ban of

Croatia. The Count Latour was assassinated. The Emperor fled. The populace defeated the troops, and stormed the arsenal. The Constituent Assembly declared itself to be sitting "*en permanence;*" and issued instructions to the directors of the railroads, prohibiting them from transporting troops on their lines. But nobody ever thought of seeing the prohibition enforced, or of destroying part of the rails, and, consequently, large masses of troops, under the command of Prince Windischgrätz, were soon found to have arrived by rail. The Assembly published likewise a proclamation to the people of Austria, extolling the insurrection of the 6th of October as one of the most glorious events in the history of Austria. An address was also sent to the Emperor, exhorting him to return to his faithful subjects, and declaring that his refusal to do so must necessarily lead to civil war.

Measures like these placed the Constituent Assembly on a level with the insurgents. Having thus sanctioned the Revolution, that Assembly ought to have acted in the spirit of its public declaration. But they did nothing of the kind.

General Auersperg, the Commander of the city of Vienna, withdrew, on the 8th, all the remaining troops from the town, and placed

them in a threatening attitude on the *glacis*. At a later period he retreated to the Belvedere Villa, where, without heeding the protests of the Constituent Assembly, he took up a strong position under the protection of ten batteries.

If but *one* energetic and enterprising man had taken the lead of the Vienna Revolution, he would have dislodged General Auersperg from this position. The General gave, indeed, the kindest and most conciliating answers to all questions and remonstrances. But the ultimate end of his position spoke for itself. The Vienna National Guards and the armed populace were six times stronger than the Belvedere troops; they had it in their power, within twenty-four hours, to double this number, by enrolling the militia and the country levies. They had the artillery of the National Guards, and the guns which they took from the soldiers; and so pugnacious were the Viennese, that the greatest exertions were required to keep them from attacking the military. If averse to bloodshed, the Constituent Assembly had it in their power to surround General Auersperg's troops, and starve them into submission. The people leant in that direction, and many members of the Assembly urged the propriety of these measures;

but the Bohemian deputies, who were already instructed by the agents of the Camarilla, opposed any measures that might have ended the crisis.

Almost at the same time the President and the Committee were informed of the arrival at Schwendorf of Jellachich with an armed band of Croatians, and of the victory of the Hungarians. The Academic Legion and part of the national guards asked for permission to attack the new comers. But in this instance too the Bohemians succeeded in preventing a measure which would have tended to defeat what they flattered themselves were *their* plans, and instead of despatching an armed force, they sent Mr. Prato, a member of the assembly, to open negotiations with Jellachich. Mr. Prato found the heroic Ban in a wretched plight, surrounded by about 2000 Croats in rags, who bivouacked and slept in the fields. The poor fellows had made a fabulous march in the course of seven days and nights. They were utterly worn out, for they, of all the Ban's troops, had managed to keep up with the rapid flight of their chief. The rest of the army arrived in the course of the following days: they were equally exhausted and dispirited. The Ban and his men were in such a state that their capture was certain, if,

instead of Mr. Prato, a few companies of national guards had been sent to bring them to terms. General Auersperg and the Croats were at the mercy of the Viennese, who might have despatched some troops of guards and students to meet and invite the Hungarian army to come to Vienna. In that case, nothing was more easy than to defeat and capture the troops of Prince Windischgrätz as they arrived in the vicinity of Vienna; and, in conquering these troops, the insurrection would have defeated the last hopes of the Court party.

But the Viennese were inactive, and so were the Hungarians. They gave the hostile corps of Auersperg, Jellachich, and Windischgrätz time to effect a junction; to attract reinforcements from all parts of the country, to blockade the city with a formidable army, and to bombard, assault, and carry the suburbs and city of Vienna.

The Hungarian army was in hot pursuit of the fugitive Croats. When they reached the Austrian frontier, they came to a sudden halt. The Committee of Defence waited for a legal and solemn invitation from the Austrian Constituent Assembly—a measure which the reactionary majority of that assembly refused to take,—the armed and insurgent population of Vienna sighed for the assistance of our troops, but they wanted the

courage to dissolve the assembly. They sighed for the arrival of the Hungarians, and cursed them for their slowness. All and every body wished to keep on the safe side of the law, and, impelled by this laudable desire, they permitted the enemy to outnumber and snare them.

The Hungarian army crossed the Austrian frontier on the 28th of October. They ought to have crossed it on the 18th. They mustered to the strength of 25,000 men, 10,000 of whom were raw levies. The army which they prepared to attack was under the command of the Prince Windischgrätz, and numbered 70,000 men. The Prince, who was aware of the despair and demoralisation of the inhabitants of Vienna, kept the city in check by advancing some small divisions against its walls, while he placed the *gros* of his army under the command of Baron Jellachich, who took up a position at Schwechat, Mannswörth, and Kaisers-Ebersdorf. A battle was fought on the 30th of October, and as no *sortie* was made from Vienna, the day ended (in spite of some brilliant successes at Mannswörth) with the defeat of the Hungarians, who were compelled to retreat to Pressburg.

Neither the Austrian Court at Olmütz, nor Windischgrätz, its representative, were, after this

first victory, inclined to enter into negotiations. Before the battle such negotiations might have been opened with advantage. They would have led to the overthrow of the Court party. As it was, that party claimed nothing short of unconditional and unlimited subjection.

In the commencement of December the Imperialists prepared to invade Hungary. Prince Windischgrätz with the main army advanced on the Upper Danube; General Schlick with a strong corps bore down from Gallicia; General Puchner marched by Grosswardein, and General Nugent advanced on the banks of the Drave against Essek, and the southern counties on the right bank of the Danube. The movements of these various corps were to be supported by the insurrection of the Razen, Wallachs, Saxons, and Slowaks.

The forces at our command were as nothing compared to the masses of our enemies. We had some garrisons in the fortresses. Görgey* and Perczel had 30,000 men on the Upper Danube. In Upper Hungary we had an ill-trained corps of 8000 men, and in Transylvania we could not even dispose of 6000 troops. Our most efficient force

* General Moga, who commanded at Schwechat, resigned after the defeat, and Colonel Görgey was promoted to the command of the army on the Upper Danube.

was still in the Bats country and in the Banat, where they fought against the Razen. These troops, including the blockading corps round Arad, numbered 20,000 men.

This state of affairs made Prince Windischgrätz sure of an easy victory. Hence the overbearing tone of his proclamations; hence the grossness of his conduct in refusing to see the deputation which the Parliament sent to him, and whom he kept as prisoners in his head-quarters. Prince Windischgrätz and his protectors had yet to learn what the real force of a free and enthusiastic nation is.

The Generals Schlick and Puchner commenced their operations in the first days of December. At that time General Schlick marched from Gallicia and advanced by way of Bartfeld and Eperies to Kashaw. General Puchner, supported by the insurgent Wallachs, dislodged our troops from Transylvania, and drove their commander Katona across the frontier towards Nagy Bánya.

The *gros* of the Austrian army entered Hungary from the Upper Danube, on the 16th of December. They broke through our lines, which were spread over too extended a ground, and after several skirmishes at Tirnau and Kasimir, they compelled Görgey to fall back upon Alten-

burg and Raab. Görgey concentrated his army at the latter place, and, having drawn in all his detached corps, he gave the city up to the enemy, and continued his retreat to Buda, where he intended to effect a junction with General Perczel's corps (6000 men) which came up from the Drave. But before the junction could take place, Perczel was engaged at Moor, where Jellachich, with a large force, attacked and defeated his troops. The news of the defeat at Moor, and the rout of Görgey's rearguard at Bábolna, made a deep and discouraging impression, even on the best patriots. The Government and the Parliament were transferred to Debrezin; but before this step was taken, it was thought advisable to send a deputation to the Austrian head-quarters, to offer and to negotiate a peace. Only when this last attempt at a peaceable mediation met with a scornful, contemptuous, and treacherous refusal, the nation woke to despair, and with it to a sense of their dignity. Henceforward it was a duty to persevere and hold out to the last.

Görgey's army arrived on the 31st of December in the vicinity of Buda, where he occupied the road leading to Raab and Stuhl Weissenburg. On the 1st of January, a Council of War assembled at Pesth, under the presidency of

General Vetter, who acted as Secretary at War. A plan for the defence of the country was drawn up and accepted by the assembled Generals. It was resolved to retreat from the two capitals, and from the Banat and the Báts country, up to the Maros and Theresiopel, to concentrate the forces of the nation on the Theiss, and to defend that river against any attacks of the Imperialist armies. Görgey, with 20,000 men, was despatched to Upper Hungary. His march in that direction was intended to deceive Prince Windischgrätz as to the nature of our plans, and to divert his attention from the Theiss.

On the 3rd of January, 1849, our army withdrew from Buda and Pesth. The better half of our troops, under Görgey, marched upon Waitzen; and Perczel, with 10,000 men, proceeded to Szolnok. The Parliament had already left the city of Pesth. Our calculations proved correct. Windischgrätz was deceived by our movements; he directed all his attention to the march of Görgey's troops, and after taking Pesth he sent but a few weak detachments against the Theiss.

On the 4th of January, 1849, our troops under Meszaros were defeated at Kashau. The members of the Government learned this bad news on their journey to Debrezin. They sent me to

take the command of the corps under Meszaros, and I succeeded by the battles at Tarczal, Bodroy-Keresztur, and Tokay (22nd, 23rd, and 31st of January), to put a stop to the advance of the Austrians upon Debrezin, and to cover the seat of the Government.

Our forces were meanwhile concentrating on the other bank of the Theiss. Dépôts, factories, and foundries were established at Debrezin and Grosswardein. The new levies were enrolled in battalions and escadrons, and at the end of January our army was raised to a respectable standard.

Görgey had meanwhile fought his way from Waitzen to Ipolyság, and from that place through the mountain cities and into the Zips county, where he turned round upon Eperies. The defiles of the Braniczko, which he had to pass on that road, were forced by Colonel Guyon. Görgey reached Eperies on the 6th of February, and re-established his communications (interrupted for four weeks) with our troops on the Theiss, and with the Government at Debrezin.

He threatened the Austrian corps under General Schlick, in the rear, while its front was occupied by our first corps, which advanced from Tokay under my command. Under these

circumstances, General Schlick made a hasty retreat from Kashau to Torna and Rima Szombat, in quest of the *gros* of the Austrian army.

On the 10th of February, a junction was effected at Kashau of Görgey's and my own corps, and Dembinski, whom the Government had appointed to the command of all the Hungarian armies, advanced from the Theiss (where he and Perczel had, at the end of January, defeated the Austrians at Czegleg) towards Upper Hungary, intending to lead our troops at Kashau against the Austrians on the Pesth road. Owing to Dembinski's dilatory movements, General Schlick succeeded in skirmishing out of the difficulty, and in re-establishing his communications with the army of Prince Windischgrätz, who was then marching from Pesth upon Gyöngyös.

In the middle of February, the following dispositions had been taken by Dembinski for our manœuvres on the Theiss, and in Upper Hungary:—The third corps, under Vécsey, and afterwards under Damjanitsh, was to leave garrisons on the Maros, at Szegedin, and Theresiopel, and to march up the Theiss to the road between Szolnok and Debrezin. The second corps, which hitherto occupied that road, now occupied Füred

and the fords on the Theiss. The seventh and first corps, under Görgey and Klapka, were to advance on the Pesth road: on the height of Porosslo they were to be joined by the second corps, and to proceed to Gyöngyös. Damjanitsh was to cross the Theiss at Czibakháza: he was to take Szolnok, from whence he was to advance, in forced marches, along the railroad, in order to effect a junction with Dembinski, and to support that general's manœuvres against the *gros* of the Austrian army.

This was the plan of our operations; but Prince Windischgrätz, instead of waiting for its execution, advanced in slow marches by way of Hatvan and Gyöngyös to Erlau.

The two armies met on the 26th of February, at Kápolna. The combat on that day lasted six hours; and though it led to no definite result, still the Hungarians remained in possession of Kapolna and Kail. On the 27th, the fight was renewed, and victory, though obstinately contested, leant, towards nightfall, in favour of the Austrians. The Hungarians fell back upon Kerecsend and Mezökövesd, where, concentrating the whole of our forces, we waited for another attack. Prince Windischgrätz would not risk the chances of another battle. The report of

his questionable victory sufficed, however, to induce the Olmütz Cabinet to launch the New Constitution of the Austrian Empire of the 4th of March, 1849, and by these means (so the Olmütz politicians thought) to annihilate the ancient Constitution of the kingdom of Hungary.

The diffidence shown by Prince Windischgrätz failed to encourage our commander-in-chief, Dembinski. After a bloody rear-guard fight, he retreated to Porosslo, and from thence, on the 2nd and 3rd of March, across the Theiss. Having done this, he yielded to the opinion of the army and its generals, resigned his command, and returned to Debrezin. He was succeeded by General Vetter.

Our third corps, under General Vécsey, had acted more energetically. They had attacked Szolnok, routed the Austrians (Karger's brigade), and captured eight guns.

General Vetter intended to cross the Theiss at Czibakhàza and Szolnok, while he left it to Görgey's corps to occupy the upper Theiss, and eventually to gain the road to Erlau.

The first, second, and third corps were, for this purpose, concentrated at Czibakhàza, where an attempt was made to cross the river. But the badness of the roads induced Vetter to relinquish this plan. After leaving the small rear-guard, to

deceive the enemy as to his movements, he turned the *tête* of his columns, and conducted them back to the Erlau road.

Görgey, who had crossed the Theiss at an earlier period, facilitated the *trajet* of the army at Füred. Vetter, who fell ill, resigned his command to Görgey, as the oldest general after him.

On the 1st of April, the whole of the army stood concentrated between Gyöngyös and Kápolna, and a plan was made to turn and outflank the enemy's strong position at Bag and Aszod.

For this purpose, the corps of Damjanitsh, Klapka, and Aulich advanced, on the 2nd April, to Arokszállás. Görgey's late corps (now under the command of Gáspar), which had been left at Hort, was attacked by Schlick, whom they defeated and pursued to Hatvan.

Jellachich's rear-guard, as they advanced from Isászeg, was, on the 4th of April, engaged and defeated by our first and third corps, under Görgey.

On the 6th, the *gros* of the Austrian army concentrated at Isászeg shared the fate of Jellachich's rear-guard. Their annihilation was certain, if Gáspar had made an energetic advance on the Gödöllö road. As it was, Windischgrätz found himself compelled to retreat to Pesth, where he

concentrated his army on the Rakos field, and waited for the attacks of Görgey.

Our chiefs held a Council of War at Gödöllö. Kossuth attended it. We resolved to operate, not against Pesth, but against the Austrian army, which was then blockading Komorn. But, for the purpose of deceiving the Austrian generals, we left Aulich, with 10,000 men, behind, while the other three corps advanced, in forced marches, to Waitzen and Komorn. On the 9th of April, two of our corps attacked and carried Waitzen. The Austrians were driven back by way of Gran, and their General, Götz, fell on the field of battle.

On the 16th, the army, advancing by Vadkert and Ipolyság, reached the Gran river, at Léva. They crossed it on the 18th. On the 19th, they encountered the enemy at Nagy Sarlo. General Wolgemuth, with 20,000 Austrians, opposed our progress. The combat lasted twelve hours, at the close of which the Austrian army was defeated, flying and partly dispersed.

Our victory at Nagy Sarlo induced General Welden (who had been sent to supersede Prince Windischgrätz in the command of the Austrian troops) to quit the cities of Buda and Pesth, and to resign all thoughts of opposing our approach to Komorn.

Leaving General Henzi with a garrison at

Buda, he evacuated Pesth on the 23rd April, and removed his army to Raab. Part of the troops whom we had routed at Nagy Sarlo, joined the retreating Austrian army by way of Gran, while other remnants of that army made good their way to and sought protection beyond the Waag river. Part of them under Jellachich moved downward to Essek, and an enormous quantity of military stores were floated down the Danube.

Our troops (under General Aulich) entered Pesth on the 24th April.

The successes of Görgey and his army in Central Hungary and on the Danube were equalled by Bem's and Perczel's victories in Transylvania, in the Bats country, and in the Banat.

General Bem, whom the Government appointed in December to the command of the small Hungarian corps which Puchner had expelled from Transylvania, succeeded in organizing and reanimating the courage of this corps. At the end of December he led it from Nagy Bánga back into Transylvania. His operations during the next three months formed the most brilliant episode in the Hungarian war. With an ill-armed and ill-disciplined troop of 10,000 men, he managed, in an incredible short space of time, to reconquer the whole of that province. Though surrounded by a hostile population, he defeated

the superior numbers of Puchner's army, and drove them over the frontier. Nor was it Puchner's corps alone which he compelled to seek a refuge behind the frontier: an army of 15,000 Russian auxiliaries were likewise routed and driven into Wallachia.

General Perczel was equally fortunate. After his return from Dembinski's army, he took the command of the corps at Szegedin. He carried Sz. Támas and the Roman entrenchments, drove the Razen to Titel, and relieved the garrison of Peterwarasdin.

The successes, but above all the late acts,* of the young and unlawful emperor induced the Parliament to proclaim the Independence of Hungary and her Repudiation of the House of Habsburg. The news of this act reached our camp after the battle of Nagy Sarlo. It made a favourable impression on the great majority of the troops.

It was on the 2nd of April that the first division of Görgey's army, retiring from Sz. Peter, entered the gates of Komorn. A brilliant attack which was made upon the Austrian entrenchments on the right bank of the Danube, caused the retreat of the Imperialist army to Raab, and from that place onward to the frontiers of their own country.

* Austrian charter of the 4th March, 1849.

UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA

CHAPTER I.

APRIL.

THE siege of Komorn was raised. The Hungarian army had executed a manœuvre, which stands all but unparalleled in the history of strategical operations. After an uninterrupted retreat of many weeks, and in various directions; after a retreat, which would have had a disheartening and demoralising effect even upon the best disciplined troops, the Hungarian army made a sudden stand, and, turning round upon the enemy, who came up in hot pursuit, they defeated them in every encounter, and compelled them to retrace their steps on the very ground over which they had hurried with the eagerness and the exultation of an all but certain success.

The capital of the Austrian empire stood silent with fear and shame. The press, which delivered its oracles under the inspirations of martial law, had long since proclaimed that the

rebellion was suppressed and the rebels annihilated, and that only a few miserable adventurers consulted their safety by a wild and inordinate flight, pursued by the imprecations and the revenge of the people whom they had enslaved by their terrorism. The victorious arms of Austria had crushed the Revolution! her foot was in the act of extinguishing its last smouldering embers!

After such triumphant language, it was painful in the extreme to admit a series of disasters, and to hide unparalleled defeats under the specious pretence of strategical necessity. But the state of things was so bad that this last miserable expedient was eagerly resorted to. The persevering retreat of the Austrian army was represented as part of a cunning stratagem, which would eventually cause the ruin and destruction of the Hungarian army. The climate of the country and the want of proper means of communication were next adverted to; but the retreat and flight of the Imperialist forces were still represented as a clever manœuvre, which must lead to decisive and brilliant results. The evacuation of Pesth, the retreat across the Danube, and the withdrawal of the Austrian army from Komorn, had already taken place, but still the partizans of Prince Schwarzenberg scorned to admit the possibility of such contingencies, and represented

them as the wild and morbid fancies of the rebellious spirit of the times.

But when the awkward mystification came at length to light, the people of Vienna began to mutter strange things in favour of the approaching Hungarians, whose hereditary martial renown had been firmly re-established, and whose position was such, that though still exposed to the eventualities of a hostile fate, they were at least certain that their *honor* was safe, even amidst the reverses of military success.

The 26th of April was the day on which Komorn was relieved. Such days occur in the life of nations as well as of individuals. They pass by on the swelling tide, which, taken at the flood, leads to glory, and, if neglected, to misery and ruin.

The fate of Hungary, and the fate of the Austrian empire, lay in the hands of General Görgey. If his resolution had been bold, its execution rapid and energetic, he would have ensured the greatest success, and immortalized his name among the chiefs of his heroic country.

But General Görgey, though inimitable in the field of battle, was undecided and wavering in his plans. He allowed days to pass before he could make up his mind as to the purpose of his next operations. On the one side lay Vienna with its profligate court and mercenary army,

trembling at the approach of the avengers, who were to unfetter and turn the tide of popular fury against them. On the other hand lay Buda, with its royal castle, and its historical reminiscences, the centre and the heart of our own beloved Hungary.

An expedition to Vienna required good generalship, confidence in the justice of our cause, and energy in execution. In a political and strategical point of view, Vienna was the most important position; its possession would have maimed the strength of our adversaries, while it would have supplied us with the resources for the continuance and extension of our sacred feud.

The expedition to Buda was something of a military promenade, and the possession of the fortress was of no immediate consequence, for a close watch of a few weeks could not fail to exhaust its provisions, and starve it into submission. Görgey turned away from Vienna, and attacked Buda; with this decision the die was cast, and the favourable moment was gone, never again to return.

His. fatal resolution has repeatedly been branded with the name of treason. This sweeping condemnation is, to the best of my opinion, unsupported by the facts of the case. It is, indeed, true that General Görgey neglected to pay suffi-

cient consideration to the imperative nature of circumstances; unlimited ambition and selfishness were clearly discernible in all his actions; but for all that, there is no reason why his expedition to Buda should have been dictated by sordid motives. The cause of this fatal direction of the campaign may be found in the fact, that Görgey, whom Kossuth intended to place at the head of the war department, was unwilling to leave the army without crowning his merit by the conquest of Buda. He was aware that this feat of arms, grand and heroic, if not in its consequences, at least in the *manner* of its execution, would stamp itself into the hearts of the Hungarian people; that the old traditional glory of Buda would henceforward be his glory, and that the storming of her heights would eventually conduct him nearer to the goal he aimed at. That goal was, probably even then, the dictatorship of Hungary.

After an unprofitable and protracted halt before Komorn, the dispositions for the march were at length issued on the 29th of April. The seventh corps under the command of Colonel Pöltenberg, and consisting of twelve battalions and sixteen escadrons, with forty-eight pieces of artillery, was sent to Raab, to reconnoitre the fugitive Austrian army. Part of the garrison of Komorn, viz., four battalions and two escadrons, with twelve field-pieces, were instructed to advance and dis-

lodge the Imperialists in the island of Shütt. A few detachments were left in the mountain districts and on the banks of the Neutra, but the bulk of the army, viz., the first and third corps, and the division of Colonel Kmetty, were ordered to advance against Buda.

General Görgey was desirous to superintend the siege, or rather the assault of Buda, and General Damjanitsh—Görgey's devoted friend—received instructions provisionally to take the lead of the War Office, to employ the new levies and stores according to the best of his own opinion, and to endeavour, by playing the war department out of Kossuth's grasp, to pave the way for Görgey's future plans. But on the day previous to Damjanitsh's departure for Debrezin, that general was overturned in his carriage, broke his leg, and was unfit for immediate service. Upon this, I was appointed to take the place of Damjanitsh.

I left Komorn for Debrezin on the 29th of April.

CHAPTER II.

MAY.

PESTH — AULICH — GENERAL HENZI — DEBREZIN — THE PARLIAMENT — KOSSUTH'S GOVERNMENT — THE RUSSIAN INTERVENTION — PLAN FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY — THE MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE NATION — A CABINET COUNCIL — SIEGE AND FALL OF BUDA — THE WALLACHIANS IN TRANSYLVANIA — GENERAL KLAPKA RETURNS TO THE ARMY — HE TAKES THE COMMAND OF THE FORTRESS OF KOMORN, AND OF THE TROOPS ON THE RIGHT BANK OF THE DANUBE.

PESTH was filled with joy and exultation. The columns of General Aulich entered the city on the 28th of April, and on my arrival there on the 31st of that month, I found its inhabitants still maddened with joy. Thousands of flags, with the colors of Hungary, waved from the housetops, from the doors and windows. The streets were crowded with a joyous population, and each file of soldiers, each individual hussar and honved, was cheered and covered with flowers.

But on the other bank of the Danube lay, prostrate and oppressed, the city of Buda, sighing under the iron foot of General Henzi. Buda was as a city of the dead: no sound came floating over the waters of the Danube—no sign, either of joy or lamentation, was discernible on its gloomy walls. The fortress lay like a gigantic sarcophagus.

Our army in Pesth was under the command of General Aulich. The banks of the Danube were guarded by outposts. The Hungarians were on the left bank; the Austrians on the right.

Aulich had garrisoned Pesth with one brigade of his troops, and when I arrived he was in the act of leading the rest of his corps to the island of Tshepel, whence he intended to cross the Danube near Ratzkeve and Ercseny, and thus to commence the siege of Buda.

General Aulich stands prominently forward among the men who devoted their splendid military talents to the liberation of Hungary. His far-sighted generalship, his indomitable courage, his presence of mind and perseverance, have roused many of his comrades to emulation, though they were attained but by few. Neither the wearying mechanism of a thirty-six years' service in the Austrian army, nor the toils of a career which he commenced as a private soldier and ended as a lieutenant-colonel, prevailed against his signal talents and his thirst for that knowledge

which is really and truly power. The obstacles which obstructed his path served but to purify his principles, and to impart to his character that firmness and chasteness of form which charmed by its harmony though it might awe by its severity. Qualities like these made him by no means a fit tool in the hands of despotic rulers. He was one of the few whom the revolution of March failed to surprise, because it found them prepared. Aulich welcomed the first faint rays of civil liberty, and for its protection he vowed to hoist even the bloody banner of war. His soldiers adored him, for he shared their dangers and their fatigues: his battles were conquests; his attacks were victories.

As a soldier and a general, he is entitled to the respect of all times; as a man and citizen, he had even stronger claims to affection and esteem. His simplicity, single-mindedness, kindness, and chivalrous honesty were worthy of a better and purer time, and that majestic serenity which was his chief characteristic through life remained untroubled even amidst the horrors of a death which was not a soldier's death, and of which the infamy lies with the doomer, not with the doomed.

In the course of the two days which I passed at Pesth, I had frequent opportunities to watch the preparations which General Henzi, the Austrian

commander of Buda, made for the defence of that fortress. These preparations were carried on with great spirit and energy. The battlements of Buda, which had been neglected ever since the cessation of the Turkish war, were partially restored, and in some places strengthened by double and even triple rows of pallisades; new parapets and batteries were built on the walls of the fortress, and great care was taken to fortify the aqueduct on the banks of the Danube, for the fate of the garrison depended on an uninterrupted supply of water. The sight of these works showed me that Henzi was prepared to hold out to the last; and this impression was still strengthened by the reports I received of large quantities of heavy artillery and military stores, which were collected on the walls of the fortress, and of the strength of the garrison.

A rumour had reached my ears of the dispirited and mutinous temper of the Austrian garrison of Buda. It was said that the troops deserted in large detachments, and that their officers were gloomy and discontented. I was soon convinced that these rumours were devoid of foundation. On the contrary, the garrison of Buda seemed bold and spirited, and their commander was bent upon making an obstinate resistance.

The reason why the Austrians, on their retreat, left a garrison at Buda, is obvious in the extreme.

Their march was too precipitate to allow of their taking away the artillery, and the stores of Buda and Pesth, which for a time had served as their principal depôts; they had, moreover, reason to hope that the glaring bait thus carelessly thrown out, would lure us away from the chief object of our operations. Events have proved the justness of their calculations. Buda attracted, and for a time paralyzed our military forces: we neglected to press on the heels of the flying enemy, to advance into and conquer Austria; and we gave the fugitives time to rally, and to attract the Russian armies, which, in those very days, prepared to cross the frontiers of the Austrian dominions.

Buda ought, indeed, to have been the central point of our operations; and an attempt to take it by a *coup-de-main* would have been advisable, and even praiseworthy. But a closer insight into the preparations and the spirit of its garrison, and the energy of its commander, ought to have excluded any thought of a regular siege, and, most of all, of a siege which was laid with three-fourths of the army and the whole of the cavalry force.

Aulich's corps of ten battalions, nine escadrons, and forty pieces of artillery, reinforced by the division of Colonel Kmetty, would have sufficed, immediately after the retreat of Jellachich, to carry the fortress by an impromptu attack. But

if that attack remained unsuccessful, even Aulich's and Kmetty's corps ought to have withdrawn from the siege, and joined the bulk of the army, to add to the energy and, consequently, to the success of the invasion of Austria. A honvéd brigade, on the right bank of the Danube, and a few battalions at Pesth, would have sufficed to observe the Austrians at Buda, and to confine them to the *rayon* of that fortress.

Before leaving Pesth, I communicated these observations to General Görgey, whose army was just then marching upon Buda. There was still time. Counter-orders might be given, and Hungary might have been saved. But Görgey could not be induced to resign his plan. He protested that he could not think of ordering his troops back, and that the plan being advanced so far in its preparations, might be carried into execution.

I left Pesth on the 2nd of May, and arrived at Debrezin on the 3rd.

The brilliant successes of the Hungarian arms had not, I found, been lost on Debrezin. When I left that city in January, immediately after the arrival there of the Government and the Parliament, I left this improvisated metropolis of the kingdom of Hungary lost in gloom, anxiety, and faintness of heart. Few of its inhabitants believed in a favourable turn of circumstances. But on the day of my arrival in May, I found the Debrezin

people full of confidence and pride. The historical bravery of our troops had prevailed against the invaders, and the old God of Hungary had not wholly withdrawn his hand from his people.

The Parliament, too, which passed the winter months in a drooping state, seemed to have revived in the genial air of spring. Members poured in from all sides. The faint of heart waxed courageous, and the sick became whole. Even the ranks of the Upper House were reinforced by large arrivals from all Hungarian counties, when the news of our late successes was properly understood and fully confirmed. The question whether or not a legislative assembly is equal to the task of conducting, or even of allowing others to conduct, military operations, has by repeated distressing experiences, been finally settled. Generals and legislators are either of them excellent in their generation, but they cannot co-operate. The Hungarian insurrection was indeed peculiar in its nature. To force it down to the standard of a commonplace revolution would be wrong. In its first period, when the treasonable intrigues of Austria were still secretly at work, there can be no doubt but that the continuance of the Parliament was expedient, useful, and even necessary, for its firm and majestic bearing foiled all the attempts of the Austrian courtiers and their underlings, no matter how great their activity and effrontery. The

court of Vienna was aware of this fact. When Count Lamberg fell a victim to the unbridled passions of the populace of Pesth, he carried in his pocket the decree which pronounced the dissolution of the Parliament. But when the rising and the resistance became general; when the Austrian attempts by cunning or by violence to subjugate us, were met by the strength of the whole nation: the existence of a legislative body could but paralyze the military operations and the proceedings of the administration.

But since the Parliament remained assembled, that body ought to have risen in independence, strength, and majesty (especially after the declaration of the repudiation); in such times of unequalled difficulties they ought to have controlled the government; they ought not to have stooped to be the tools of individuals: the Parliament ought to have stood forth as the firm centre of a legalized insurrection. But if they would not do this, why did they prolong the farce of their existence? Why were they made to act as a drag to the movement of the men whose liberty and unrestrained freedom of action alone could enable them to save the country? The members of the Parliament, instead of losing their time with a motley jumble of preambles, clauses, and enactments, ought to have strained every nerve to wake and organise the forces of the nation. A clear and

decisive language ought to have been adopted on the subject of the present condition and future prospects of the country. This was the time to consider and determine the alternatives, to open diplomatic relations, and to inform the governments and nations of Europe of our own good right, and of the perjury of Austria. What reason could we have to hide our intentions? The justice of our cause and the strength of the nation made candour easy, safe, and expedient. If the endeavours of the Parliament had leant in this direction, there can be no doubt but that their influence might have been salutary, even in this second period of the war; especially if they had directed their energies to practical objects, without opposing or impeding the military operations. But if the Parliament could not or would not move in the circle to which I adverted, that assembly ought to have been dissolved, and the dictatorial power given into the hands of the man who enjoyed the fullest confidence of the people.

The members of the Hungarian Government were patriots, men of pure characters and of undoubted honesty. After the Declaration of the Repudiation, Kossuth ordered Szemere to form a Cabinet; and Szemere, who took the office of Secretary of State for Home Affairs, appointed the following gentlemen to the various ministerial departments :—

*

Count Casimir Batthyány; Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Horvath, Bishop of Csanad: Public Worship.

Vukowitsh: Justice.

Csányi: Public Works.

Görgey: War Department.

In spite of the gigantic difficulties which beset the path of the new Government, I found, on my arrival at Debrezin, that public business, excepting the business of the War Office, was discharged with a precision and promptitude which did honor to the members of the new Government, but especially to Louis Kossuth, who was the common centre and vital principle of the Government and the Parliament. During my first interview with Kossuth, I saw that he was far from being satisfied with General Görgey's plan of operations. He expressed his fears lest Buda might resist the attack of our troops, and he protested that the loss of the present favorable time would prove our ruin.

The guidance of the War department was, at this time, in the hands of Mr. Meszáros. He was a man of signal honesty and firmness, who, in March, 1848, had been called to office by the king's own will, and who, ever since that time, remained faithful to the cause which he had then sworn to defend. He was not only an able man, but also possessed of brilliant talents, and in

less disturbed times he would have been a meritorious servant of his country; but, torn from the path of his usual routine, by the extraordinary events of the last year, he wanted circumspection and energy. He could not, as Secretary at War, create an imposing military force; the heterogeneous elements of the army resisted his attempts at fusing them into single and compact masses, and the intrigues of his adversaries escaped his observation. Simple, candid, and honourable as he was, he transferred his own qualities to his colleague and opponent, the Austrian secretary at war, who abused his confidence and deceived him whenever it served his plans to obtain an advantage at the expense of truth and honesty.

Meszáros, who had accepted his office reluctantly, and only in obedience to the king's express command, was unprepared for such disgraceful treatment. Disgusted with his post, he accepted (in December, 1848) the command of the troops which were to oppose the operations of the Austrians under Schlick, who at that time had advanced to Kashau. But his misfortune pursued him even in this command. On the 4th of January, 1849, he was defeated in a battle near Kashau; discomfited, and broken in spirit, he returned to Debrezin, to resume the duties of his office, which, owing to a strange prejudice, was

still left in his hands. He was but too happy to resign the direction of affairs to me; and, promoted to his post of honor, responsibility, and care, I had soon ample opportunities to discover the secret causes which, up to the present, and at a later period, obstructed the progress of events and limited the development of the national forces.

The ambition of some of the chiefs prevented the co-operation of our forces and the concentration of our resources. In many cases the orders of the War Office were disregarded. In others, the generals flatly refused to obey. Bem, though a general of undoubted merit, took the lead among the independent chiefs. He scarcely ever wrote to the War Office, disregarded its instructions, and corresponded only with Kossuth. It was to Kossuth he applied, and from whom he received money and stores. But in the case of Bem there was some excuse for this refractory spirit, for his successes were a splendid justification of his actions; while others, such as Perczel, had no plea whatever to advance in defence of their mutinous behaviour. The army in Upper Hungary was commanded by Dembinski, an old general of tried military capacity, who protested against the commands of the War Office. He declared that he would rather resign his command than submit to have

his well-matured plans interfered with; and as for Görgey, he manœuvred on the Upper Danube in a state of perfect independence from the Government, and even from Kossuth.

Such was the state of things when Meszaros resigned the limited powers of his office into my hands.

In spite of the splendid successes of the Hungarian armies in all parts of the country, the opposing views of the leaders, and the uncertainty of their connexion with the Government, caused me to apprehend the impossibility of employing the strength and resources of the nation to so much purpose as the safety of the country required amidst the fresh dangers which were threatening us on all sides. I communicated my apprehensions to the members of the Government, and induced Kossuth to confirm the following Resolution, which was at once forwarded to the commanders of the various corps and divisions:—

"Debrezin, 20th May, 1849.

"The probability of a Russian invasion, and the considerable reinforcements which have lately poured in to the Austrian armies, make it incumbent upon the Government, with all its powers, to provide for the defence of the country. On the representations of General Klapka, the

Secretary at War, I have therefore resolved as follows:

"The military forces of the nation are to act in concert and co-operate with the combined plan of defence adopted by the Government.

"The arbitrary and fanciful character of operations which some commanders, regardless of the direction of the campaign, have adopted, must be done away with.

"For this purpose, the commanders of forces shall have the general plan of the campaign communicated to them. Each commander will likewise receive his separate instructions, informing him of the part his corps is to take in the operations.

"Immediately after the capture of Buda, or in case of a failure, immediately after the establishment of a blockading corps round that fortress, and the arrangement of the other corps on the Upper Danube, General Görgey will proceed to this place to take the lead in the War Office, for the purpose of establishing the preparations for the defence of the country on a broad and solid foundation.

"The commanders of the various corps have hitherto taken it upon themselves to remove, translocate, appoint, and grant medals and orders to, military officers. For the future, they are bound to appeal to the War Office, and in the

higher grades to the Governor of the country for confirmation. On the field of battle alone shall the commanders be entitled to reward the merits of individuals, according to the best of their opinion.

"This Resolution of the Council of Ministers, and its confirmation by the Governor of the country, shall at once be communicated to the army and the military authorities throughout Hungary.

"KOSSUTH."

It was but natural that the chiefs and leaders of the various corps who had hitherto been all but independent, were by no means favourably impressed with this energetic measure. Perczel, and others, while they recorded their protest against it, declared that the measure tended to invest the Secretary at War with a plenitude of power, and that was calculated to make him a prey to the most dangerous ambition.

Suspicion was thus called into life. Harmony and mutual confidence alone would have saved the existence of our young state; suspicion poisoned its springs of life. The originators and fosterers of this baneful opposition had no idea of the lamentable results to which it tended. Their haughty sturdiness and rash irascibility prepared the way for the events which were soon to crush the independence of our beloved country.

The news of the Russian invasion, vague in the outset and scarcely believed, gained a daily increasing probability. Foreign journals informed us of the resolution of the Cabinet of Vienna; of the secession of Count Stadion, and of the disgraceful intrigues of Dr. Bach and Prince Schwarzenberg.

When in the course of the winter the Austrian press attacked the cabinet on the subject of the Russian invasion of Transylvania, Prince Schwarzenberg and Dr. Bach stooped to protest that General Puchner had acted on his own responsibility when he invoked the Russian assistance for the protection of the Saxon inhabitants of Transylvania. They disavowed that measure, declaring that they had despatched a courier to order the Russian troops out of Transylvania, but that the said courier had been captured by the Hungarian rebels. A promise was given that energetic measures should be taken to induce the Russians to evacuate the province of Transylvania. And in the midst of the calm which these official statements produced, the Austrian ministers concluded the treaty which authorized and even solicited the Russian intervention.

General Bem did not wait for Prince Schwarzenberg's measures. He expelled the Russians and Austrians from Transylvania, to the signal satisfaction of Europe. It was even thought that

after this defeat no attempt at intervention would be made, without causing a general European war.

Those who harboured such hopes were mistaken. On the 1st of May, 1849, the Austrian journals published the following official proclamation :—

"The insurrection in Hungary has within the last months grown to such an extent, and its present aspect exhibits so unmistakably the character of a union of all the forces of the revolutionary party in Europe, that all states are equally interested in assisting the Imperial (*i. e.* Austrian) Government in its contest against this spreading dissolution of all social order. Acting on these important reasons, His Majesty the Emperor's Government has been induced to appeal to the assistance of His Majesty the Czar of all the Russias, who generously and readily granted it to a most satisfactory extent. The measures which have been agreed on by the two sovereigns are now executing."

That is to say,—Russian armies were being concentrated on the frontiers of Gallicia, and in the Danubian Principalities.

The military forces of the Hungarian nation were at that time distributed in the following points:—

Our chief strength lay in the army on the Upper

Danube, which covered the environs of Raab, Buda, and the island of Shütt, and which consisted of five corps.

Round Buda lay the first corps; commander, General Nagy Shandor; ten battalions, ten escadrons, forty guns. Second corps; commander, General Aulich: ten battalions, fifteen escadrons, forty guns. Third corps; commander, General Knezich; nine battalions, fourteen escadrons, forty guns. Colonel Kmetty's division; five battalions, six escadrons, sixteen guns.

The following troops were in and around the city of Raab, in the island of Shütt, and in and around the fortress of Komorn:—

Fourth corps, commanded by Colonel Pöltenberg, and the fifth corps, commanded by General Lenkey. The former consisted of eleven battalions, seventeen escadrons, forty-five guns; and the latter of twelve battalions, four escadrons, eighteen guns. Colonel Horvath's detachment, of two battalions, three escadrons, four guns, was on the banks of the Neutra, and a flying corps of two battalions, one escadron, six guns, commanded by Major Armin Görgey, garrisoned the cities in the Carpathians.

The army on the Upper Danube was under the immediate command of Görgey, and amounted to a total of sixty-one battalions, seventy-two esca-

drons, 209 pieces of artillery, 50,000 men, and 7200 horses.

The rest of the Hungarian armies may be quoted as follows:—

1. The army of the Banat, under the Generals Perczel and Vetshey, and afterwards under Lieutenant-General Vetter. It numbered 30,000 men.

2. Bem's army in Transylvania, 32,000 men.

3. Lieutenant-General Dembinski's corps, at Eperiesh, 12,000 men.

4. Colonel Kazintshy's division, in the Marmorosh, of 6000, and

5. The garrison of Peterwarasdin, of 5000 men.

The joint number of all these corps amounted to a total of 135,000 men, with 400 pieces of artillery.

Founderies and factories of guns, swords, gunpowder, and saltpetre; commissions for the preparation, selection and purchase of regimentals, military stores, and horses, were partly forming in various provinces, while in others they were actively and zealously endeavouring to supply the wants and increase the efficiency of the troops. But the Government found its principal support in the *people* of Hungary, whose devotion and enthusiasm made them ready, at the first sum-

mons, to rally round the standard of their country by hundreds of thousands.

Such was our condition when the news of the arrival at Krakau of the first Russian columns reached us. Our enemies—viz., the Russians, Austrians, and (thanks to Austrian intrigue!) the Wallachians, Razen, Croats, and Saxons—took the field, with not less than 300,000 men.

It appears from official quotations, that the forces of our enemies were divided as follows:—

The Russians in Hungary, 90,000 men; Russians in Transylvania, 60,000 men; the Austrian army at Presburg, commanded by General Welden, and afterwards by General Haynau, 60,000 men; the Austrian army, under General Nugent, on the banks of the Drave and the Styrian frontier, 12,000 men; the Croatian army, under Baron Jellachich, at Esseg, Ruma, and Concurreny, 25,000 men; the Austrian army, under General Puchner, in Transylvania and Wallachia, 15,000 men; a Servian corps, 15,000 men; a Wallachian corps, 20,000 men; the garrisons of Esseg, Temeshvar, and Karlsburg, 10,000 men, making a total of 307,000 men—that is to say, twice the number of our own troops. The Hungarian nation was devoted to certain ruin, unless it put forth the whole of its strength, developed all its resources, to an all but fabulous degree of providential courage and perseverance.

The Hungarian people were prepared to co-operate with the Government. All ranks, all classes of society, joined in the endeavour to uphold and preserve the national honor. But the energies of a nation, when once roused by the force or favour of circumstances, ought to be employed with energy and confidence in the success of the cause which they are to serve, lest the excitement wear away with inactivity, and lest factious reflection may breed dissensions, where unity of will and singleness of purpose are the only possible salvation. Even in spite of Görgey's unfortunate expedition against Buda, the safety of Komorn, and the re-conquest of the country between the Theiss and the Danube, would still have availed to make us masters of our fortune, if the Parliament and the Government had made a free and judicious use of the immense resources which our generous and incomparable people placed at their disposal, with all the recklessness of enthusiastic devotion.

When I entered upon the duties of my office, I soon found that neither the Parliament nor the Government had any clear idea of the whole extent of the impending danger, and that they were far from agreeing as to the means by which that danger was to be obviated.

Some there were, who, with a fatal excess of

confidence, despised the power of our adversaries; while others, the victims of a blind panic, went about counting the heads and bayonets of our antagonists, and despairing of the fortunes of war even before they had tried them. The former passed the time in alternate fits of exultation and indifference, while the latter bemoaned their fate with an unmanly resignation. A few only took a moderate and rational view of our military position. They were aware that no choice was left us but to capitulate with Austria, or to make war even to the knife.

Any negociations with Austria were as little likely to lead to a favourable result as those of the Prætoria party in Poland.* Relying on her Russian auxiliaries, Austria would have refused to accede to either an armistice or a peace, for in either case she would have been compelled to acknowledge the rights of the Hungarian nation. She would have been prevented from enslaving and draining Hungary, and yet both the subjugation and the spoils of Hungary were indispensable to the Schwarzenberg cabinet, sinking, as it was and is, in the quagmire of a vicious administration, and a misappropriation of the public funds and resources. The loyal and conciliatory spirit of the Magyars made them open

* In 1831.

to any reasonable and honourable transaction, especially before the foray of the Croatian borderers, and when no blood had as yet been shed. But Austria feared, and not without reason, lest her various provinces and nationalities, encouraged by the example of Hungary, should endeavour to shake off the hated yoke of Viennese supremacy, thereby overthrowing the proud dream of Austrian greatness and unity. Hence she sought, by most disgraceful intrigues, to confuse the natural simplicity of affairs. Hence it was that acts of loyal self-defence were branded with the name of "Revolution"—that deceitful assurances and promises were employed to excite and goad the various nationalities to madness, and that, when all their diabolical acts had been foiled by the bravery and devotion of the Hungarian nation, the Russian Czar was appealed to, to consummate the work of falsehood and destruction.

Dr. Bach, the Austrian minister for Home Affairs, who long envied the rights and privileges of the Hungarian nation, which he attacked (though unsuccessfully) in one of his memorials, would not allow the favourable opportunity to escape him. Russia offers 150,000 men, and, "if need be, another army of the same number, for the subjugation of Hungary. The expenses of the war shall be defrayed by the conquered." Such were the calculations of Schwarzenberg and

of the other members of the court and cabinet. "Why, indeed," said they, "should we offer to purchase, when we have the power to take all we want? And even if the rebels were to prevail against the power of Russia, we can rely on the cabinets of Berlin, Dresden, Munich, and Paris. The idea of a *soi-disant free* people is incompatible with the patriarchal government, and with the dignity of Austria."

Such were the sentiments of the Vienna cabinet. They left us no choice between war and negotiations. Besides, there could be no question of negotiating and treating, so long as Kossuth had the power of the state in his hands. To negotiate was to compel him to resign, to cause the Parliament to condemn him and his cabinet, to form a Committee of Management from among the adherents of the Habsburg dynasty, or to appoint Görgey to the post of a dictator. But who had the power, or who indeed had the will to do all or any of these things? A deputation, which, in January, 1849, had been sent to the Austrian camp, had experienced so humiliating a treatment, that we were not likely to find any volunteers for the diplomatic service, even among our most devoted patriots.

As for an "unconditional surrender" it was not to be thought of at a moment when our enemy was conquered, prostrate, and retreating

on all sides, before the advancing battalions of our brave troops.

Nothing was consequently left us, except a "combat à outrance," and our chances in that contest were great. We were, moreover, justified in expecting that the nations and governments of Western Europe would not stand by and see a brave and gallant people, and one which had given such unmistakable proofs of constancy, perseverance, and ability of self-government, hunted down and crushed by the superior numbers of its oppressors.

The hostile army of 300,000 men should have been met by an equal number of Magyar troops; in the cities, in the villages, and in the hamlets, the rest of the population ought to and would have opposed them with knives, pitchforks, and hatchets. Thus arrayed, thus united, thus resolved, we were invincible and proof-worn to the blows of fate.

Kossuth, too, held this opinion. Though not a soldier, he possessed a marvellous influence to rouse and bring into action the hidden energies of the masses. He could not, indeed, give them a military organisation, and the result of his administrative measures was not always such as to reflect credit on the latter.

His confidence in our power was great, and his anticipations of victory proportionate. Still he

preached a crusade. Still he proclaimed a period of public prayers, and a general fast. Measures like these were calculated to make the people suspicious of their own power. It struck them that affairs must have come to a sad condition indeed, if salvation could be expected only by Divine dispensation, and the immediate interference of Providence. Success was certain, if, instead of these and other measures, he had called the Hungarian nation to arms, and organised them in the following manner:—

The men, from eighteen to thirty years of age, were to assemble at their various places of rendezvous, there to be enrolled, partly to fill up the deficiencies in the battalions and reserve corps, and partly for the purpose of making new corps. By the energetic execution of this measure, the numbers of the Hungarian army might have been doubled in a few weeks.*

All other able-bodied and spirited men ought to have been organised and prepared, at the very first signal, to attack the enemy. Strong Guerilla bands ought to have been unleashed against the invading armies. Our soil, thus prepared, would have furnished graves to the Russians and Austrians, but no battle-fields. Kossuth, as I have already stated, would have carried this

* After my sally from Komorn (in August) I acted up to this plan, and succeeded, within eight days, in creating no less than five efficient battalions.

plan into execution, if he had been energetically and extensively backed by the men who surrounded him. As for Görgey, he relied on his battalions of tried soldiers. The masses of the people had little value in his eyes.

In a Cabinet Council, held on the 12th of May, the outlines of a plan for the defence of the country were agreed upon.

The leading idea of this plan was to divide the forces of the country in such a manner as to make them equally efficient for the twofold purpose: either by a decisive blow to hurry the war to a speedy close, or to extend its duration, by avoiding a collision with the enemy's troops.

Pursuant to this leading idea, it was resolved to make the fortress of Komorn the *point-d'appui* of an entrenched camp, for a garrison of 30,000 men, and for the purpose of definitively impeding the advance of the main body of the Austrian army. The second and third corps (20,000 men), under General Aulich, were to take a position on the river Neutra, and communicate from thence, to the right with General Dembinski, and to the left with the garrison of Komorn. General Aulich was instructed to reconnoitre the hostile forces on the left bank of the Danube, to cover the mountain cities and districts, and, after ascertaining the enemies' intentions, to effect, by forced marches, a junction

either with the garrison of Komorn or the corps under the command of General Dembinski, and thus to enable one of the two armies to leave the defensive and to make an *offensive* retreat in sight of the enemy. General Dembinski was ordered to keep the mountain defiles in Upper Hungary, with the assistance of General Aulich, to throw the bulk of his army against the Russian corps which advanced from Arva, and, after annihilating it in the narrow valleys of the mountains, to concentrate his forces against the other Russian army which invaded Hungary by way of Dukla. Numerous detachments in the north-eastern counties were for this purpose placed at the disposal of General Dembinski.

But if the Russians were, instead of advancing by Arva, to push the bulk of their army forward on the road of Eperiesh and Pesth, the forces of the Generals Dembinski and Aulich were to be concentrated at Mishkolz; and their line of retreat was, in that case, marked out towards the Theiss, in the direction of Füred.

The blockade of the fortresses of Arad and Temeshvar, and the protection of the Banat and the Bâtsh country, were committed to General Perczel, who, for these purposes, was placed in command of one-half his own corps and of the whole of General Vetshey's corps, while General Bem was instructed to lead his troops, and the

second half of Perczel's corps, against and to carry Titel, and to complete the relief of the garrison of Peterwarasdin, by dislocating the rest of the besieging army on the right bank of the Danube. This done, General Bem was to return, to advance along the banks of the Danube, up the stream, to cross at a convenient place, to hoist the Hungarian colors on the right bank, to effect a junction with Colonel Kmetty's corps, and to communicate with the garrison of Komorn. His line of retreat lay *viâ* Buda, in which direction he was to fall back on the bulk of the Hungarian army, of which he was, in that case, to take the chief command.

After the conquest of Buda, the division of Colonel Kmetty was to advance to the Platten lake, to organize the insurrection of that part of the country, and to join the forces of General Bem.

The reserve corps were to assemble on the banks of the Theiss, where they were to wait for the orders of the War Office.

The command of Transylvania was given to Colonel Czecz, with instructions completely to suppress the Wallachian insurrection, to carry the fortified city of Karlsburg, and to prepare the defence of the defiles of the borders and the mountains.

The Council of Ministers, as well as General

Görgey, expressed their concurrence with the views laid down in this plan, and the necessary dispositions for its execution were immediately dispatched to the various commanders.

General Görgey, with an army of 30,000 men, was at this time still before Buda, without, however, advancing his works to the walls of the fortress. His dispositions aroused the indignation of General Nagy Shandor, who reported on the subject to Kossuth, pointing out the necessity of the presence of a Government Commission at head-quarters, for the purpose of watching and inquiring into the conduct of the Commanding General. Kossuth instructed me to proceed to General Görgey's camp, and to ascertain the real state of affairs.

I arrived before Buda on the 15th of May.

The head-quarters were in a villa on the Schwabenberg. Preparations were making for carrying the fortress by storm. At the commencement of the blockade, General Görgey had addressed the following letter to General Henzi, who was in command of the fortress :—

"General!

"Buda is surrounded by Hungarian troops, who wait but for the signal to attack the fortress with that energy which a desperate war of self-defence alone can give to each individual soldier.

Your post at Buda is a forlorn position. Accept, therefore, the offer which my feelings induce me to make to you. Capitulate! My conditions are the following: Your officers and men are to be my prisoners of war; the officers shall retain their swords and baggage, but the soldiers must surrender their arms and accoutrements. My authority in the Hungarian army; the subordination which I enforce with an iron hand; my own personal honor, which no one, not even Austria, has to this day dared to impugn, (as the successes of the 'rebel hordes' may perhaps have proved to you) will serve you as guarantees for these conditions. Raab, Stuhl-Weissenburg, Komorn, Neutra, Hansabègh, the mountain cities, and the banks of the Waag, are in our hands.

"Buda is closely blockaded. Buda is not a real fortress, and you, General, have most inexplicably been selected by the Austrians for the performance of a Don Quixote trick, even the tragic end of which can hardly preserve you from ridicule.

"But if these considerations cannot move you, I trust you will relent when you consider that you are an Hungarian, that you owe a heavy debt to your country, and that I offer you an opportunity of liquidating that debt. If, after mature consideration, you still persist in your purpose to defend the so-called fortress of Buda to the last, I cannot guarantee your safety and the safety of

your troops against the passionate excesses of my victorious troops. But if, neglectful of all warnings, you were to carry your defence to the length of destroying the suspension-bridge and of bombarding the City of Pesth, from whence, according to the terms of the convention, no attack is meditated against you—if, I say, you make yourself guilty of a course of action which I am justified in stigmatising as disgraceful, I give you my word of honor that, Buda once taken, the whole of its garrison shall be put to the sword, and that I will not, in that case, be answerable for the safety even of your own family. You are the commander of the so-called fortress of Buda, but you are no less the protector of your family and a Hungarian.

"Consider what you are about to do. I appeal to you in the name of your country and in the name of humanity. I expect your answer at three o'clock, P.M., of this day. Your party have most disgracefully acted in arresting and illtreating the bearers of our flag of truce. Warned by such precedents, I entrust this letter to the care of a captive Austrian officer.

"Head-quarters of Buda, 4th May, 1849.

"GENERAL ARTHUR GÖRGEY."

The answer which the Commander of Buda

returned to this letter, was couched in the following terms:—

"GENERAL!

"You have thought proper to send to me, as the Commander of the so-called fortress of Buda, a peremptory summons to capitulate within three hours, to give that fortress into your hands, and to deliver myself and my gallant garrison to your keeping as prisoners of war. This is your proposal: to which I reply, that the fortress of Buda was not, indeed, a fortress at the time of your precipitate retreat from it on the 3rd, 4th, and 5th of January of this year—a fact which is satisfactorily proved by the flight *en debandade* of the Hungarian army. But since that time Buda has been transformed into a tenable position, and one which will have the honor to oppose to you, General, the most decided resistance. I summon you, therefore, immediately to put a stop to your ineffectual fire upon the walls of Buda—for unless you do, I am determined to direct the fire of my own artillery upon the city of Pesth; and so colossal are the means which I can devote to that purpose, that the ruin of that city is inevitable. And to work that ruin I am forced, for your batteries on the Pesth side of the river are actually playing against me.

"I have also the honor of informing you that I am not a Hungarian, but a native of Switzerland, —that I am naturalised in Austria—that I owe Hungary no duties—that my family is not, as you suppose, in your power—and even if they were, that I cannot condescend to consider that circumstance, and my last word is: Obedient to my duty and the dictates of honor, I mean to defend this place to the last man; and if destruction is to be the lot of the twin cities of Buda and Pesth, it is you, General, who are responsible for them.

"Buda, 4th May, 1849.

"HENZI,
"Commander of the Fortress."

It appears that our first and inconsiderate attack had not by any means given General Henzi a high idea of the efficiency of our staff for the siege of a fortified position. The establishment of the field-batteries on the heights surrounding Buda, the ridiculous and useless waste of ammunition by firing these batteries during two days, and our other preparations, were so extremely inefficient that General Henzi, who had reason to expect the advance of an Austrian corps for his relief, was fully justified in his determination to hold out and defend the fortress to the last.

The whole of our available material for the

siege arrived exactly fourteen days after the commencement of the blockade, and consisted of four 24-pounders and one 18-pounder, and of sundry 30 and 60-pounder mortars, to which we added the howitzers from our field-batteries, whose powers of destruction had already, in a terrible manner, been made apparent to the wretched inhabitants of Pesth.

When I set out to reconnoitre the works, I witnessed the operations of a breaching battery of our five pieces of heavy artillery. This battery was placed opposite to the Stuhlweissenburg Gate, at eight hundred yards' distance. Its shots told with considerable effect on the time-worn and crumbling walls of the fortress, and it was expected that the breach would be practicable in a few days. From the fortress our fire was returned with considerable spirit, but with little effect, owing to the construction of our works of loose earth and sand-sacks.

It was, however, clear that our means of action were inefficient, and that we were slow in using them. I commenced to have my doubts of a favorable result. In this spirit I made my report to the government at Debrezin, expressing my regret that arrangements of so incomplete a nature were likely, while they endangered our success, uselessly to sacrifice the lives of many brave soldiers. I expressed my opinion that our

troops, though bold and enthusiastic, must to a great extent rely on the favor of accident, if they attempted, against so strong a garrison, to carry the fortress at the point of the bayonet.

Such, however, was Görgey's intention. The night of the 16th to the 17th May was fixed for the assault. The appointed hour was one o'clock in the morning.

General Aulich was ordered to lead his troops through the Razenstadt suburb, to break through the Castle Gate into the Park (Schlossgarten) and from thence into the fortress. Our breach, which was not quite practicable, was to be mounted by the first corps under the command of General Nagy Shandor; General Knezich and the third corps were directed against the Vienna Gate (Wiener Thor) and its bastions; and Colonel Kmetty had orders to take the strongly fortified aqueduct.

The general assault commenced at two o'clock in the morning. The storming columns, especially in the Wasserstadt suburb, were received with bombs, grenades, and red hot balls. The Austrians set fire to the large stores of wood, whose flame rising and illuminating the sky and the scene of the combat, sent a strong light on the Danube and the fire-ships which were floating down upon our pontoon bridge. A formidable and ruinous cannonade was directed against Pesth,

although not a single gun had been fired from the Pesth bank of the river, and although none of our troops were stationed on that bank.

Our gallant Honvéds,* though repeatedly repulsed, still returned to the charge. Day was breaking. The roar of artillery, and the shouts of the besiegers and the besieged, gradually ceased. The leaders of the various corps, seeing the utter hopelessness of a storm with ladders only, drew their fatigued troops to their former positions.

Görgey and myself watched the combat from the heights of the Schwabenberg. When the retreat of our troops was announced, I parted from him, not without serious misgivings as to the success of the siege. Before I returned to Debrezin I had a conversation with General Nagy Shandor, who complained of the indifference of the staff, and the unpractical character of the dispositions, and who expressed his doubts of Görgey's honesty. These doubts he communicated to Kossuth. Though I could not altogether sympathise with Nagy Shandor's apprehensions, I could not blind myself to the fact of a serious and dangerous dissension. Every one of Görgey's remarks on Kossuth betrayed an intensity of hatred which appalled me. I feared for the future, and resolved to strain every nerve

* Honveds—*i. e.* Home-defenders, the Hungarian Militia.

to effect a reconciliation between the two men in whose hands Providence had placed the fate of the nation.

The evil passions of the chiefs had their effect on those who surrounded them. The officers of Görgey's staff sought by all the means in their power to discredit the measures of the Government in the eyes of the army; and the friends of Kossuth were equally eager to accuse Görgey of treachery, and to prove their allegations by every one of his dispositions, nay, by his very victories. This was the mood in which I found the Government and the population of Debrezin on my return to that city. They were loud in their complaints of the loss of time in the siege of Buda. They were violent in their cries, that treason was at work. To make matters worse, a letter arrived from General Perczel, enlarging on the conduct of Görgey, and insisting on his being tried by court martial. Görgey's star was on the decline; his ruin seemed certain. A large part of the army itself rose in opposition against him.

Under these circumstances, he ventured a second and a desperate attack on the fortress. After a combat of several hours, the unequalled gallantry of our honveds prevailed. The conquest by assault of the fortress of Buda, in all but plain daylight, and with storming ladders only, is

the most brilliant feat of this war, and worthy to be quoted with the heroic deeds of all times and nations.

The news of Görgey's success reached Debrezin on the 22nd May, and was published by the following proclamation :—

"Praise to the holy name of God! Praise to the heroes of the National Army, who sacrifice their lives to the liberation of our country!

"*The fortress of Buda is in our hands!*

"The Government has received the following official report of this important event:—

"'Buda, 21st May, 5 o'clock, A.M.

"'The Hungarian colors are flying from the towers of Buda Castle! The honveds are scaling the walls of the fortress on ladders! The enemy's 24-pounders have hoisted the white flag!

"The first attack, which commenced at midnight, was directed against the Vienna Gate. The Castle Gate and the breach were attacked at one o'clock in the morning, and continued to the break of day. A murderous fire was directed upon our honveds, from the bastions, towers, and houses. Heavy stones were thrown down upon them; but their devoted courage overcame the resistance of the enemy.

"'The fire of the Austrian troops, though fierce and continuous, has done less execution than might

have been expected. But at this moment a street fight is commencing, which is likely to lead to a great sacrifice of life. The enemy retreats from the bastions on the side of the Schwabenberg. One of their detachments holds out in a position near the Weissenburg Gate. Through the breach the honveds pour into the fortress. The fire of artillery and musketry is already silenced in this part of the town, but strong discharges of small fire-arms are heard from the Pesth side of the fortress.

"'6 o'clock 30 m. A.M.

"'A powder magazine has exploded. The street fight still continues in the fortress.

"'7 o'clock, A.M.

"'The firing has ceased on all sides. *Buda is conquered!*'

"May the nation gather fresh courage and enthusiasm from the example of this success! May the combat which is still impending be short, and the liberation of the country complete! Peals of bells throughout the country, proclaim the victory of Hungarian arms. Pray to God, and thank him for the glory he has vouchsafed to grant the Hungarian army, whose heroic deeds have made it the bulwark of European liberty!

"Debrezin, 22nd May, 1849.

"The Governor of the Commonwealth,

"LOUIS KOSSUTH."

The dispositions for the storm were on the 21st what they had been on the 16th of May. General Nagy Shandor, and the first corps, attacked the breach; the second corps, under General Aulich, stormed the Castle Gate and the bastions near it; General Knezich led his troops against the Vienna Gate; and Colonel Kmetty, with his division, were detached against the entrenchments of the aqueduct. The details of the affair, and the persevering bravery of the besiegers, as well as of the besieged, are set forth in the report of the first corps. This report, which was sent to the Government by Major Antosh, is dated from Buda, the 21st of May :—

"The fortress of Buda is in our hands! The battalions of the first corps were the first to scale and gain a footing on the walls. The forty-seventh battalion was the first in the breach, while the thirty-fourth advanced simultaneously at another point. They were closely followed by their brave comrades, and a general advance took place, in spite of a murderous fire of grape and musketry. Every one of our honveds was a hero; and though the garrison made a most obstinate resistance, our loss is by no means considerable. Major Burdina, who led the third battalion of the regiment Don Miguel, died, with several of his gallant officers, a hero's death, on the walls of

the fortress. Several officers of the eighty-fourth battalion are likewise among the slain. The Austrians made an obstinate and even a heroic resistance on all points. When the walls were in our power, they opened a destructive fire upon us from the narrow streets of the city. But they were prevented from re-loading their pieces, for our soldiers, seeing the fall of their comrades, pressed forward to the attack, and carried everything before them. The Imperialists became at length convinced of the uselessness of their resistance. They laid down their weapons, and accepted quarter at the hands of our honveds.

"General Henzi, though worthy of curses, displayed to the last moment the qualities of a good soldier. He fell in the breach, pierced by bullets and bayonets.

"The Imperialist Colonel Allnosh, of the regiment Ceccopieri, intended to spring a mine under the suspension-bridge. His mine was awkwardly constructed, and he fell a victim to his attempt. His mutilated body was found near the *tête-du-pont.*

"The heroes of the day among the first corps were, General Nagy Shandor, who, after displaying the greatest activity throughout the course of the siege, conducted the assault with unparalleled bravery and circumspection; Colonel Maziassy, who led his battalions intrepidly to the charge,

who was twice thrown down from the walls.* He was severely wounded, but he still remained at the head of his column. He entered the fortress, and, strange to say, he survived his fall and his wounds. Lieutenant-colonel Driquet was the first officer of the staff who entered the fortress. He was followed by Major Casimir Jnkey, who marched at the head of his battalion. An equal heroism was displayed by the other corps, under their gallant leaders, Aulich, Knezich, Leiningen, and Kmetty. It would take volumes to record the instances of individual gallantry and devotion."

The news of the conquest of Buda wrought a sudden change in the minds of the Parliament on the subject of Görgey. In an extraordinary sitting, a motion was made by Szemere the President of the cabinet, and the Parliament resolved that the thanks of the country be expressed to the victorious General and his army, and that the grand cross of the Hungarian order for military merit be awarded to Görgey. A committee of members was appointed to convey this resolution to the army. Gabriel Kazintzy was the speaker of that committee.

General Görgey was aware of the sentiments which, in the course of the siege, prevailed on his account at Debrezin. He declined the prof-

* A height of 42 feet.

fered reward, protesting that his principles would not allow him to accept a mark of distinction; that the mania for titles and orders was already rife among the officers of his army, and that for the purpose of calling them back to the early purity of their purposes and tendencies, he felt it incumbent upon himself to set them an example. Such were his words. But his mode of action showed the real nature of the sentiments he entertained against the Governor, whom he hated, and from whom he would not, henceforward, accept either rewards or instructions. The secret springs of his action became more and more manifest, until in July, he and his adherents rose in open and undisguised opposition against the Governor and the Parliament.

I was, meanwhile, engaged in executing the plan of the defence of the country; but I found so many obstacles thrown in my way, that, losing all hope of a favourable and great result, I petitioned to be sent back to the army. Among my motives for this resolution, I will but advert to the peremptory orders of Kossuth, which were frequently issued without reference to the War Office, and which, in more than one case, exercised an obnoxious influence on the progress of our operations. In proof of this assertion, I need but refer to one instance:—

The insurgent Wallachians, of Transylvania,

were, after the defeat of the Russians and Austrians, still unconquered. By the vilest arts, they had been deluded, armed against the Magyars, and incited to murder, incendiarism, and other outrages. The Austrian agents had persuaded them that the free abolition of all feudal burdens, which the Hungarian Parliament had decreed, was nothing but a snare: a means to obtain their assistance in expelling the king and overthrowing his government, in order the more effectually to suppress their language, religion, and nationality. The deluded people congregated, and two men, Shaguna and Janku, a bishop and an advocate, took the lead of the insurrection. The masses, inflamed by religious fanaticism and national jealousy, marched forth, not to battle, but to devastate the Magyar districts, and to annihilate the defenceless population. No language can express, no pen can trace the horrors of murder and destruction which ensued. Already had they sacked the cities of Thordan, Zalathna, and Nagy Enyed, (in which latter place they burnt the famous library) and murdered, violated, and expelled their inhabitants. The sky was red with the flames of hundreds of Magyar villages. The fiery marks of the justice and the paternal love of the Austrian Government were placed on our houses, our churches, and our harvests; and it was only when the insurrec-

tion had risen to a fearful height, and spread to an almost uncontrollable extent, that the Hungarian Government thought of enlightening the deluded populace, of mediating between them and their passions, and, by means of a lasting peace, to work the salvation of both Hungarians and Wallachs from the Machiavellian policy of the Habsburg-Lorraines.

Mr. Dragosh, by birth a Wallachian, was commissioned to treat with his countrymen. He proceeded to Janku's camp at Abrudbánya, for the purpose of concluding an armistice of two months. He opened the negotiations with apparent success. The Wallachs were at length informed of the true state of affairs. They were not disinclined, under acceptable conditions, to lay down their arms, when the leader of one of our detached corps, misled by an untimely pugnacity, and without referring to the War Office, solicited Kossuth's permission to attack the Wallachs in their retreat in the highlands. He pretended that Dragosh and the Wallachs were engaged in treasonable intrigues. His representations were so earnest, and so confident was he of his success, that he prevailed upon Kossuth to give the order for an attack. Upon this he advanced, in defiance of the late orders of the War Office, which instructed him and the other commanders of detachments to remain in their quarters so long as the negotiations lasted. But on

his march upon Abrudbánya, he was detained by the natural obstacles of the ground, attacked, and compelled to retreat. The Wallachs, who believed themselves betrayed and imposed upon, assassinated Dragosh, and several other countrymen of theirs, who advised them to be reconciled to the Hungarians.

Hatvani, the ill-starred promoter of this disaster, had meanwhile been reinforced by some other detachments. He advanced upon, and reached Abrudbánya. But the Wállach population, who had received a military organisation by means of Austrian officers and soldiers, attacked and routed his corps. As a consequence of this defeat, all the Magyars who inhabited that part of the country were either killed or mutilated. All negotiations were of course broken off. The mountain districts, which might have covered our retreat and enabled us to continue the contest, remained in the hands of the enemy and became the stronghold of the insurgent races of Transylvania. Hatvani was indeed tried by court-martial, but I am unable to state whether any or what amount of punishment was awarded to him.

This was our only mishap in the month of May. In all other parts of the country, our successes were constant and signal.

General Bem attacked and defeated the Austrian General Malkowski, who returning from his re-

treat in Wallachia, had entered the Banat, by way of Orshova. Malkowski's corps of 10,000 men was, for the second time, driven across the Wallachian frontier. General Bem effected a junction with Perczel, who had fought with signal success against the Servians, and commenced the blockade and siege of the important fortress of Temeshvar. At the end of May he prepared to advance upon Titel, the last place which the Servians still held in the Bátshka country.

Dembinski recruited his forces in Upper Hungary. His corps of 10,000 men held the cities of Eperiesh and Kashau.

The frontier defiles of Transylvania were fortified, and that province (excepting always the districts in which the Wallachian insurrection raged, and the fortress of Karlsburg) was completely in our hands.

The army which had reduced the fortress of Buda advanced slowly to its new positions on the Waag and the Upper Danube.

The Parliament and the Government resolved at this time to remove from Debrezin to the reconquered capital of the country. For this purpose the Parliament was prorogued to the commencement of July.

General Görgey consented at length to take the direction of the War Office, which he established at Buda. He commenced his reforms,

which I, who merely acted as his representative, could not, even with the best of my will, carry into execution. Great results were to be anticipated from his distinguished talents of organisation. If he had acted in harmony with Kossuth, his successes were sure to be brilliant. The forces of the nation, and their unequalled enthusiasm, if properly directed and advantageously employed, would have prevailed against the invading legions of our enemies.

But Görgey would not consent to divide the glory of his task. Surrounded by evil counsellors, and too prone to listen to their advice, he thought of uniting the dignity of a commander-in-chief with the leadership of the War Office. The popularity he enjoyed in the army, and other thoughts, of greater ambition than purity, contributed perhaps to confirm him in his views. To enable him to unite the two offices in his person, he established a Chancellery of operations at head-quarters—an office which was meant to represent the commander-in-chief. The unfortunate similarity of this establishment with the awkward and ridiculous Vienna Board of War Commissioners (Hof Kriegsrath), its disabling and still undecided influence on the operations which it presumed to conduct from a distance, and in ignorance of the peculiarities of the ground and of the forces and movements of the enemy, characterised

its working in the Upper Danube, and proved its utter absurdity and incapacity. But Görgey, who had provided for the contingency of his absence from the War Office, by appointing a responsible under-secretary and plenipotentiary, flattered himself with having arrived at a satisfactory solution of his difficult and twofold problem, and of being enabled to look calmly at the future events. The extraordinary contingencies, the threatening dangers of our position, were such, that all his energies, all his resources, were hardly sufficient to enable him honorably to discharge the duties of *one* of his offices, yet he stretched forth his hands and grasped both.

After resigning the lead of the War Office to Görgey, I was appointed to the post of chief commander of the fortress and the entrenched camp of Komorn; and the seventh and eighth corps in the island of Shütt, and on the right bank of the Danube, were provisionally placed under my command.

Before I set out for my destination, Görgey communicated to me the changes he had made in the army. He had appointed General Vetter to the command of the troops in the Batshka and the Banat, and Visocki was promoted, in the place of Dembinski, to the command of the corps on the Gallician frotier. Perczel and Dembinski were placed at the disposal of the Commander-

in-chief. Aulich, who was temporarily disabled, resigned the command of the second corps to Colonel Ashboth.

I left Pesth on the 31st May, amidst the preparations for the reception of the Government. On the following day I arrived at Komorn.

General Guyon, whom I succeeded in the command of Komorn, was one of the bravest soldiers in the Hungarian army. In autumn, 1848, he was promoted to the rank of major, and to the command of the second battalion of Pesth volunteers, and in this capacity he assisted in our expedition against the Ban Jellachich, in our march upon Vienna, and in the battle of Shwechat, where he vindicated the martial honor of Hungary by his brilliant attack upon Manswörth. Promoted to the rank of colonel in consequence of this feat of arms, he operated in November, 1848, though not very successfully, against the Austrian General Simunich, who had entered our country by way of Trentsin. Though favored by a variety of circumstances, he could not obtain any decisive advantage over General Simunich, who at length made good his retreat from Tyrnau into Moravia. A month later, his corps was attacked and thrown back upon Komorn, in a battle which he fought at Tyrnau, with a strong Austrian column, under the command of Schwarzenberg.

In the course of Görgey's retreat to Buda, and

from thence through the mountain cities to the Zips county, Guyon was the leader of our advanced guard. As such, he allowed himself to be surprised by an Austrian division, who defeated him at Neudorf, in the Zips county; but he took his revenge by storming the defiles of Branitzko, which were defended by a brigade of General Schlick's corps, thus clearing for Görgey's army the road to Eperiesh and Kashau, and securing their communication with the other Hungarian corps, and forcing General Schlick to leave his position at Kashau, and to make a hasty retreat to Torna and Rima-Szombat.

The part which he took in the battle of Kapolna was more passive than active; but on the evening of the second day he was employed by Dembinski to cover his retreat from Kereczend. After our retreat across the Theiss, in the commencement of March, 1849, when the dissensions between Dembinski and Görgey became patent, Guyon took the part of the former, and was consequently removed from the army and placed at the disposal of the Government. Kossuth appointed him to the command of Komorn. He set out for that fortress, but he could not, for a long time, obtain access to it, surrounded as it was by the enemy's forces. Guyon lurked in disguise in various parts of the country, until he at length succeeded in joining my corps. After the battle of

Sarlo, I detached him with an escadron of the 1st Regiment of Hussars. At the head of this troop he attacked and broke through the lines of the Austrians, and riding into Komorn, he brought the garrison the joyful news of the Hungarian army marching up to the rescue.

When I arrived in Komorn, I found Guyon occupied with the reconstruction of the works which had suffered from the fire of the besiegers, and with fortifying the entrenchments of the camp. He was ill pleased with his revocation from his command, which he ascribed to the hostile influence of Görgey, and he hastened to Debrezin to give in his resignation. Kossuth succeeded in mitigating his resentment, and he left Debrezin to take the command of the corps in the Bátshka, under the chief command of General Vetter. Assisted by Colonel Kmetty, he defeated Jellachich by Hedjesh; he fought in the last battle of Temeshvar, and he was one of those who accompanied Kossuth to Turkey. He shared the Governor's exile and captivity at Widdin and Shumla, until his liberation was effected by the intervention of the British Government.

But to return. After inspecting the fortress and the garrison, I commissioned Colonel Assermann to superintend the works and the victualling department of Komorn, while I proceeded to Raab to inspect the seventh corps of the army.

CHAPTER III.

JUNE.

ARRIVAL AT RAAB — THE SEVENTH CORPS — POSITIONS AND STRENGTH OF THE AUSTRIANS ON THE UPPER DANUBE—POSITIONS AND STRENGTH OF THE HUNGARIANS—THE PALATINAL HUSSARS—BATTLE AT TSHORNA—RECONNOITRES IN THE SHÜTT AND ON THE WAAG—BATTLE OF ZSIGARD—LETTER TO GÖRGEY—A TWO DAYS' BATTLE ON THE WAAG.

BEFORE leaving Komorn, I reported to Görgey, as well as to Kossuth, on the preparations, on the means of defence, and on the progress of the works in the entrenched camp. I mentioned in this report the deficiencies which had struck me, and dwelt forcibly on the circumstance, that a large quantity of provisions of all kinds was still wanting to complete the efficiency of the fortress. I took this opportunity openly to declare that the movements of various corps, and the positions which they had taken, convinced me that an alteration had taken place in our plan of defence;

that no information of this fact had reached me from the Central Chancellery, and I protested that I would much prefer the command of the first corps, to that of Komorn, if that place were to be considered merely as a fortress, and if, as had been the case in the course of last winter, the garrison was to be weak and unfit for operations in the open field. Kossuth's answer to this report, which I received at Raab, will, in conjunction with other documents, serve to characterise the events of the war.

"The Governor of the Commonwealth to General Klapka.

"My dear General,

"The Government has at length arrived at Pesth. The people received us with exulting enthusiasm—for in our persons they cheered the idea of national liberty and independence.

"I have received your two letters of the 2nd and 3rd June, and I reply to them as follows:

"I believe that the plan of operations which you submitted to the Cabinet Council at Debrezin, and which we accepted, was the result of an understanding between yourself and your friend Görgey, and I had no reason to doubt but that after your departure for Komorn this plan would be brought to execution. I calculated the forces under your command to be—

The Garrison of Komorn . .	8000	men.
Kmetty's Corps	4000	„
Damjanitsh's Corps	7500	„
Pöltenberg	8000	„
Making a total of . . .	27,500	men.

"But even if the corps under the command of Damjanitsh had, for strategical purposes, been ordered to the left bank (a movement which might always have served to cover Komorn from that side), I relied on your having still 20,000 men, and that you would have no difficulty in recruiting their strength to the number of 5000 more.

"But if this is not the case, I confess that I cannot but entertain serious apprehensions, and I must entreat you to come to an understanding with the Secretary at War, and to induce him to a speedy execution of the said plan of operations; for though firmly convinced of the importance of Komorn, I cannot, if that place is to be regarded merely as a fortress, and not as a great entrenched camp, but consider it a serious loss that your talents, which require a larger sphere of action, and which, in this time of general exertion, are indispensably necessary to the country, should be condemned to the keeping of Komorn, which would be quite as safe in other hands.

"I am in hourly expectation of the return from the Banat of the Minister Vukowitsh. He will

form one of the results of the recruiting of a corps of from 12 to 16,000 men. Unless this force is to be placed under the command of Bem, there is no objection to its joining your army. But even if they are to join you, it is necessary that your forces be recruited by new enlistments. For this purpose it is indispensable that the War Office, and by means of that office I, myself, am continually to be informed of the numbers actually in the battalions, and of the number of recruits which have been sent to you. I recommend this affair to your particular notice.

"Under to-morrow's date I mean to issue instructions for sending (for the use of your recruits) 1000 suits of summer regimentals, for the corps of Komorn, as well as for that at Raab. A second supply of regimentals will follow in the course of next week.

"I did not by any means find such an extent of preparations here as I had been led to expect from the promises of Lukáts, &c. But even in the most favourable case, I think it necessary to establish at Komorn a manufactory of weapons and percussion caps, to construct powder mills, and to set down a commission of Equipment.

"For this purpose I recommend to you Mr. Székely, who, you know, is a clever and honest man. If you think you can make use of him as commissioner of goods or purveyor of stores, I

beg you will inform me of it, and I will send him to you.

"The bearer of this is instructed to pay you 1000 florins. Another remittance to the same amount will follow the day after to-morrow.

"You will use all your energies in the construction of the works and fortifications. I will take it upon myself to let you have the money, and the commissioner Ujhazi is instructed to provide you with the labourers and implements.

"As to the question between an offensive and defensive warfare, I am firmly convinced that the longer we delay acting on the offensive, the more prepared will the enemy be to meet us, and the more difficult will it be to succeed. In the development of resources, the enemy has less obstacles to conquer than we have, especially since the want of weapons is becoming painful. In my opinion, it would have been very advantageous if we had made use of the time in which the Russian intervention was preparing, for the purpose of attacking the Austrians, who were then isolated; or, at least, for the purpose of advancing on the Laytha. But whether or not the latter movement is still advisable, depends upon the powers at the enemy's disposal. If the statement of 15,000 men on the left, and 25,000 on the right bank, be true, we might indeed, by a prompt and energetic movement, attack them

on either shore. I propose to confer on this matter with Görgey.

"But the most important point of the operations is, that Komorn may be placed in a most efficient state of defence.

"General Lahner has sent several thousand muskets to Komorn to be repaired, but I do not believe that your factory will suffice to do the work with sufficient dispatch. If such be the case, you will please to send a part of these muskets back. I mean to put them into the hands of the Pesth gun-makers.

"General Lahner has likewise sent 500 cwts. of saltpetre to Komorn, to be used in the fabrication of gunpowder. Your powder-mill is still to be built: when can it work? I think General Lahner would have acted more judiciously if he had sent this transport of saltpetre to some place where the powder-mills are actually at work. Whenever yours is so, I will take care that you are plentifully supplied with materials.

"Yours sincerely,

"Pesth, 7th June, 1849." "KOSSUTH."

A few days after I received this letter, I was surprised by a visit from Görgey, who came to confer with me on our differences. Instead of the second corps, which had originally been intended for Komorn, I was placed in command of

the division of Colonel Kmetty, which had already advanced from Buda to Papa, and to reinforce and complete my battalions, I received a promise of from 4000 to 5000 recruits. But the corps on the left bank of the Danube were provisionally to be placed under the command of Görgey himself; that is to say, they were to remain at the disposal of the Central Chancellery.

In consequence of this arrangement, the troops which remained on the right bank of the Danube and in the island of Shütt, and which formed the garrison of the entrenched camp, and of the fortress of Komorn, were the seventh and eighth corps, and the division of Colonel Kmetty. My force consisted of twenty-nine battalions, twenty-eight escadrons, and seventy-six pieces of artillery.

The seventh corps was at Raab; the eighth corps, with the exception of a few battalions, which were garrisoned at Komorn, was in the great island of Shütt. Colonel Kmetty was at Papa. As for me, for the purpose of acting in concert with the various corps which operated on the left bank, I was to receive the leading features of my dispositions from Görgey, or from the Central Chancellery, which represented him.

Ever since the relief of Komorn, the seventh corps passed its time at Raab, undisturbed by the enemy, and given up to a most satisfactory repose. The hearty welcome, and the kind hospi-

tality of the citizens of Raab, made them forgetful of the fatigues and sufferings of the winter months. Their time was passed in balls, in parties or excursions, and in the theatre; and undismayed by the threatening aspect of the future, the officers and soldiers had no care but how to employ the time of rest and pleasure to the best advantage. The officers, who for five long months had scarcely doffed their fur-jackets and coats, and whose heavy boots were worn out in the mire of the bivouac, appeared at Raab in all the splendour of a soldier's life in peace.

It was this corps which in autumn, 1848, formed that inefficient army which opposed the first Austrian invasion on the western frontier, was defeated by Windischgrätz, and driven back to the walls of Buda. They were the troops whom Görgey had led on his admirable expedition to the mountain cities and Kashau, and among whom he had his stanchest adherents and friends. This corps was chiefly officered by the late Austrian officers, and this was the reason why its battalions were distinguished by a jealous *esprit de corps*. The use of the German language, and of German words of command, reminded me of the time when the House of Habsburg was still the supreme arbiter of the fate of Hungary; and though distinguished by military order and strictness of discipline, the enthusiasm

which this corps displayed in the cause of liberty was slow, calculating, and lukewarm, compared to the bold and exuberant spirits of the other divisions of the army on the Upper Danube.

General Pöltenberg, a native of Germany, was the commander of this corps. His case was that of many foreigners, who embraced the cause of the Hungarian insurrection because they felt themselves bound by their oath and word of honor, but not from patriotism or a sympathy for the cause of the revolution. Pöltenberg was formerly captain of a regiment of hussars, which, in obedience to the orders both of the Austrian and the Hungarian Cabinet, was quartered in Hungary in the summer of 1848. In Pressburg, Pöltenberg and the other officers, headed by the chief of the regiment, the unfortunate Count Lamberg, took their oaths to the Hungarian Constitution, and were placed at the disposition of the Hungarian War-Office. Pöltenberg, who, in spite of the overtures of the Austrian Cabinet and the persuasions of other officers, remained faithful to his oath, was, in January, 1849, promoted to the rank of a colonel and commander of a division; and in April he was, in consequence of the ill health of General Gaspar, appointed to the command of the seventh corps.

He was sentenced to death on the 6th October, 1849, and hanged at Arad. His crime was his loyalty and truth to the oath which he had taken

in obedience to the express commands of the Emperor Ferdinand, and his refusal to reward the confidence of the Hungarian Government by desertion and treason.

Pöltenberg was a man of middling military capacities; but he was a gallant soldier, whose kindness of heart gained him the respect of his friends and the love of those who served under his command.

At Raab I received authentic information of the position and the strength of the enemy.

After the battle of Sarlo and the relief of Komorn, the main army of the Austrians (40,000 men), under the command of General Welden, had retreated to Pressburg, and finding that the Hungarians were not inclined to follow up their advantages, they took the following defensive position:—

On the right bank of the Danube they occupied the ground between Wieselburg and Altenburg, pushing their detachments forwards on the road from Pressburg to Raab, on which they advanced to Oedenburg. In the lesser Shütt they were posted at Hedervar.

On the left bank of the Danube, they followed the line of the Waag to Freistadt.

In the commencement of June, Welden resigned his command to General Haynau. That officer had, in the Italian wars, given signal proofs of

courage as well as of obstinacy and cruelty. The ministers, Schwarzenberg and Bach, took him on the recommendation of Field-Marshal Radetzky, and found in him a willing instrument for the execution of their blood-thirsty and revengeful plans. He celebrated his advent to office by the execution of the Hungarian officers, Major Ladislas Mednyanszki and Captain Gruber, and of a very respectable clergyman, the Rev. Mr. Razga, of Pressburg.

He made no alteration in the positions of the Austrian army, but he applied himself to reorganise and newly divide it. The reinforcements, which arrived from Austria Proper, Moravia, and Bohemia, increased this army to the strength of 50,000 men. A Russian division of 16,000 men entered Pressburg at this time, for the purpose of acting as a reserve force to the main army of the Austrians, on the Upper Danube. The first corps of this army was under General Schlick, and the second, third, and fourth corps were commanded by the Generals Tshoritsh, Ramberg, and Wohlgemuth. At a later period, the fourth corps was commanded by Prince Lichtenstein. The cavalry division was under General Bechthold, and the division of Russian reserve-troops under General Paniutiune.

Besides these forces, which were placed under General Haynau, as Commander-in-Chief and

Plenipotentiary of the Austrian Emperor, and which held an advantageous central position in and around Pressburg, another reserve corps was concentrating at Pettau, in Styria, under the auspices of General Nugent, who conducted this corps, at the end of June, to the county of Zala, and from thence against a powerful and well-organised rising of the population around the Platten lake.

A Russian corps of 18,000 men, under General Grabbe, had meanwhile entered Hungary from Western Gallicia, and advanced, though slowly and cautiously, from the Arva, through the county of Liptau, in the direction of the mountain districts.

The forces which the Hungarians opposed to these armies were :*

First corps, under General Nagy Shandor, of 10 battalions; 12 escadrons; 40 guns; 9000 men.

Second corps, under Colonel Ashboth, of 10 battalions; 9 escadrons; 42 guns; 7000 men.

Third corps, under Count Leiningen, of 9 battalions; 14 escadrons; 42 guns; 8000 men.

Seventh corps, under Pöltenberg, of 12 battalions; 17 escadrons; 48 guns; 9000 men.

Eighth corps, under Colonel Assermann, of 12 battalions; 3 escadrons; 12 guns; 8000 men.

* Excepting always the organised rising on the Drave and on the Platten lake.

Colonel Kmetty's division, of 5 battalions; 8 escadrons; 16 guns; 5000 men.

Colonel Horvath's division, of 2 battalions; 3 escadrons; 4 guns; 2000 men.

Major Armin Görgey's division, of 2 battalions; 1 escadron; 4 guns; 1600 men.

Making a total of 62 battalions, 67 escadrons, 208 field-pieces, and 49,600 men, with 6000 horses.*

After the third corps, which came from Buda, had taken up their position in the line, the Hungarian army held the following positions:—

On the right bank of the Danube, the banks of the river Raab were held by Kmetty's division at Téth and Martshaltö, while the seventh corps lay at Raab and its environs, and the eighth corps at N. Medjer, Szakollash, and Nemesh-Bogya.

On the left bank of the Danube, the third corps had taken up a position at Neuhäusel (on the banks of the Waag), while the second lay at Tardoshked and Tot-Medjer, and the first at Nameny and Motshonak.

The garrison and the reserves at Komorn were composed of eight battalions, which ought to have formed part of the eighth corps.

Colonel Horvath, with two battalions and three

* The battalions were not complete, and the strength of a corps is therefore to be estimated less by the number of its battalions, than by the actual number of men serving in them.

escadrons, held the city and district of Neutra, and Major Armin Görgey's corps was in the mountain cities.

The two armies were thus placed opposite to each other, each observing the enemy's movements, without making any decided advance; and beside some skirmishing, and the petty hostilities of the outposts, no collision took place in the first days of June. The Austrians were still waiting for the Russian reserve force, and the Hungarian chiefs were intently engaged in recruiting the numbers of their battalions, which, by the diseases and casualties of the campaign, had been reduced to but one-half of their original strength.

Görgey passed this time at Pesth; the Central Chancellery was at Dotish, at the distance of forty English miles in the rear of the army, where they occupied the castle of the Count Niklas Esterhazy,* and where they found all the accommodation and the comforts which their dignity required. Neither I, nor any other general officer, had received the slightest intimation of Görgey's plans and intentions. The dispositions were issued from day to day, and left the leaders and the troops in the most harassing uncertainty, especially those placed among the moors and bogs of the conflux of the Waag and Danube.

* The father of the Colonel Paul Esterhazy.

The general feeling of depression and uneasiness was, on the 7th of June, removed by an agreeable event. A troop of 120 Palatinal hussars arrived at Papa, after a fatiguing and dangerous march from the quarters of their regiment, in Upper Austria. The hussars, of all our soldiers, showed the greatest devotion and patriotism. As early as the year 1848, we were surprised by the arrival of hussars from the Hungarian regiments, who had left their quarters in Gallicia and Bohemia, and who, after adventurous marches and almost fabulous fatigues and dangers, succeeded in making their way to the banners of the Commonwealth. The boldest among these adventurers were the Palatinal hussars. The first division of that regiment left their quarters at the frontiers of Saxony, in November, 1848, and, riding through Bohemia and Moravia, continually skirmishing with the Austrian troops, who sought to stop them on the road, (for their escape had been announced by means of the telegraph,) they reached their native mountains on the borders of Moravia, where the population received them with unbounded exultation, and conducted them to Pressburg. Various other troops left the central depôt at different times, and fought their way into Saxony and Prussia, from whence they hoped to be able to return to Hungary. The regiment of Palatinal hussars was in a fair way to dwindle

away and resolve itself into nothing, when the Austrian Government, for the purpose of putting a stop to the frequent desertions, ordered them to the Tyrol and the Vorarlberg, where they thought it would be easier to confine the refractory horsemen. But on the march to their new quarters, one escadron of hussars left the regiment at Wels, in Upper Austria; a second followed soon after; and in Styria almost the whole of the corps dispersed, and rode away in little troops, each of which endeavoured to find the ways and means to hasten to the rescue of their unfortunate country. Several troops, and among them the one which arrived at Papa, succeeded in their attempt, while others were surrounded, captured, and decimated by the Austrian troops.*

I established the new-comers, whom I commended for their patriotism, in an escadron of their own, and attached them to Kmetty's division. Their leader on the adventurous expedition was a serjeant. I promoted him to the rank of lieutenant, and decorated him with the third class of the Order for Military Bravery.

On the 12th of June, my scouts informed me of the advance of the enemy's columns on the Oedenburg road, from Kapuvar, and Sz. Mihaly

* These desertions are but a small specimen of that grand and general "*débandade*" which must take place, if Austria, with her present system, presumes to lead her mutinous troops to battle.

to Csorna. Some of their detachments had lately made their appearance in that part of the country without being prevented by Pöltenberg. But in the present instance we readily seized the opportunity thus presented to us, to bring the seventh corps and the division of Kmetty again into proper training. I communicated my intentions to Colonel Kmetty, who informed me from Téth, that he was repairing the bridge which crosses the river Raab at Moritshida, and that there was not therefore any obstacle in the way of an attack upon the enemy's flying columns.

In the afternoon of that day, Colonel Kmetty crossed the Raab river in two columns. To cover his movements, he directed one of these columns upon Kapuvar, while with the second he advanced to Csorna, where he arrived at five o'clock in the morning of the 13th of June, after a forced march of thirteen hours. He found the enemy drawn up in order of battle in front of the village.

The Austrian General, Wiss, who commanded at Csorna, received the news of the approach of our troops but a short time before their arrival. He could not, therefore, without risking the loss of his baggage, venture upon a retreat. He expected, moreover, to receive reinforcements from Kapuvar and Sz. Mihaly, where the rest of his brigade was stationed.

The Austrian forces at Csorna consisted of three battalions, five escadrons, and eight field-pieces. Kmetty's force, which equalled them in number, and which had the advantage in respect to artillery, attacked them at once, and a violent combat ensued. The cavalry attacks on our right wing were on either side executed with alternate success; the Austrian lancers vied in boldness and daring with our hussars. After a combat of several hours' duration, our storming columns entered Csorna from the south, and compelled the enemy to abandon their position, and to retreat in the only direction which was open to them,—viz., to Bö-Sharkany and St. Peter.

While Kmetty engaged the Austrians at Csorna, I conducted part of the seventh corps to reconnoitre the enemy's positions around Wieselburg, for the purpose of diverting their attention from the engagement at Csorna. By way of Kony, in the rear of the enemy's column, I sent Colonel Zambelli, with a few escadrons and four field-pieces, to reinforce Kmetty's division. Colonel Zambelli, however, did not arrive in time to prevent the retreat of the enemy; and as Kmetty's troops were too fatigued to keep up the pursuit, the new comers were compelled to be content with a slight skirmish at the entrance of the village of Bö-Sharkany. The fugitive Austrians

set fire to the bridge over the Rabnitz, and continued their retreat unmolested by our troops.

The loss of human life on either side was severe. The Austrian general, Wiss, fell, and remained on the field of battle. From 150 to 200 of their men were either killed or wounded; 80 solders and several officers, among whom was Prince Solms, were captured by our troops. We, in our turn, had 120 men killed, and 80 wounded. The hussars suffered most: every fifth man and several of their officers were either killed or wounded.

Colonel Kmetty, after leaving a small detachment in the Rabnitz to observe the enemy's movements, returned on the 14th to his former position at Martsaltö and Téth, while the ninth corps marched back to Raab.

This first success, trifling though it was, had a good effect on the spirit of our troops, and the news of it produced a joyful sensation in the capital.

Respecting the plan of invasion of the Russians and Austrians, Görgey could not, at that time, entertain any doubts. General Haynau and the bulk of the Austrian army, with a strong reserve, were in and around Pressburg. General Grabbe, whom we knew from his campaigns in the Caucasus, advanced slowly against the mountain cities. The great Russian army, under

Prince Paskiewitsh, stood prepared for immediate invasion, in and around Dukla. Forty thousand Russians, under the Generals Lüders and Grotjenhelm, advanced against Transylvania, where they were, at a later period, joined by an Austrian corps under General Clam-Gallas. And from the Batshka country, where Perczel's former successes had been turned into defeat, the Ban Jellachich advanced with his Croatians. All these masses of armed men were pressing forward to the centre of the country, to force the armies of the retreating Magyars to join and accept a decisive battle on the wide plains of Middle Hungary. The time had come in which Görgey was called upon to make his choice; either to act on the defensive and to prolong the contest, or, by taking the offensive, to endeavour to end the war by a few bold manœuvres.

The dispositions of the Central Chancellery showed clearly that the communication of two corps with Dembinski, which formed a prominent feature in my plan of defence, had found no favor in the eyes of the Commander-in-Chief, and that the other alternative was chosen,—viz., the junction of all the best troops on the Upper Danube. Considering the very insufficient means at our disposal, there could be no idea of a defence of the counties on the banks of the Theiss and of Upper Hungary. A force of

12,000 men was all we could have spared for that purpose. There was not, therefore, any impediment to the advance of the Russian army over the frontier, and to their march upon Pesth. The capital and two-thirds of the country were given up in this fatal campaign, even before the first cannon had been discharged, even before the foot of a single Russian defiled the soil of Hungary. It is only from this point of view, and only under these suppositions, that Görgey's wilful change in the plan of operations can be excused; but no excuse can be found for the recklessness and negligence which he displayed in the execution of his own plan.

The first of our operations, the possibility at a favorable moment to direct the whole of our force to any point of advantage; our strong central position at Komorn; our safe and expectant attitude, in which we ought to have persevered until we compelled the Imperialists to declare their intentions,—all these advantages were sacrificed to the jealousies of the Commander-in-Chief. We might have chosen our own time, and selected our own ground. When the enemy's plans were manifest from the movements of their troops; when their forces were divided and in search of advantageous positions: we might have brought forward 50,000 men, picked troops, and we might have forced them to accept a de-

cisive battle. Görgey, who prematurely left the defensive position to take the offensive, made moreover an unfortunate choice of ground, by selecting positions which deprived victory of success, and which made a defeat almost synonymous with annihilation.

I take this opportunity to give a short sketch of the ground which witnessed the first mighty concussion of the contending armies, and on which the most sanguinary contests took place, in the course of the war.

The Danube, below Pressburg, divides in two arms of unequal breadth, which, after forming the large island of Shütt, unite again at Komorn. The lesser arm, which takes a northward course, is a reservoir for several smaller streams which join it from the north, and among which the Raab and Neutra rivers are the most important. This branch of the Danube has, at its conflux with the Waag, the name of the *Neuhäusel arm*, and from thence to its ultimate union with the other branch, it is generally known by the name of *Waag-Danube*. At the distance of several German miles from the conflux of the Waag and Danube, (and indeed of the conflux of the Neutra, which flows almost in the same direction with the Waag,) the territory of the two rivers slopes downward, and merges into an immense plain, which, but insufficiently guarded by means of

weak dykes, against the frequent inundations of the rivers—is full of quagmires and pools of stagnant water—and which affords a safe footing only in the midst of summer. In consequence of the change in the plan of operations, the second and the third corps were, in the latter part of June, marched through the midst of these bogs and quagmires, against the enemy, who surpassed us in numbers, and who stood in an advantageous position on the right bank of the river Waag.

On the 13th of June, the bridge over the Waag-Danube at Guta, and over the Neutra at Naszvad, were repaired, and the second corps was ordered to leave its positions on the left bank, to cross over into the Shütt island, to encamp at Aszod, and to cover the throwing of a bridge over the Neuhäusel arm of the Danube. A dyke which was necessary for the passage through the moor, between the Neutra and the Waag-Danube, had been completed by the voluntary assistance of the population of that district, and the last obstacle to our progress was thus removed. On the morning of the 13th, the corps had arrived on the Shütt island, and in the position at Aszod.

Colonel Ashboth, the commander of the second corps, sent that very day Colonel Sckulits on a reconnoitring expedition to Vasarut, where, after some skirmishing, the enemy was thrown

back upon Kürth. A general attack was planned for the 16th June.

Early in the morning of the 16th, and leaving a detachment at Aszod, for the protection of our newly-constructed floating-bridge, Colonel Ashboth, with seven battalions, five escadrons, and four batteries, crossed the Neuhäusel arm, and proceeded in the direction of Kiralyrév. Another column, of one battalion, one escadron, and a half battery, under the command of Major Rakowszky, and intended to outflank the enemy, was ordered, under the direction of experienced guides, to cross the river at a nearer point at Guta, to march on the right bank of the Waag, along the river upon Nedjed and Farkashd, to surprise the small detachments which the enemy had in those places, and to join the principal column at Zsigard.

The only practicable way from Aszod to Zsigard follows the rising banks of the Feketeviz river, which joins the Danube at some distance above Aszod. The banks of this little river are covered with thick brushwood, and, in many places, with forests. A dyke, road, or bank, of thirteen miles' length, and of the breadth of half a score of yards only, runs between this river and the bogs which cover the ground for the extent of many miles. One battalion of our troops crossed the river in boats, to clear the opposite (right) bank from the enemy, and to enable us to pass along on the

dyke. The enemy's outposts were surprised by the sudden appearance of our troops: they retreated with some confusion.

After a march of six hours, the advanced guard of our column reached the end of the dyke and the village of Kiralyrév, which, defended as it was by only one company of Austrians, they attacked and occupied. The Austrians, under General Pott, whose force we estimated at one brigade and three battalions, declined accepting the engagement, and retreated upon Zsigard, where they took up a position on the rising ground between that place and Pered. Their left wing leant on Zsigard.

They were immediately attacked by Colonel Ashboth. The rapid advance of our horse and artillery against the enemy's right wing and centre, compelled the Austrians to retreat. Zsigard was defended by a battery in an excellent position, supported by two battalions. Colonel Ashboth, placing himself at the head of his troops, attacked and entered the village, while the battery was taken by a brilliant attack of a division of Botshkay hussars, under Major Kaszap. But the place was scarcely occupied by our troops, when strong reinforcements, advancing from Dioszeg, took their place in the enemy's line, and restored the fight. General Wohlgemuth, who commanded

the Austrian reserve troops on the left bank of the Danube, had been informed of our expedition, and being in no manner impeded by any movement of our third corps, which kept its place on the Waag, he dispatched the strong brigade of General Herzinger against Pered, to the assistance of General Pott.

Thus reinforced, the Austrians opened from three batteries (and amongst them one rocket battery) upon our left wing, which had advanced too far from our lines. Their fire was harassing, especially since the troops whom it attacked could return it with only one battery. The left wing retreated, the Austrians followed in hot pursuit; we were obliged to resign our possession of Zsigard, and the artillery which we had taken in the entrenchments of that place. Strong columns of Austrian horse, whom we could oppose by a few escadrons only, advanced simultaneously against Kiralyrév, where they threatened our rear. Colonel Ashboth gave his orders for the whole line to fall back, and a retreat commenced, of which I will say that, considering the unfavorable ground and the superior forces of the enemy, our troops retreated in tolerable order.

Major Rakowszky, whose crossing had been drawn to an unfortunate length, by the want of boats, and who could not on his long march make

up for the loss of time, arrived at Zsigard one hour after our retreat; and being informed of the result of the engagement, he fell back upon Nedjed, which he occupied, and where he afterwards threw a bridge across the Waag.

Our want of success may be chiefly ascribed to General Knezich, the commander of the third corps, who could not make up his mind to co-operate with Colonel Ashboth. In spite of the representations of his officers, he refused not only to throw a bridge at Nedjed, but he declined likewise to allow a detachment of his troops to cross the Waag in boats, and to hasten to the support of the second corps.

This affair cost us 500 men of killed and wounded. We were compelled to leave three field-pieces in the enemy's hands.

The Austrian forces in this engagement were estimated at from 8000 to 9000 men; Colonel Ashboth's troops mustered half that number.

On its arrival in the Shütt island, the second corps returned to its camp at Aszod.

For the purpose of assisting the second corps in its attack on the Waag, I had instructed Colonel Kosztolany to distract their attention, and engage the forces of the Austrians in the Shütt. Kosztolany's division of four battalions, three escadrons, and eight field-pieces, advanced early in the morning from their quarters at

N. Medjer, against Bösh, where they attacked the Austrian brigade Reishach. But the strong position which the enemy had taken up, on very broken ground, precluded all success; and after a lengthy cannonade, and a severe loss of men and of train-horses, Colonel Kosztolany found himself compelled to fall back upon Patash, and from thence upon his former position at N. Medjer. He displayed in this engagement a great want of circumspection, which, added to the strong position of the enemy, completely destroyed the advantages which I had anticipated from his expedition.

General Nagy Shandor, too, with the first corps, advanced on that day from Motshonok to Shintau. He directed a column of six battalions, eight escadrons, and three batteries, against the Austrian entrenchments on the Neutra road (opposite to Shintau), and carried them by assault. From the heights, which thus came into our possession, he opened a destructive fire of two batteries upon Shintau, and by the simultaneous advance of our storming columns, the enemies were compelled to give ground; when the Austrian reserve corps coming up at the very last moment, stopped the progress of the Hungarian columns, and compelled them, after a hot fight, to retreat, and abandon the entrenchments which they had conquered in the early part of the engagement.

The disorder which prevailed at the commencement of our retreat caused the loss of four 12-pounders, and of several ammunition cars.

Our loss in killed and wounded was trifling.

The unsuccessful operations of the army on the Upper Danube, on this the first day of a general advance, served as a pretext for the Central Chancellery to pronounce its strictures on the leaders of the divisions. Colonel Ashboth, in particular, was accused of having acted against the spirit of the dispositions, by venturing an attack when he was instructed to reconnoitre the enemy. At a later period Colonel Ashboth justified himself, by proving that the dispositions were so worded as to convey the idea, not of a reconnoitring expedition, but of an attack upon, and dislocation of, the enemy's forces, being recommended by the gentlemen of the Central Chancellery. But if these gentlemen had indeed meant to issue instructions for a reconnoitring expedition, they were the more wrong, since such an expedition seemed calculated to point out to the enemy the exact place on which we were preparing to direct our attack, thus giving them an opportunity to concentrate their troops at the threatened point in all comfort and security.

As for me, in my position at Raab, there was nothing to prevent my believing that Görgey intended to outmanœuvre the enemy—to induce

them to weaken their forces on the right bank of the Danube, and to concentrate them on the Waag—and finally, to execute a quick and decisive movement against the weakened part of the Austrian positions, thereby transferring the scene of the war to the right bank of the Danube. But I was greatly surprised when, on the 18th of June, I received official notice, from head-quarters, of Görgey's intention to repeat the unsuccessful attack of the 16th, with the second and third corps; to march our brave soldiers through the same moors, and to engage the enemy exactly in the same manner which had led to so much unnecessary bloodshed. I could not, under these circumstances, conquer my apprehensions—especially since news had come from the south, of Jellachich's advance, and of his occupation of the Channel line.* I resolved to address a friendly letter to Görgey, with whom I at one time lived on a footing of the greatest intimacy, but who had lately become subordinate to the influence of Colonel Bayer, the chief of his Central Chancellery. I wrote:—

"My dear Friend,

"Some weeks ago, when I drew up the plan for the defence of the country, I had cause to

* The "Franzens Canal," in the Batsh country.

believe that it would obtain your approbation. I am sorry to find that I was mistaken, and that your views differ from mine. I have for some time been convinced of this fact, by your directing the first corps to the Neutra; and my conviction has been strengthened by the late offensive movements of the second corps in the Shütt, and across the 'Neuhäusel arm.' Give me leave, therefore, to submit my views to you, not as an officer who serves under you, but as a friend.

"In the first instance, situated as we are, I must pronounce against any hasty movement in the offensive. An offensive war, with frequent defensive reactions—such is our task at this moment. It is the highest task, while it is the simplest in a national warfare. If we can but succeed in gaining time to recruit and concentrate our forces, we need not fear for an opportunity to annihilate the enemy's power; such an opportunity will, in that case, occur in the regular course of things. For God's sake, do not let us resign ourselves to illusions! Only a practical review of our condition—a calm and deliberate survey of the dangers which on every side surround us, can enable us to work the salvation of the country.

"If, as I proposed in my plan, these corps had been sent to Komorn, we might have defeated the enemy again and again on the right bank

and in the Shütt, and there would have been no occasion for Kmetty's assistance here. That officer, if reinforced with a few thousand men, and dispatched to the Drave, would, by his manœuvres in Jellachich's rear, and in the rear of the Austrian corps round Peterwarasdin, do some essential good to the movements of our southern army. I have daily entreated you to complete the corps in the Banat and the Batsh, to place them under the command of *one* man, and to create an efficient army in the south. This plan, too, was defeated by the jealous ambition of some commanders, who believed that such measures tended to limit the sphere of action of the individual leaders of corps. As it is, the Austrians have been beforehand with us: having their eyes open to their own advantage, they have concentrated an army in the South, which, in conjunction with the Austrian troops in Transylvania, will (even without the Servians) amount to from 30,000 to 40,000 men. So large a corps will, of course, be able not only to relieve the two fortresses of Arad and Temeshvar, but also to force us to leave the districts we have only just occupied in those parts. General Perczel,* the commander of the Banat army, fills his dispatches with accounts of his victories, although there is

* I was not, at the time, aware that General Vetter had taken the command of the troops in the Banat and Batsh country.

not one point on which he can concentrate anything like a respectable force. Suppose, now, Jellachich, with 30,000 men at his heels (and a junction with Puchner's corps would give him five regiments of horse), were to make his appearance on the left bank of the Danube? I do not mean to judge the actions of the individual leaders, but I will say, if our operations are swayed by the heedlessness of ambition, that ruin will and must overtake us.

"I protest that we ought not to be too greedy of victory, but that we ought, in the South as well as here, to re-form our available forces, so as to make them a guarantee to our cause, in order to avoid the necessity of staking the present and future welfare of the country on a single and desperate cast.

"Let me therefore entreat you, at your earliest convenience, to give existence and shape to the lower army, and to consign its command to energetic and trustworthy hands. As for this part of the country, let Komorn be the hinge on which our operations turn. Our position round that fortress is much more likely to awe the enemy than our feigned assumption of offensive warfare. It is the latter which the Austrians must desire, since it eventually will turn to their advantage. Do not let us be deluded. The Imperialists are likely to hold back for some time,

for the purpose of inducing us to leave our positions. What guarantee have we for the result of the contest, if we fall into this trap? And if the fate of war turns against us, who is to restore to the army its courage and confidence? Let the Austrians attack *us*, since they would conquer Hungary, and attack they will and must, though they do not at all seem to like the idea of such a thing, here on the Upper Danube.

"The perseverance in so imposing an attitude of defence as our present, is, in my opinion, what circumstances command us to do. Nor ought we to swerve from this line of action—or *in*-action if you please—until circumstances are changed, and until we have completed our preparations.

"In conclusion, let me entreat you again to send forces—no matter where they come from—to the Drave.

"KLAPKA.

"Raab, 18th June, 1849."

Before a reply to this letter could reach me, I was instructed by the Central Chancellery, at Dotish, to proceed to, and take the command on the Shütt island, during the general attack which on the 20th was to come off against the Austrian positions on the Waag, and to devote my especial attention to cover the "*trajet*" at Aszod, where

the Commander-in-Chief in person proposed to advance with the second corps.

It appeared then that my letter came too late, or that it failed to induce Görgey to oppose the plans of his staff, and nothing was left to me but to devote all my energies to the support of the adventurous attack against the Austrians, and in the event of its failure, to mitigate, as far as in me lay, the grievous character of the disaster.

The Austrian forces in the Shütt island amounted to three brigades, at Bösh, Alistal, and Vasarut. The forces with which I was to oppose them on this extended line, consisted of only four battalions, seven escadrons, and twelve field-pieces. It was to be expected that the Austrians, on being informed of Görgey's movements, would throw the bulk of their army upon Aszod, for the purpose of destroying the bridge of that place, and cutting off the retreat into the Shütt of the second corps.

I did not allow myself to be misled by the faulty dispositions of the Central Chancellery, and I especially directed my attention to the execution of what Görgey wished me to do, and to preserve him, in the case of a rout, from being annihilated in the corner between the Waag and the Neuhäusel Arm. On the 19th, therefore, leaving four battalions in Komorn, I threw the bulk of the garrison into the Shütt, where, joined to the forces

which I mentioned above, they took the following positions in the course of the nights of the 19th and 20th of June. Colonel Count Esterhazy, with two battalions, two escadrons, and four field-pieces, encamped at Nagy Medjer. Colonel Count Zichy, with two battalions, two escadrons, and four guns, stood at Szakallash; and Colonel Kosztolany, with four battalions, five escadrons, and twelve pieces of artillery, at Aszod.

The three roads leading to Komorn, as well as the bridge at Aszod, were covered as well as the small forces at my disposal allowed it. I myself took the command at Aszod, and for this purpose I started from Raab on the 19th for Komorn, from whence, after due preparations for the support of the troops in the Shütt, I proceeded to Aszod, where I arrived at the moment that the opening report of the artillery booming from Zsigard announced the commencement of the battle.

CHAPTER IV.

JUNE.

BATTLE OF ASZOD—FRESH DELAYS, AND NEGLECT OF THE CENTRAL CHANCELLERY—TRANSLOCATION OF THE IMPERIALISTS FROM THE WAAG TO THE RIGHT BANK OF THE DANUBE—ADVANCE OF THE AUSTRIANS AGAINST RAAB — RETREAT OF THE SEVENTH CORPS TO KOMORN—BATTLE OF JHAZA—KMETTY'S RETREAT TO THE LOWER DANUBE.

When Görgey received the news of our defeat on the 16th, he resolved to take the command in person, and thus to put a stop to all loose and desultory warfare, and to avenge the discomfiture of the Hungarian troops by a great and brilliant feat of arms. For this purpose he left Pesth for Komorn, and from thence, on the morning of the 20th, to the bivouac at Aszod.

I found him and his suite in a wood at some distance from the bridge. He came forward to meet me, and excused his non-attention to my last letter by asserting that it came to his hands

when he had already issued his dispositions, and that he could do nothing to revoke them. He protested his conviction that our views would harmonise better if we had met sooner, that "the attack on the enemy's positions on the Waag was necessary for the occupation of the Waag-line," and that "to-day's combat must lead to a decision."

This last assertion proves that Görgey ventured his attack on the strongest point of the Austrian positions only because he thought it indispensable for the occupation of the left bank of the Danube. It was an illusion (for I will take the mildest word) to think of the occupation of that bank on the height of Komorn, at the very moment when the advanced guard of the Russian army had already crossed the Carpathians, and while Grabbe, with a strong corps, stood at Arva.

The thunders of battle rolled in loud and continuous peals, when Görgey at length, (at ten o'clock in the morning,) mounted his horse and proceeded to the scene of the contest—a distance of ten miles from Aszod. His departure gave the decisive signal for the battle of Pered on the 20th and 21st of June.

The second corps stood on the 19th at Aszod in the Shütt; the small column of Major Rakovszky was at Nedjed on the Waag bank; the third corps was at Tardos Ked, and on the

Waag opposite to Negyed; the first corps was at Moczonok. The garrison of Komorn, as I stated before, took their place at Aszod on the night of the 20th June.

According to the dispositions which were issued on the 19th, the second corps was to cross the "Neuhäusel arm" early on the morning of the 20th, and to attack the enemy at Zsigard. The third corps was ordered at the same time to cross the Waag at Nedjed and to support the second corps, while the first corps was to force a passage across the Waag at Shintau, to advance upon Szered, and to effect a junction with the other corps on the right bank. The management of the Austrians in the Shütt was left to me and to the Komorn troops.

Görgey, as I stated before, reserved the chief command to himself.

The second corps, on which devolved the most arduous duties, crossed the "Neuhäusel arm" in the night of the 19th and 20th.

Its numbers, including the detached column at Nedjed, amounted to 7000 men.

The enemy, warned by the attack of the 16th, had drawn in his outposts to Zsigard, and the second corps reached Kiralyrev without meeting one of the patrols. The dense fog of the morning veiled the movements of either party. This was the favorable moment for an attack upon Zsigard,

when the enemy was unprepared, and open to a surprise. But no attack was made. Görgey had ordered them to wait for his arrival. The sun rose meanwhile. The fog cleared away, and the Austrians beheld, to their great astonishment, the Hungarian forces drawn up in battle array at the distance of but a thousand yards. They hastened to regain the positions which they occupied on the 16th. They mustered to the strength of two brigades. Their movements were precipitate and evidently confused. At that moment the roar of cannon sbunded from the banks of the Waag.

Major Rakovszky led his troops against Zsigard and the adjoining forest. The Austrians thus threatened in their rear, and believing that an overpowering force was marching upon them, covered their retreat by a fight of thirty minutes' duration; left their advantageous position at Zsigard, and came to a stand-still between Pered and Szelly, leaning with their left wing on the former place, and with their right on the latter.

At ten o'clock, A.M., Colonel Ashboth ordered the second corps to the charge without waiting for the arrival of the Commander-in-chief. He sent an officer back to report this movement.

The enemy, whose artillery force was stronger than ours, opened a violent cannonade upon our

storming columns. The fire was well kept up, and told upon the whole of our line.

At noon, their centre being sorely pressed, and their cavalry routed by the charge of some escadrons of Würtemberg hussars under Colonel Mandi, the Austrians sought to cover their line of retreat to Deaki. They drew in their right wing and took a more compact position at Pered. But Major Rakovszky, who had meanwhile joined the main column, and who commanded on the right wing of our corps, drove them from the plantations on the Waag to Pered, where he stopped, and placed his columns in order for an immediate assault upon that village. The place was kept by several Austrian battalions and two batteries. Their preparations showed Pered to be the key of their position, and that the fortunes of the day were bound up in its occupation. Colonel Ashboth therefore arranged a front attack of five battalions and two batteries, while Rakovzsky and his column advanced on the left side. Our troops marched with a firm and steady pace, in the midst of a furious fire of grape and grenades. The forty-eighth battalion had reached the church, when the enemy uncovered a masked battery, and opened a raking fire of ball and cartridge upon them, upon the troops that followed, and upon a division of Würtemberg hussars, who attacked from the opposite side. Our men

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were thrown back. Colonel Ashboth, painfully alive to the importance of the moment, rallied the retreating masses and placing himself at the head of three battalions, he again led them to the charge. The brave troops followed their intrepid leader. The main street was carried; every house, every courtyard, every garden, was the scene of a desperate combat. Austrians, Bohemians, and Poles, stood front to front and breast to breast with the Magyars. The Imperialists wavered at length. A retreat was attempted. They moved backwards—slowly and in good order at first, but another charge dispersed them, and the ebbing tide of their flight rolled to Deaki and Galantha. At two o'clock, P.M., we were in possession of Pered, with its dead, wounded, and captives. At this moment the third corps (nine battalions, fourteen escadrons, forty guns,) arrived. They had crossed the Waag at Nedjed.

Görgey, who had just made his appearance in the battle-field, took at once the command of the two corps, and ordered the troops to lie in bivouac at Pered.

The second corps bivouacked to the left, the third to the right. Two battalions and half a battery occupied Kiralyrev, and some minor detachments were thrown into N. Szelly and Selly. Incredible though it seems, still it is a fact, that

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Görgey sent no troops in pursuit of the enemy on their flight to Galantha, while Deaki, a village which lay at the distance of but 3000 yards from our line, was guarded only by a small piquet.

Colonel Ashboth had in the course of the day given ample proofs of his ability as a commander and his bravery as a soldier. Still Görgey could not forgive him for having proceeded to the attack without waiting for the arrival of the Commander-in-chief, and of the third corps, and for having thus hazarded the decision of the day. He felt an equal displeasure with General Knezich, the commander of the third corps, on account of his slowness and indecision, which in this instance, too, caused his late arrival on the scene of battle.

Görgey had scarcely come to Pered when he announced that the two officers had forfeited their commands. General Knezich's place was given to Colonel Leiningen, and Ashboth's command was handed over to Colonel Kaszony, the leader of the cavalry of the third corps.

This change of commanders was unseasonable, for it was difficult to replace their intimate knowledge of the peculiarities of their troops. This circumstance alone ought to have induced Görgey to make cautious dispositions for the following day, and such as would enable him to avoid a decisive

blow from the enemy, whose numbers by far exceeded those of our troops. For Görgey could not help being aware of the presence at Pressburg of 15,000 Russian troops, and nothing was more natural than that they would hasten to support their allies. Their advent increased the numbers of the enemy to 30,000, while our second and third corps mustered only 15,000. Our troops had, moreover, gone without their provisions for the last thirty-six hours. After the heat and the fatigues of the battle, they were left to hunger and thirst. But these considerations, and the dangerous corner which the conflux of the Waag and the "Neuhäusel arm" formed in our rear, and last, not least, the scanty means he had at his disposal for the "*trajet*" over those waters, failed to convince Görgey of the fact that little was to be gained by a victory, and that a defeat must lead to the total rout of his gallant troops. If the Austrian forces at Pered had indeed been dispersed and worsted on the first day of the battle, there would have been some reason to hope for success on the second day. But as it was, the blow had swerved from its direction by the incoherent character of our manœuvre, by Knezich's late arrival on the field of battle, by Ashboth's premature attack, and by the limited successes of the first corps at Szered. The Austrians had gained time to fall

back upon and to join their advancing reserve force. Our plan was to force their line. That plan was again to be considered as a failure.

The Imperialists reserve force marched up in the course of the night. On the morning of the 21st they advanced from Galantha and occupied Deaki.

Görgey took his position in front of Pered. The second corps, forming the right wing, extended to the Waag, while the second to the left of Pered occupied a ground which was exposed to the enemy's masked batteries. The village of Kiralyrev, on our extreme left, was, for the protection of our line of retreat, occupied by two battalions, one escadron, and one battery, under Major Rakovszky. The communication between this place and Pered was kept up by the cavalry (eight escadrons) of the second corps. The rest of our horse, with the exception of a few squadrons on our right wing, formed a reserve force in our rear, behind the village of Pered.

At ten o'clock, A.M., the enemy approached our line. Their artillery opened a terrible fire upon our unprotected position in front of Pered. Nevertheless, it was soon clear that this attack was only meant to amuse us, while the Austrians, aware of the weakness of our left wing, concentrated their main force against it. At eleven o'clock, A.M., large masses of foot and horse were seen moving into the unoccupied plain towards A. Szelly, who,

after the taking of that place, commenced an attack upon the village of Kiralyrev. Their intentions were now patent to all. The danger was great and imminent, and our preparations against an attack from that side were of the most limited nature.

Görgey gave his orders. Colonel Pigetti and twelve escadrons of hussars were hurried to the charge. Their onset created some confusion. The enemy fell back; but unmasking some batteries, they raked our hussars with a destructive fire of grape and canister. Confused in their turn, they waver and retreat. The Austrians press after them in hot pursuit. The enormous knot of hussars, cuirassiers, and lancers, galloping, charging, cutting, pell-mell, swept onward to Pered—pursuers and pursued locked in the mazes of a grand moving ring-fight—the shock was likely to prove irresistible and decisive. All of a sudden, the discharge of musketry rang from the cover of a plantation near Pered. It was well kept up, and did much execution. The enemy halt, fearing an ambush. Another discharge! the Austrian cavaliers turn their horses' heads, and the trace of their career is lost in a dense cloud of dust and smoke!

The danger was over. The crisis which threatened us turned to our advantage—thanks to the steadiness of the sixtieth battalion, which,

from its position behind the plantation, interfered with the rout, and compelled the enemy's horse to flight.

Still the Imperialists had, under the protection of this attack, pushed two strong columns forward, between Pered and Kiralyrev, while the space thus vacated on their left wing was taken up by the Russian division, Paniutine, which immediately engaged our third corps. Görgey had already, at an earlier period of the fight, left his position at Pered, and posted the third corps to the right of that village, while the second corps was thrown into Pered and Kiralyrev. The former place was now attacked by overpowering numbers, and with a strong artillery force; though obstinately defended by our troops, there was no way of holding out for any length of time; and when the news came that Kyralirev, too, had been carried by the enemy, Görgey found himself compelled, notwithstanding Leiningen's advantages over the Russians on the right wing, to leave his position, lest the enemy should surround him and attack his rear. A retreat commenced, and, notwithstanding the unfavorable nature of the ground, the two corps fell back in excellent order, presenting an imposing front to the enemy, while they divided, the third corps retreating to Nedjed, and the second to Aszod. Görgey, who accompanied this latter corps, insisted on its

retreat to the Shütt island, and to this end it was necessary to force a passage through the village of Kiralyrev, which had been occupied by the Austrians.

When Görgey arrived in front of this village with four battalions, the numbers of which were diminished, while the men were exhausted with fatigue, he ordered them to form in columns and to charge. Twice did the gallant soldiers make their way into the village, and twice were they driven back. For the third time they charged, and after a violent and bloody struggle, they occupied the place. Large numbers of Austrians fell before them; the houses and gardens of Kiralyrev were filled with corpses. Our honveds, drooping with hunger and fatigue, displayed an intensity of devotion, and a determined contempt of death, which stand almost unparalleled among the later combats of this war.

The storming of Kiralyrev enabled our troops to continue their retreat to Aszod. The third corps too remained unmolested, and crossing the Waag at Nedjed, they burnt the bridge in sight of the enemy.

Our loss in killed and wounded, on the 20th and 21st of June, amounted to the number of 2500. The Russian artillery had proved destructive to our train horses, and many of our batteries had lost one-half of their horses.

The village of Aszod lies amidst rich corn-fields and pasturage, to the left of the road which, communicating between Guta and Vasarut, runs along the embanked dyke of the "Neuhäusel arm," and close to the spot where that road, at the distance of five miles or so from Nyarasd, joins the high road which leads from Pressburg to Vasarut and Szerdahely. About a thousand yards to the right from Aszod is the bridge, which Ashboth crossed when he advanced to Zsigard, and which I had been instructed to cover while the other troops were engaged at Pered. There are three roads leading from Aszod: to Apatza Szakallas, where Colonel Zichy's division stood, to Kiralyfölde and Nyarasd, and to the Guta road. This last road is, of course, extremely short.

After my interview with Görgey, I returned to the right bank of the Danube, and ordered Kosztolanyi's division (which had been placed at my disposal) to bivouac on either side of the Guta road, and to cook their dinners. I felt assured that the enemy would soon occupy all our time, and that they would have hard work in the course of the day.

At noon I received information from my patrols at Nyarasd that the Austrians were coming down upon us from Vasarut and Albar. I sent an

escadron of Karoly's hussars * to reconnoitre them, but before my hussars reached Nyarasd, they were fired at by the enemy.

I had no desire to fight the battle too near the bridge, which I was instructed to cover. I ordered my troops forward to meet the enemy. Kosztolanyi's force of two battalions, one escadron, and four field-pieces, advanced in two lines on the Guta road, along the Danube, while Colonel Rohomzi, with three escadrons of Caroly hussars, and one flying battery, advanced in a parallel line by way of Kiralyfölde. Between the two columns, and behind them, marched the reserve forces—two battalions, one escadron, and four field-pieces—under Colonel Janik. At the same time Colonel Zichi received orders to advance on the high road of Apatza Szakallas, and to protect my left wing. My intention was to force the position of Nyarasd, and to drive the enemy's column, which advanced upon that place, back to Vasarut. If I succeeded in this, I was sure that I should not be attacked in the course of the following day, but that I could remain undisturbed in my position at Aszod.

The enemy occupied Nyarasd, and the plantation on their left wing (in front of the village), with a considerable force. Their reserves were in

* A new regiment, which had just been formed.

the rear; their cavalry stood to the right of the place. Before they could think of advancing another step, they were engaged by Kosztolanyi, who set on them with his battalions and carried the plantation. Upon this a lengthened cannonade ensued, which assumed a very decided character on our left wing, and in consequence of which the enemy's artillery was forced to retreat to the village. Kosztolanyi, leaving the plantation, led his storming columns in their track, when the enemy's horse, who had hitherto kept quiet, charged upon my left wing. Our horsemen advanced to meet them, and a fearful shock ensued. Our hussars, though young, and not yet broken to the fight, held out with great energy; but when another Austrian column threatened their flank, they turned to a disorderly flight. They were stopped by an escadron of Hunyadi hussars, whom I sent to their support. They rallied, while our artillery, advancing, kept the enemy at bay. Rohomzi, to make up for the disgrace of the flight, led his young troopers back to the charge. But their courage was broken. Again they were repulsed. It was then I came forward to rally them. Owing to this unfortunate cavalry fight, I was forced to recal my right wing, which had already entered the village. I fell back upon the next position in my rear. My attack was changed into defence.

The enemy, aware that their right wing was engaged with young and inexperienced soldiers, followed up their advantage with the whole of their cavalry force. This was the third attack; it was as disastrous in its consequences as the two preceding ones. The enemy's horse gained ground, and commenced to threaten my rear. I advanced an escadron of Hunyadi hussars, the only old troopers I had, and ordered them to charge the enemy's horse. In vain! They recoiled after the shock, and nothing was now left to me but to do without any cavalry, and to fight the battle with my infantry on the right wing. Colonel Janik, whose reserve force (sixty-fourth and eighteenth honved battalion) had as yet taken no part in the engagement, arrived on the field at the very moment when I myself was in danger of being captured. Some discharges from these battalions astonished the enemy, and scared them away. My foot advanced: the artillery was brought up, and a well-directed fire soon put a stop to all further attacks. The engagement was restored to its proper level, and the hussars took their place in the line. And since Kosztolanyi managed to keep his position on my right wing, while Zichi's detachment advanced (though slowly) from Apatza Szakallas, the enemy, losing all hopes of success, retreated to Nyarasd, and from thence to Vasarut.

My troops were fatigued: I ordered them into bivouac, and wrote a letter to Görgey, telling him that I could not answer for the success of the following day, unless I had a division of old hussars. In the same letter I asked for news of the battle of Zsigard and Pered.

I then sent Colonel Zichi back to his former position.

At nine o'clock, P.M., I received Görgey's reply. He informed me of the events of the day, and of the taking, not only of Zsigard and Pered, but also of Szeli, Deaki, and Sellye. His letter showed him to be confident of success.

On the 21st, the reports of artillery from Pered resounded from morning to night. I ordered my troops to have their rest and dinner. I was prepared for a hot engagement, in the case of Görgey being forced to retreat. The hussars, who the day before had fought with so little success, promised to atone for their delinquencies, and entreated me to give them an opportunity of showing their altered frame of mind.

At three o'clock, P.M., the reports of artillery drew nearer; at four o'clock the first vans arrived at the bridge, and after them, wounded men, and soldiers that had strayed from their battalions. They all protested that the battle was lost, and that the army was in full retreat. Upon this, I sent patrols and orderlies to ascer-

tain the fate of the day. They returned at six o'clock, P.M., and confirmed the statements I had received. A short time afterwards, I received Görgey's own report of his retreat with the second corps, and of his intention to arrive at Aszod bridge at eight o'clock, P.M.

The Austrians had meanwhile jostled my small detachments out of Nyarasd, and drawn a battle-line in front of that place and of Alistál. But when they found us immovable, they formed in four columns, which, spreading in a crescent, moved down upon Aszod, evidently preparing for a concentrated attack. This was at six o'clock, P.M. Considering the ground between me and the enemy, I knew that they could not open the fight before seven. I felt convinced of being strong enough to cover Görgey's crossing, and to keep my positions; and I was also aware of the fact, that the Austrians were not likely to fight later than nightfall, but that they would retreat to Nyarasd.

With the four battalions, five escadrons, and ten field-pieces at my disposal, I occupied the following positions:—

Kosztolanyi, with two battalions and four three-pounders, was posted on the Guta road, about 1000 yards from the bridge towards Nyarasd.

Janik, with two battalions, occupied Aszod, and a small farm which lay near that village, in the

direction of Apatza Szakallas. Two half horse-batteries were favorably placed under cover, at a distance of from 500 to 600 yards from Aszod. Under cover, on either side of this artillery, stood four escadrons of hussars. The rest of my cavalry kept up the communication between Kosztolanyi and Janik; between the village and the Guta road.

At seven o'clock, P.M., the advanced guard of the second corps arrived at Aszod bridge; and, at the very moment, Kosztolanyi, on the right wing, fired his first shot at the enemy. The artillery force of the Austrians — five or six batteries at the least—came forward, and opened a murderous fire against our close position. Our artillery returned the fire with exemplary firmness and steadiness. The contest had lasted above an hour, and still the Austrians, though thrice outnumbering us, had not gained an inch of ground. I stood in front of the village, which they literally *covered* with grenades, to exhort the battalion which was posted at that place to perseverance, and to show the officer Görgey's forces, which were just in the act of crossing the bridge, and whose destruction, unless we stood our ground, was the more certain, as our horse-battery, partly dismounted by the enemy's fire, had made a hasty retreat. At that moment I saw that my left wing was threatened. The enemy was the more able

to surround us, since Zichi, deceived by some of their patrols, instead of advancing on the high-road, remained inactive at Apatza Szakallas. Nothing was left to me, but to place myself at the head of the battery, and to conduct it to its former place. The artillerymen were brave, and so was their officer. They had already recovered from the first shock of their defeat, and turning round upon the advancing enemy, they poured in a strong and well-directed fire. The Commander-in-chief, who had arrived from Pered, and with whom I had communicated on the subject, sent me a detachment of Würtemberg hussars, and half a battery, for the support of my left wing. These reinforcements enabled me to repel the enemy's columns, and to restore the engagement to its level. And, since the right wing kept its place on the Guta road, and darkness had set in, the Austrians, as I supposed they would, contented themselves with firing their cannon to a late hour of night, when they retreated to Nyarasd and Vasarut. Thus ended this eventful day, which might have witnessed the rout and ruin of a large part of the Hungarian army, if the Austrians had attacked me sooner, and if they had turned their numerical superiority to a better account.

Görgey, riding in a peasant's cart, had arrived on the banks of the Waag, just when the fight commenced. He appeared out of spirits and

depressed about the unfortunate result of his expedition, and he manifested great anxiety as to the ultimate results of the day, when he saw the advance of so strong a hostile power, and at a moment, too, when his troops, worn out with fatigue and the hunger of a two days' battle, were looking to the Shütt island for repose and sustenance. While the combat lasted, he again took to his horse, and assisted in the manœuvres of the right wing. It was ten o'clock, P.M., when the engagement subsided on all sides. The second corps bivouacked between Aszod and the bridge, and at the dawn of morning, when all the troops had crossed, the bridge was destroyed. My own battalions took their rest in the positions which they occupied during the engagement.

At two o'clock I met Görgey in the village; and we resolved, in the course of that very night, to move our troops back to the position which they occupied previous to our movement on the 10th. The second corps was consequently to occupy Guta; Kosztolanyi's division was to march to Apatza Szakallas, and cover the Komorn road. An outpost was to be left behind at Aszod.

I was still conversing with Görgey, when a few reports were heard. They were followed by a straggling fire of musketry along the whole length of the line. We mounted our horses. The night

was very dark, and I anticipated a surprise. But on finding out that the disturbance was owing to a false alarm, I took my leave of Görgey, and issued my instructions for Kosztolanyi's march. At one o'clock, A.M., his column proceeded through the corn-fields to Apatza Szakallas, where they arrived at daybreak, and established themselves in the camp in front of the village, without any molestation from the Austrians either on that or the following day.

I returned to Komorn. But being at that time seized with a violent fever, I retreated from the malaria of that place, and sought to regain my health in the purer air of Dotish.

After the complete success of his fourth corps, and the Russian reserve division on the Waag, General Haynau thought that the moment was favourable, with concentrated forces, to act on the offensive on the right bank of the Danube, and to advance against Raab.

On the day after the battle of Pered, the whole of the Imperialist troops, excepting Potts' brigade, were ordered back to Pressburg, where they were to cross the Danube, and to join the other troops in their advance upon Raab.

On the 26th, the Imperialists—viz., the first, third, and fourth corps, the cavalry, and the Russian reserve, were on the road from Pressburg to Raab, and on the Rabnitz river, while none but

the second Austrian corps occupied the larger Shütt island and the left bank of the Danube.

The enemy's intentions were now patent. They had so clumsily masked their retreat from the Waag and the larger Shütt, that, from the reports which we received from all sides, there could be no doubt as to the direction of their march. An equal clearness was thus thrown on the movements which *we* were called upon to make. The enemy gave us an opportunity of offering them a decisive battle, with equal, and indeed with larger forces, on a ground which gave us all the advantages of a superior position while it left us a safe retreat. A garrison might have been left at Komorn, and on the banks of the Waag; and on the 26th or 27th, or, if marching in short stages, on the 28th, our army could have effected a junction with Pöltenberg and Kmetty, and thus mustering no less than 40,000 men, they might have taken a strong position in and around Raab town and river. But instead of taking these simple measures, the Central Chancellery fell, after the battle of Pered, into a maudlin helplessness, which at length, and in spite of all persuasions to the contrary, resulted in Pöltenberg being left, with 9000 men, to defend the city of Raab against the whole Imperialist army. He was thus devoted to a certain defeat.

Never was there any institution so proficient in the art of killing time as Görgey's pet Board,

the Central Chancellery and their chief, the Colonel Bayer. The second corps, which, in the night of the 22nd, had been sent to Guta, remained three days in that place: on the 26th it marched to Neuhäusel, and on that day it was concentrated at Komorn, in order that it might—according to Bayer's instructions—make up for the loss of time by a march of forty miles, from Komorn to Raab, there to support Pöltenberg. The battles on the Waag had diminished this corps by one-half, and the selecting and marching it according to Colonel Bayer's orders was the surest means to leave Pöltenberg, if at all attacked by the enemy, unsupported and isolated.

While Haynau thus advanced, no notice whatever was taken, for ten days at least, of our second and third corps, which, for no earthly purpose whatever, remained on the left bank of the Danube. With such mistakes, it was no wonder that the Government at Pesth lost confidence in Görgey's generalship, and that the party increased in power which insisted on a change in the command of the armies on the Upper Danube.

Pöltenberg's isolated position became every day more difficult, and his entreaties for support more pressing. On the 28th, the Imperialists had taken Hochstrass, from whence they advanced two columns against Teth and Eneshe. The first

of these columns crossed the Raab river in the course of that day at Cseiseny, and advancing to the Papa road, it cut off Kmetty's line of march to the city of Raab, while the weakness of the forces at our disposal prevented us from doing anything to prevent them.

The city of Raab is well built, and contains a population of 20,000 inhabitants. It lies at the junction of the rivers Raab and Rabnitz with the Danube (that part of the river being called the Raab-Danube-arm), and it is the centre of the various highways on the right bank of the Danube. Three of these highways lead to the capitals of Hungary, while three other roads communicate with Austria and Styria. The fortifications of Raab, which were built in the course of the Turkish wars, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were, in 1809, destroyed by the French, who spared no part of the old walls, except the bastion fronting the Raab river and the arm of the Danube. These remains of the fortress form the apex of the angle which is formed by the Raab, Rabnitz, and the Danube-arm; while the suburbs of Raab are situate between two lines of that angle — viz., the Ujvaros suburb, between the rivers Raab and Rabnitz; and the Sziget suburb, between the Rabnitz and the arm of the Danube. Opposite to the city itself, on the lesser Shütt island (which is formed by the Danube river

and the Raab-Danube-arm,) lies the village of Revfalu, commanded by the rest of the fortifications.

With regard to tactics, the position of Raab towards Hochstrass has many disadvantages; its principal drawbacks are the rivers which cross that position, and which admit of a combined and equal defence only when there is no lack of means of communication. Besides, the position is too large for any but a considerable force, especially if the defence is to be extended to the frith of the Rabnitz at Abda and the banks which command it.

Having at an earlier period directed Pöltenberg's attention to these circumstances, I marked out a more limited circle of defence, and for this purpose I had strong entrenchments thrown up at the most important point,—viz., at the crossing of Csorna and Wieselburg roads. I issued instructions to throw bridges over the Rabnitz, for the purpose of securing a communication between the suburbs;* the Sziget suburb was to be strongly entrenched and barricaded. I regret to say that my orders were not executed. The entrenchments of Sziget and the bridge over the Rabnitz were neglected. This neglect was the more fatal, since even with all these means of defence, our

* Ujvaros and Sziget.

seventh corps had but little chance of protecting Raab against an hostile force of five times our number, and to provide against our being outflanked at Menfö on the Papa road.

The second corps, which left Komorn on the 19th with instructions to support our forces at Raab, could not make its way to that city, for it was necessary to rest our fatigued and wayworn troops on the road at Puszta Sz. Janos. Though still suffering when I received the news of an impending attack upon Raab, I hastened from Komorn (which I left at noon,) to the field of battle. At six o'clock, P.M., I arrived near the Dove Inn, on the Raab road, where I found Görgey in the act of rallying his retreating battalions.

The attack of the Imperialists had commenced at noon. Their chief column, composed of the first corps, and the Russian reserve division, advanced from Hochstrass upon Abda, for the purpose of crossing the Rabnitz and engaging our front. Two flank columns were pushed forward; one against the Sziget suburb, and the other against Revfalu in the lesser Shütt. The fourth Austrian corps and their cavalry division crossed the Rabnitz at a higher point, intending to advance by Lesvár,* upon the flank of our posi-

* Between the Raab and Rabnitz.

tion. The third Austrian corps, under General Ramberg, had already on the previous day taken up a position on the road from Raab to Papa, where it advanced a division to oppose our troops under Kmetty, who had marched from Papa to Jhaza.

General Pöltenberg took the limited position which I, at an earlier period, had marked out for the defence. The entrenchments at Ujvaros were given in charge of Colonel Kossuth, with two battalions, six escadrons, and seven pieces of artillery; while the position of Sziget and that of Revfalu, in the lesser Shütt, were each occupied by two battalions, two escadrons, and eight field-pieces. Two battalions and two batteries were placed in the city as a reserve force. The rest of the seventh corps, consisting of four battalions, eight escadrons, and ten pieces of artillery, took a strong position at Menfö, on the Papa road, for the purpose of opposing the enemy's columns, which, in that direction, were preparing to outflank us.

The Abda bridge was broken off. The entrenchments on our side of the Rabnitz were armed with some guns, which first opened on the enemy as they advanced from Hochstrass, and which would have succeeded in effectually stopping their progress, had not some other detachments which advanced from Lesvár, compelled Pölten-

berg to give up this post, and to fall back upon his entrenchments in the rear. The battle now extended over the whole line, from Menfö to Révfalu. Our troops fought with great gallantry and perseverance, but they were compelled to yield the ground to the enemy's superior numbers. Only in the entrenchments of Ujvaros on the Abda road, Colonel Kossuth stood his ground immovably against the Imperialists, whose forces mustered eight times stronger than his own. His entrenchments were first attacked by a brigade, and, in the next instance, by the whole corps of Austrian reserves; and, finally, when the *gros* of the Austrian army had crossed the Rabnitz at Abda, they were attacked by a whole corps at once. All was in vain. It was then that the Austrian General Schlick brought ten batteries to bear upon this single point. Some of our powder-carts exploded, our guns were dismounted, and our gunners mowed down in files: still Colonel Kossuth and his heroes kept the place which they had defended for the last three hours. But Sziget was evacuated by our troops, and the Austrian columns which entered that suburb prepared to attack his rear. Compelled to retreat, he quits his position in the greatest order, and falls back upon the city of Raab, after destroying the bridge which crosses the Raab river, under the walls of the

bastion. The other columns had already crossed it, for Colonel Kossuth was the last to retreat. This done, our troops quitting Raab, proceeded to the Gönyö road, and took up a position near the Dove Inn, where I found Görgey, and where he himself had just arrived to take the chief command of the troops.

Colonel Liptai's operations at Menfö had, meanwhile, proved equally unsuccessful. His cavalry was thrown back in several onsets. The enemy's successes at Raab compelled him, too, to leave his position. When I arrived, Colonel Liptai was just falling back upon Kiss Megyer, to re-establish his communication with Pöltenberg. Görgey had no news of Colonel Kmetty; that officer was cut off. Afterwards we learned that he had fought a battle at Jháza; that he obtained some advantage, but that, receiving no news of the operations of the second corps, he marched, at nightfall, back to Papa, and from thence to Veszprim.

Görgey remained on the Gönyö road; and to stop the enemy in their pursuit, he kept the corps for some time in line of battle. He then commissioned me to take the lead of the wing which retreated from Menfö; and, after an honourable engagement of his rear guards, which continued to a late hour at night, and in which he repulsed the enemy's columns as they ad-

vanced on our track, he arranged the retreat of our right wing and centre to Gönyö, and of the left to Sz. Ivan, and Atsh. After a few hours' rest in the two first-named places, the two columns effected a junction with the second corps at Atsh, where they encamped on the heights in front of that place, and in a covered position behind the Czonczo, on the outskirts of the Atsh forest.

Business of importance induced me at that time to leave the army for Pesth, though for one day only; and Görgey, who readily consented to this step, charged me to confer with the Government on the progress and prospects of the war.

CHAPTER V.

JULY.

CONFERENCE WITH KOSSUTH AT PESTH—BATTLE AT ATSH ON THE 2ND JULY—GÖRGEY IS WOUNDED—HE IS RECALLED—MESZAROS IS APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND—HE CANNOT JOIN THE ARMY—THE SPIRIT WHICH PREVAILED AMONG THE TROOPS—A COUNCIL OF WAR—KLAPKA AGAIN ATTEMPTS TO MEDIATE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND GÖRGEY—ANOTHER CONFERENCE WITH KOSSUTH—GÖRGEY REMAINS WITH THE ARMY.

A STEAMBOAT journey of six hours brought me from Komorn to Pesth, where I arrived early on the morning of the 1st July.

Our losses on the Waag and the Raab; the successes of the Ban Jellachich in the Batsh country; the irresistible advance of the Russian invaders in the north of Hungary, and in Transylvania, followed each other in such rapid succession, that the people—worn out with confusion, anxiety, and lethargy—stood in quiet expectation of the coming events. Large masses

were congregating on the banks of the Danube, eager to snatch at any stray news that might happen to come from the scene of war. The streets were sad, sullen and silent; the shops were closed—all work was at a stand-still. Raw levies marching here and there — carts with wounded soldiers — orderlies hurrying to and fro: it was thus I found the city of Pesth on the 1st of July, 1849.

After a short visit at my father's I proceeded to Kossuth's, where I found the ministers Szemere, Kasimir Batthyanyi, and the General Perczel. They were in expectation of the return of the Generals Kiss and Aulich, and of the minister Csanyi, whom the Governor, on receiving the last reports from the army, had sent to Görgey. When Kossuth saw me, he complained with great bitterness of the manner in which the war on the Upper Danube was being conducted. He protested that Görgey had listened by far too much to Colonel Bayer's advice, and that Bayer had shown himself by no means a fit and able person for a chief of the staff and of the Central Chancellery. He told me that Csanyi, Aulich, and Kiss, had been sent to Komorn to arrange the immediate retreat of the upper army and its junction with the army under Visocki's command; and he further protested that he expected obedience from Görgey and the other leaders of the

army. A concentration of our forces on the Theiss or Maros, he said, was our only means of saving the country from the impending danger.

After Kossuth, the subject was taken up by General Perczel, who handled it in his usual passionate manner. An enemy of Görgey's at all times, he had often branded him with the name of a traitor. He felt that the moment had come in which he might give vent to his feelings, and insist on the chief command being given to some other general. Perczel, I grieve to say, had less of modesty and devotion, than of passion and ambition. He had not said many words when he identified Görgey with the army, and by his abuse of that gallant body he compelled me to a rejoinder. I begged he would respect the honor of the brave soldiers whose heroism had spread the fame and the glory of Hungary to the farthest ends of the world. An unpleasant altercation ensued, which was interrupted by Szemere's interference, and Perczel, as well as the other chiefs, were at length perfectly satisfied with the explanations I gave of the condition of the army. After waiting in vain for the return of the commissioners, and after various conversations on the progress of our operations in other parts of the country, I took my leave of Kossuth and returned to Komorn on that very day.

Early on the morning of the 2nd, I went to

Görgey, whose head-quarters at Komorn were near the Waag bridge, to report my arrival and to communicate to him those parts of my conversation with Kossuth which referred—not to his person—but to the service. The generals and Csanyi had left the day before—after receiving Görgey's promise that the army should be concentrated, and that the retreat should commence. This I learnt from Görgey, who added that, since that time, an attack on the entrenched camp might be anticipated from the advance of the Imperialists by Atsh, and that to leave the camp undefended would be a disgraceful action. He protested that when he pledged his word to retreat, he could not anticipate such an advance on the part of the Austrians, and that he was afraid he should not be able to stand by his promise. Before we came to an understanding on this point, the enemy's advance was intimated to us by the reports of artillery from the right bank of the Danube.

Görgey ordered me to superintend our left wing and our centre, while he himself took the command of our right. He intended to keep the heights and entrenchments of Monostor (the most important point of our position), to resign the ground behind the Czonczo rivulet from Atsh to Igmand and the Buda road, and to draw our forces to the entrenched camp of

Komorn. Of this plan he informed the Government in a laconic epistle, on which I intend to enlarge at another occasion, because it exerted a fatal influence on the conduct of the war and the progress of events.

The Austrians under Haynau had, on the 29th June, marched from Raab, on the line of Gönyö and Böny, to Mezöörs. On the 30th June they advanced their left wing to Atsh, their centre to N. Igmand and Bábolna, and their right wing to Kisber. On the 1st July, they pressed upon our advanced detachments, and pushed them out of the Atsh forest, which they occupied, as well as Csem and Herkaly. There could be no doubt but that they intended from that point to venture an attack upon our entrenched camp.

The fortifications of this camp are on a chain of hills, which forms a half circle, and which includes Uj-Szöny and the *tête du pont* of the right bank of the Danube. The highest point of this range of hills, the Monostor, lies above Uj-Szöny, and close to the banks of the river. It is the pivot of the position. From the height of that hill, the besieging army is enabled to commence the siege, to command the Danube, and to bombard the city and fortress of Komorn on the Shütt island opposite. As early as the autumn of 1848, the Hungarian Government resolved to entrench these dangerous elevations, and

to prepare them for the protection of the ground in their rear. Lieutenant-General Török * undertook the construction of these fortifications; but he executed them on so extended a plan, that, in the course of the first siege, the weak garrison of Komorn could not manage to defend them. When we relieved the fortress on the 20th of April, we were compelled to carry every inch of these heights at the point of the bayonet. The greatest care had since been taken in the reconstruction of the entrenchments; the plan was improved, and on the sand hill near the *tête du pont*, on the Igmand road, a new and strong redoubt was built; it was spacious enough to harbor 800 men, and from nine to ten pieces of artillery. There are ten entrenchments in this camp. They are numbered and named, commencing with the Monostor hill, and proceeding to the new redoubt on the Igmand road. This redoubt (No. 8) has two "flêches," (9 and 10), in the direction of the village of O-Szöny, which unite it with the *tête du pont* on the Danube, opposite to and under the command of the fortress. The four first entrenchments, situate on the right wing of the Monostor, have closed gorges; they are strengthened by advanced sconces. All the others, with the excep-

* He was promoted to the rank of General, and executed at Arad.

tion of the redoubt No. 8, are open gorged. The whole of the works are of firm construction, and surrounded by trenches, with palisadoes, chevaux-de-frise, and other obstacles.

The communication of the camp with the island of Shütt was kept up by means of two pontoon bridges, of which one led from Uj-Szöny to the city, while the other united the *tête du pont* with the fortress. This *tête du pont*, which consists of a strong and bomb-proof star fort and of six smaller redoubts, forming a demi-circle to the right and left, is the *noyeau* of the camp.

Had Görgey, instead of allowing the strongest of his corps to remain on the Waag, concentrated the whole of the upper army in this strong position, he might, with justice, have expected to return each unsuccessful assault of the Austrians by a decisive attack upon them, and thus to reconquer the possession of the right bank of the Danube. But as it was, the Hungarian forces were, on the 2nd of July again, and for the third time, divided,—and for the third time they were incapable to ensure a greater success to the advantages which they obtained at so enormous a sacrifice, and by so heroic a devotion.

The forces which were concentrated in the camp consisted of the second, third, and seventh corps, and of the garrison of Komorn (four bat-

talions), making a total of 22,000 men, with 4000 horses, and 124 pieces of artillery.

The three first redoubts, with their advanced *flêches* on our right wing, were held by Colonel Janik with the four Komorn battalions, and three battalions of the second corps. Behind the redoubts 3 to 7, in the centre, was the second corps under Pöltenberg; and redoubt 8, and the entrenchments 7 and 10, with the *tête du pont* of O-Szöny (forming the left wing of our position), were occupied by the third corps under Leiningen.

The second corps, forming the reserve, was in and around Uj-Szöny.

After this preliminary statement, I return to the battle of Komorn on the 2nd of July.

At eight o'clock, A.M., the "*gros*" of the Austro-Russian army left their position at Igmand and Atsh, and advanced to attack our entrenchments. It appears that the enemy wished us to develope our forces without the *rayon* of our fortifications, to attack us, to follow at our heels, to take the entrenchments, and to drive us into the fortress. For this purpose there was an advance of strong hostile columns, who, marching by Csem and Motsa, moved upon our left wing, while strong divisions advanced likewise on the Atsh and Lorad road, and among the vineyard hills on the banks of the

Danube, in front of Uj-Szöny. The last-named forces directed their march upon the Monostor. In the centre of the semicircle which the enemy's advancing masses formed, their reserve stood forth on the heights of Csem and at Puszta Herkály.

When I arrived on the field of battle, I learned that General Leiningen, yielding to his impetuous zeal, had thrown part of our horse, under General Piketti, against the advancing enemy. The shock came off between Motsa and O-Szöny, and though favorable at first, the result was fatal to our men. Some of our best field-batteries, which supported this attack, and which, when the enemy fell back, advanced too far, were cut off in the course of the second and unsuccessful attack, and remained in the hands of the enemy. I came in time to witness the retreat of our discomfited troops, who sought the protection of the entrenchments: and I at once gave my orders to concentrate the third corps in that place, to limit it to the defence of the fortifications, and to be prepared to support our right wing, which was already hard pressed, and on which the fortunes of the day depended. O-Szöny and its environs were left to the enemy. The battle commenced amidst these unfavorable circumstances.

The Austrian forces outnumbered ours. If the contest on the Monostor ended with our defeat, part of our army was likely to be cut off from the

retreat, and to be driven into the Danube. The Monostor was the point of danger; and it was indispensable that we should direct the whole of our attention to that point. The combat had for some time raged in that direction, when the enemy succeeded in dislodging our *tirailleurs* from the vineyards of Uj-Szöny, and to advance against our entrenchments. The outer works are taken: the Austrian colors* are hoisted on the walls, and our battalions retreat to the inner line of fortifications. Again the enemy forms, and prepares to attack the entrenchments, while a column, destined to attack our rear, is pushed forward along the Danube, and protected by the high banks of that river. It was at this moment when the danger was most imminent, that Görgey appeared on the threatened point. His presence encouraged the retreating troops: they rallied and renewed the fight. The Austrian column, too, which had been despatched to attack our rear, and which advanced along the Danube, was at this juncture exposed to a murderous fire of grape and canister, from a covered strand-battery on the island opposite, which mowed them down, and caused them to consult their safety in a wild and disorderly flight. The battle was thus restored to a better level. Having

* Black and yellow.

concentrated his battalions, and placing the forty-eighth and Don Miguel in the vanguard, Görgey pushed them forward against the enemy's advancing columns. The sconces were retaken at the point of the bayonet, and the enemy was pursued through the vineyards, to the Atsh forest. Simultaneously with the attack of our foot, the Hungarian batteries opened from all the cuttings, upon the Austrians, who, on either side of the Atsh road, supported their storming columns (against the Monostor,) with the fire of a number of batteries, and who, when assailed with a few murderous discharges from our positions, felt the necessity of making good their retreat. The whole of the enemy's left wing (three to four brigades), vainly supported by the reserves, staggered, dispersed, and fled. Nor did they rally, nor take a position, until they reached the Atsh forest; and the battle, in which we had hitherto kept the defensive, was now changed to an offensive warfare from our side. A general advance took place. Our cavalry sallied from the entrenchments, and deployed opposite to the enemy's centre.

The time had come for the left wing, too, to leave its passive position, and to re-conquer O-Szöny, and the ground which had been lost in the commencement of the engagement. O-Szöny was occupied by one brigade only; but the vineyards around it, and the heights of Motsa, were

held by strong detachments of the enemy's reserve corps. At five o'clock, P.M., I took seven battalions of the third corps—leaving the rest to garrison the *tête-du-pont*—and led them against O-Szöny and the hostile forces in its environs. An obstinate and bloody contest ensued. My storming columns advanced twice into the very heart of the village, and twice were they repulsed by fresh troops of Austrians hastening to the rescue. My third attack, which I supported with some fresh columns, with two batteries, and with the guns from the fortress, playing upon our side of the river, decided the fight. We carried the village, and forced the enemy to make a hasty and disorderly retreat (with our batteries spurring their rear) to Motsa. At the time I made this attack, I sent the whole of the cavalry force of the third corps (ten escadrons) except a few escadrons, which I kept to cover my flank, against Motsa, to support our advance against Herkaly and Csém.

At half-past six, P.M., a force of twenty-nine escadrons of hussars was drawn up in our centre. Led by Pöltenberg, and in the second instance by the Commander-in-chief in person, they attempted to break through the enemy's lines.

Haynau saw the danger. He advanced the Russian reserve, and sent to his right wing for his cavalry. Our hussars attack, and successfully

too: the Austrian horse, who oppose them, are driven back; and, amidst clamor and flashing of swords, the *razzia* sweeps down upon the Russian columns at Csém, where the career of our bold horsemen is stopped by fifty guns, from a covered position, hurling death and destruction into their ranks. They halt. The broken ground admits of their rallying under cover. The Hungarian horse-batteries advance at the top of their speed: they draw up, unlimber, and return the enemy's fire. But their perseverance and devotion avail not; the Russian artillery prevails. Our batteries are silenced, and forced to fall back.

The last great attack was equally unsuccessful, for the enemy displayed large masses of cavalry against our flank, and Görgey, who, while fighting in the *mêlée*, had been wounded in the head, was compelled to desist from his attempt of forcing the enemy's line. Night was setting in; and since, owing to the dilatory movements of the troops which were to support our brave storming columns in the Atsh forest, we could not think of keeping that position, we were compelled, in spite of the favorable chances of the day, to be satisfied with the brilliant defence of our camp against the superior forces of the Austro-Russian army.

We had lost 1500 men in killed and wounded. The enemy, who numbered 30,000 men, lost about 3000. The corpses of the Austrians lay in

large heaps on the banks of the river, in front of the entrenchments of the Monostor and in the vineyards of Uj-Szöny. At nine o'clock, P.M., the last shots were fired on either side. The enemy retreated to their former position, while we again established ourselves in the camp at O-Szöny and behind the entrenchments. Görgey, who had fought heroically in the course of the day, left the field of battle with a wound.

When I called upon him in the course of that evening, I found him in bed, and in the hands of the surgeons. He seemed in good spirits about the courage and perseverance of the troops and the result of the battle. As to his wound, he did not seem to care for it.

When I arrived in my quarters, I found a courier with the following letters from Kossuth:

"MY DEAR GENERAL,

"Görgey has broken his word, which he pledged to a minister of state and two generals.

"He shall remain Secretary-at-war, but the chief command cannot be allowed to rest another moment in his hands. The Field-Marshal-Lieutenant Meszaros has been appointed to that post.

"Perhaps Görgey will refuse to obey. That would be infamous! It were treason—as, indeed, the breach of his word, and his blind submission to Bayer's influence, is akin to treason.

"General! the liberty of our country and the liberty of Europe depend upon there being at this moment no dissensions, no party quarrels in the army.

"In you I respect a Roman character. Our country and our liberty above all! Support General Meszaros. My reasons I mean to communicate to you. God and history will judge us.

"I am sure, General, I shall not be deceived in you!

"KOSSUTH,

"Governor of the Commonwealth."

"Pesth, 1st July, 1849."

8879.—K.

"The Governor of the Commonwealth to General Klapka.

"By these presents, I inform you, that, by the authority which the country has given me, and with the counsel and assent of the council of ministers, I have this day, in the name of the people, appointed the Field-Marshal-Lieutenant Lazarus Meszaros to be Commander-in-chief of all the troops of our country. And with these presents, I decree and ordain in the name of the people, that the armies, corps, divisions, garrisons of fortresses, and all other forces,

whatever their names or denominations may be, shall yield an unconditional obedience to the orders and instructions of the said Lazarus Meszaros, and shall consider it their bounden duty to recognise him, the said Lazarus Meszaros, as their lawful Commander-in-chief; and whoever shall act against his orders, that man is, and shall be considered, a traitor to the country.

"In the name of liberty and the people, I summon you by your patriotism, of which your heroism and devotion have given such signal proofs, that you shall see this decree punctually executed by your corps, and do all you can to preserve the union, which, in the present dangerous moment, can alone save our country, and indeed the liberty of Europe, and to co-operate now, as you did formerly, for the salvation of our country and of liberty, with your tried fidelity, loyalty, heroism, and disregard of all personal feelings; and for the same I give you the thanks of the country, the high rewards of self-esteem, and the verdict of history: with my sincerest respects.

"The Governor of the Commonwealth,

"LOUIS KOSSUTH."

"For the Secretary-at-War,

"SZEMERE,

"President of the Cabinet.

"Pesth, 1st July, 1849."

The first of these letters was addressed to myself; the second was a circular which in a similar form was sent to the other commanders of the various corps. The courier, Major Stankovits, who brought these letters, told me that Meszaros had left Pesth in a steamer, for the purpose of proceeding to Komorn, and there to take the command of the army; but that having arrived at Almas, he heard the reports of artillery, and fearing that the right bank of the Danube was already occupied by the enemy, he returned to Pesth.

The motives which prompted Kossuth and the Government to this fatal measure, at a time when Görgey, severely wounded in a victorious battle, had just given the troops a brilliant proof of his bravery, may be discerned from the following facts.

After our retreat to the entrenched camp, Görgey had sent a cool and dry notice to the Government, informing them, that the overpowering numbers of the enemy prevented him from protecting the capital; that he was compelled to evacuate the right bank, and retreat to Komorn. If the Government would come to that place, well and good: if they would not, they had better look out for another spot where to hold their sittings and provide the means he required for the continuation of the war. The

impression which this letter made upon the members of the Government, who were full of anxiety for the country and the people, was awful, and this impression was heightened by the craven commentary which the commissioner Ludwig sent to Pesth on the following day. It is probable that he acted under Colonel Bayer's influence. The substance of Mr. Ludwig's report may be reduced to the words: "*Sauve qui peut!*" He entreated Kossuth and the members of the Government to quit the capital, to take all they could from Buda and Pesth, and be in daily expectation of the enemy. This cry of distress proceeded from Görgey's head quarters at a time when the Austrians were still at Raab, when they wanted at least eight days to march to Buda, and when the army was concentrated at Komorn, and ready to strike the first important blow. It is true that the right bank was unprotected after our defeat at Raab and our retreat to the entrenched camp; but why the report of this fact was communicated to the Government and the Parliament, with the facts thus distorted, and the danger unduly enlarged? is a question which Colonel Bayer may perhaps be able to answer. The transaction bears his mark.

The consequence of his report was, that the Government, ignorant of the real state of affairs, and believing in the truth of these state-

ments, hastened to adjourn the Parliament, to stop the bank-note press (our only source of money), to empty the dépôts and magazines, and to send the stores and provisions away.

But the most disastrous measure was the resolution to which the Government came, at the urgent request of Perczel and Dembinski, to remove Görgey from the command, and to appoint Meszaros.

We, of the army, were not quite unprepared for the news of Görgey's deposition. Still it surprised us at a moment at which every pretence for dissension and party spirit ought to have been avoided.

I have already stated that Görgey, after the battle of Raab, was instructed to lead his troops to Pesth, and that he promised to obey. The sudden advance of the Austrians, and the obstacles which their attack threw into his way, prevented him from fulfilling his promise. I presume he neglected to state his facts and motives, and thus he exposed himself to the suspicion of having intentionally broken his word, and refused to comply with the commands of the Government. By this inattention, he gave his enemies an advantage over him. They protested that every moment which Görgey was allowed to command the army brought the country nearer to its ruin. Instead of promoting a reconcili-

ation, their advice was for extreme measures. I lament that the Government, yielding to their passionate entreaties, resolved to recall Görgey from the command, and give his place to Meszaros, who indeed enjoyed the respect of the country, but in whom the army had no confidence, and whose antecedents were unfavorable to his generalship.

The news of Görgey's recal spread like wildfire. It caused great excitement among the troops, especially among the third and seventh corps. Görgey's adherents, and among them almost all the field-officers, heightened the excitement by inflammatory remarks and speeches. The secret enemies of the Government did all in their power to make the most of this ill-advised measure. The chief agitator was Colonel Bayer. He and the Commander-in-chief's staff formed henceforward the centre of the intrigues among the army against Kossuth. As for Görgey, he was already, on the 3rd, confined by the fever caused by his wound. I entreated those who surrounded him for a time to withhold the bad news from him; but still it appears that he was informed of what had happened, and that the news produced a strong impression upon his mind.

These events—the wavering confidence of the troops and the dubious obedience of the leaders, precluded the possibility of our immediate ex-

ecution of Kossuth's orders. Still greater dangers were impending: it was indispensable to preserve the authority of the Government, and to put a stop to the heat of growing dissensions.

In any other army it would have been easy to enforce obedience to the commands of the Government. A few sentences of death, such as Maroto pronounced in Spain for the furtherance of his treason, the decimation of the best battalions, and other means of the same sort, sufficed in Spain. Our case was different. Maroto, far from wishing to prepare his troops for the fight, was only desirous to degrade them to the level of a cowardly surrender. *We* wanted the best forces of our army, and the talents of its leaders, for our war of liberation. Besides, the Hungarian corps were, in their independent organisation, perfectly familiar with the qualities of their commanders, who, in the course of the campaign, were their partners in sorrow, in joy, and in dangers. And among these commanders of the corps were the warmest friends and adherents of Görgey. Extreme measures, if pressed to an unfortunate crisis, would most probably have led to a dissolution of the army. This explains the necessity of avoiding such measures. I, in particular, felt it to be my duty to broach a mediation, without destroying either the authority of the Government or the union of the army.

Being the oldest general, after Görgey, I summoned all the commanders of the various corps and divisions, and the older among the staff-officers, to assemble on the morning of the 4th of July, in the redoubt No. 8.

Until the arrival of the third corps and other divisions, which were still on the left bank of the Danube, we were justified in delaying the retreat from Komorn; and we were enabled to do so without disturbing the plan of operations laid down by the Government. There was time to remove the obstacles in our way, by an immediate settlement of all our differences.

I opened the Council of War by informing the officers of the decree of the Government, for which I requested their confidence and obedience, and I strove to convince them that Görgey could not possibly discharge the duties of two such important offices, to the satisfaction of the nation. I entreated them to remove from their minds any unfavorable impressions which might have been brought to strike them respecting Görgey's recal from the army; since they must see that the magnitude and the imminence of the danger which threatened the country, compelled him to take the lead of the War-Office. But, I added, that if objections were raised against this arrangement—since I was desirous of hearing them at once—that I would bring such objections to the

notice of the Government, and that I was convinced they would meet with all due consideration.

In reply, the members of the Council declared unanimously, for themselves and for their troops, that of all the Hungarian leaders, they placed their highest trust in Görgey; and that they were all desirous to petition the Government to leave him in command of the army. If he must resign one of his offices, it would be less disadvantageous if the War-Office were to be given into other hands. On my question, whether nobody had to make any objection against this resolution, not a single voice was heard. Lieutenant-Colonel Thaly alone, a relative and great admirer of Kossuth's, declared that he agreed with his comrades in all essentials, but that he wished our petition should, in its *form* and *wording*, explain our sense of our position to the Government. It was next resolved that General Nagy Shandor and I should undertake to convey the wishes of the army to the Government, and that we should leave for Pesth in the course of that very day.

The authority of the Government was thus saved. The men who were prepared to undermine the loyalty of the troops, were forced to silence and submission.

The excitement calmed down. Leiningen took the command of the camp, while Nagy Shandor and I prepared to start for Pesth. But before we

embarked in the steamer, we received three letters, which, while they spurred us on to greater speed, urged the march of the army on the left bank of the Danube.

I.

"The Governor to General Klapka.

"CITIZEN AND GENERAL!

"I give you this title, because I wish to express what I expect from you in the name of the country—namely, *civic virtue*. If you obey its dictates, you will save the country.

"You will remain at Komorn, with 18,000 men in the fortress and the camp. General Nagy Shandor will lead the other corps down the river. By defeating the enemy, you have caused my wish, to concentrate the army on the lower Danube, to be capable of execution.

"We will the more stand by this resolution, since we have obtained possession of Arad, and with it, of 66 guns, 2000 cwt. of gunpowder, and 1500 muskets.

"The captured officers perpetrated excesses at Debrezin, for which the people slew them.

"Within forty-eight hours we are able to concentrate 8000 honveds and four divisions of hussars for General Perczel.

"For the time, and whenever you stay in the fortress, Assermann is placed under your command.

"Confidence and perseverance!

"The Governor of the Commonwealth,

"Louis Kossuth,

"Szemere.

"Pesth, 3rd July, 1849."

II.

"To the General and Minister, Görgey.

"I presume that by this time you will have received from Major Stankovits, the late decrees of the Government, and my appointment. I call on you, in the holy name of the country, to declare whether you have obeyed the orders of the Government, instructing you place the fortress of Komorn in an efficient state of defence, to provide it with a strong garrison, and to march the bulk of your troops to this place? On these points I expect a satisfactory answer. If you can reach Pesth within forty-eight hours, you will find it still possible to cross the Danube. At a later time it may be possible, but it is uncertain. Kmetty has been instructed either to march to Pesth, or to cross the Danube at Paks, where a bridge is building.

"I expect your definitive declarations, which will determine the measures we have to take.

"LAZARUS MESZAROS,
"Field Marshal Lieutenant.

"Pesth, 3rd July, 1849."

III.

"From the Commander-in-chief.

"To the Commanders of the Army in and around Komorn.

"Pesth, 3rd July, 1849.
"8 o'clock, P.M.

"Pursuant to a resolution of the Council of Ministers, the Commanders of your Army are, on receipt of these presents, ordered to concentrate the whole of their troops.

"A garrison remains in the fortress and the entrenched camp. It consists of

16,000 infantry,
1500 to 1800 cavalry,

and three pieces of artillery for each thousand troops.

"The cavalry to be composed of the old escadrons, and of one-half of the new escadrons.

"Your other troops are to be led from your present positions, in such a manner that, while the

garrison of Komorn, on your left wing, makes a diversion against the enemy, the troops destined for the advance are to commence their march from the left wing, and continue it with great despatch.

"The garrison of the fortress shall continue its demonstrations until the marching corps has advanced to the distance of a two days' march.

"In case the above manœuvre cannot be executed on the right bank of the Danube, you shall be bound to send us an immediate notice of the fact, while you execute the march of the troops on the left bank.

"To facilitate this manœuvre, we can, from this place, make a diversion against Debretzin, which will distract the enemy's attention from your movements.

"For this purpose, too, you are to give your peremptory orders to Major Armin Görgey to maintain his position in the mountains, and to oppose the enemy's advance in the Arva county.

"You shall immediately send us your report of the execution of this order.

"General Klapka will take the command of the troops in and around Komorn.

"The corps which are to march to Pesth, are to be commanded by General Nagy Shandor.

"But in case it were absolutely necessary to concentrate all the troops in the fortress, the

command of the said fortress and the army shall be taken by General Klapka.

"MESZAROS,
"L. G."

We arrived at Pesth at three o'clock, A.M., on the eighth July.

At eight o'clock, A.M., we repaired to Kossuth's residence, where the ministers Szemere, Csanyi, Casimir Batthyany, and Horvath, and the Generals Meszaros and Dembinski, assembled in the course of the next hour.

Kossuth listened to our report, and declared his readiness to yield to the wishes of the army, in so far as they could be brought to agree with the arrangements which had already been made. The appointment of General Meszaros to the post of Commander-in-chief of all the Hungarian troops, he could not (Kossuth said,) revoke; but there was another way open to us to attain the goal which was desired by all. He proposed to leave Görgey with the army of the Upper Danube, to let him resign the War-office, and acknowledge Meszaros as Commander-in-chief.

I declared that, in my opinion, this alteration of the former arrangement would suffice to conquer all difficulties, to stifle dissension, and to satisfy the troops. I expressed my confidence

in Görgey's submitting to these conditions, which guaranteed his position in, and his stay with, the army.

Instructions were immediately drawn up. Görgey, if he consented to resign the War-office, was appointed to the command of the army of the Upper Danube; and, by another decree, he was called upon to yield implicit obedience to the dispositions of General Meszaros, as the Commander-in-chief of all the Hungarian armies.

General Visocki's corps in the Carpathians, had meanwhile been unable to oppose the progress of the Russian troops under Prince Paskiewitsh, which had already reached Miskoltz and Erlau. Visocki's corps had fallen back to Arokszallash and Jaszbereny.

Dembinski, who assisted Meszaros in the management of the staff, gave us a sketch of the next operations. His dispositions showed evidently great talent, but his calculations were based on the rudimentary forms of strategy, rather than on the substantive momentum of our power of resistance. It was Dembinski's intention, even if the upper army succeeded in joining Visocki, to avoid striking a blow against the Russians. He wished us to retreat to the Maros, to take a central position on the banks of that river, and to throw our whole power upon any of the enemy's corps that might happen to come

within our reach. After a mature consideration of the reasons for and against this plan, of the dangers which surrounded us, and the manner in which we ought to meet them, the old minister, Csanyi, took my arm and asked me to follow him to another apartment.

Csanyi's was among the loftiest and purest characters of the Hungarian revolution. He was sincerely attached to Görgey, whom he loved as his own son. When we were alone, he pressed my hand, a tear of agony rolled over his haggard cheeks, and with a voice trembling with emotion, he told me that he saw the country faltering on the brink of an abyss. Salvation was still within our reach, if Görgey would consult his heart as well as his head; if he could but break the charm which bound him to a man who was his evil genius, and who sought to estrange him from his country's interest, and the affection of his friends.

"As for me," continued Csanyi, "I am old. I have nothing to lose! If Pesth is again given up, I shall again be the last who leaves it. Perhaps I'll go to Szegedin, and even to Arad; but beyond Arad I will not go. I am too old to be an exile. I do not care what will happen to me, — it is the thought of my country which harrows my soul!"

I replied that I could not altogether sympa-

thise with the extent of his apprehensions, but that I too had, for some time past, been struck with, and that I denounced, the fatal influence of those who surrounded Görgey. I protested that if Colonel Bayer, and some other persons, were removed from that General's side, there would be no obstacle to his complete and sincere reconciliation with the Government.

Csanyi wrote a few touching lines to Görgey, reminding him of the duty he owed to the nation, and entreating him not to allow any evil influence to prevail to such an extent as to sever him from that firmness of faith and unity which alone could preserve the country. At a later time, when Görgey left Komorn, Csanyi's letter was found on the floor of his apartment, with other papers and documents of minor importance.

As for Csanyi, that high-souled man, and generous patriot, he died on the gallows on the 8th October, 1849, but a thousand yards from the spot where he spoke and wrote words of such lofty tenderness and devoted affection.

CHAPTER VI.

JULY.

GÖRGEY INSISTS ON BREAKING THROUGH ON THE RIGHT BANK OF THE DANUBE—BATTLE AT KOMORN ON THE 11TH JULY—AN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK—THE ARMY WITHDRAWS FROM KOMORN ON THE RIGHT BANK—RETREAT OF THE 'GROS' OF THE AUSTRIAN ARMY—SALLY ON THE 28TH—AUSTRIAN PROCLAMATIONS—SALLY AGAINST OGYALLA AND BAJES ON THE 30TH—RETREAT OF THE AUSTRIANS TO THE WAAG, ON THE LEFT BANK OF THE DANUBE.

At noon we walked through the empty streets, to the Danube. We embarked, and reached Komorn in the course of that night. Görgey was much better. We handed him Kossuth's decrees: he read them, and a cloud passed over his brow. A few minutes afterwards he was calm again, and, protesting that he was quite reconciled to the measures of the Government, he sat down and wrote a few lines petitioning the Government to accept his resignation as Secretary-at-War. He then invited us to meet him in the course of the next day, for the purpose of

considering the steps which it was incumbent upon us to take.

It was high time to think of moving the army from its present positions. All our corps were concentrated. Horvath's and Armin Görgey's divisions, on their retreat from Neutra, and the mountain cities, might be expected to join us in the course of the march. Early in the morning of the 6th, when the Generals Nagy Shandor, Leiningen, Pöltenberg, and Colonel Kaszonyi, assembled at my quarters, I told them that I would insist on the dispositions being issued by the Central Chancellery, and on the immediate march of the troops.

At ten o'clock, P.M., the chiefs met at Görgey's quarters. Colonel Bayer was present. Görgey stated his views of the presumptive direction of the war: he protested that its scene must be transferred to the right bank of the Danube: that the plains of the Theiss and the Lower Danube, utterly exhausted as they were in their resources, could only witness our annihilation, by the superior numbers of the enemy. He pointed out the Platten Lake districts, as the places which nature and the inhabitants had prepared for the prolongation and the advantageous conduct of the war. He expressed his hope to obtain the ammunition we wanted from W. Neustadt and Grätz, and he concluded by stating

his opinion of the favorable nature of our position, which allowed us to fight only against our natural enemies, namely, the Austrians. He desired, and he asked our assent to, an expedition on the right bank of the Danube, through the very midst of the enemy's forces.

Görgey's views astonished me; I protested that I could not assent to his proposal. I said that the fate of the country ought not to be staked on the chances of a guerilla war, and that any warfare on the right bank must necessarily descend to that level. So long as numerous armies and organised forces were in our hands, we ought to battle and not to skirmish. I admitted that there was a time, when it would have been advantageous to make war on the right bank. It was when we had not yet lost one-fourth of our armies in five single pitched battles; when the troops had faith in victory; when no Russian hordes overflooded the country; when a position on the right bank might have brought us to the walls of Vienna. That measure came too late now. We could not, without the heaviest responsibility, again divide the powers of the nation. It was our duty to collect and unite them, to the last great battle for our country's rights and liberties. Such were the views of the Government, and such my own.

Following up my argument, I protested that

to make a separate war on the right bank, meant to secede from our brethren in the South, and in Transylvania; it meant to leave them to their fate, in spite of their bravery and devotion. But there was one consideration of all others which ought to prompt us to unite—to unite closely, inseparably, for ever! If fate had willed it—if the cause of Hungary was to fall—that cause ought to fall in a grand and decisive battle, after an heroic struggle, and in a manner which would secure our butchered nation an honorable place in the history of all future times. I enumerated the advantages of an immediate retreat on the left bank, and turning to the spirit and temper of the troops, I protested that the army had reconquered its confidence on the 2nd July. The forces which might easily occupy the line of Pesth, amounted (after leaving a garrison at Komorn) to 27,000 picked troops, with 130 guns, and 6000 horses. The corps of the Generals Perczel and Visocki were ready for a junction: they would raise that army to the number of 50,000 men, with 200 guns, and 10,000 horses.

I admitted that Paskiewitsh and the Russians were at hand: but Grabbe was still kept back in the mountain cities, and Sacken lingered on the frontiers of Gallicia. By the time we crossed the Pesth line, Paskiewitsh could oppose us no more

than an army which hardly outnumbered ours. This was the first battle the Russians had to fight in Hungary. Their troops were mostly young, and unbroken to the country; the advantage was sure to be on our side: a defeat of the Russians was equally sure to redouble the confidence of the nation, and to cause such a revolution in the public opinion of Europe, that the voice of the West would at length prevail against this disgraceful intervention. But, even if unsuccessful, the dangers of a battle would never rise to the height of those which threatened our want of success in an expedition on the right bank. If to prolong the contest was indeed an object, we could, if we would, avoid the chances of a collision with the Russians, by continuing an incessant retreat to the banks of the Theiss. If from thence a corps were dispatched to support General Bem, that officer would not only be able to clear Transylvania (the basis of our future operations) from the enemy; but it would also make him strong enough, in conjunction with Colonel Kazinezy (then at Szatmar), to turn upon the left wing of the Russian invaders. If the rest of our forces were slowly drawn to the Maros; if there concentrated, and leaning upon Arad, they waited for the moment to throw themselves on part of the Austro-Russian forces when they advanced, as they were likely to do,

in detached divisions, and on an extended line: they might engage and rout the allied army by divisions and corps. Such, I said, were the only chances we might hazard without staking the fate of our country on a single cast.

Nagy Shandor expressed his concurrence with these views. The other generals seemed undecided in their opinions, and wavering. Görgey rose to reply.

Perhaps, he said, he had not expressed his ideas with sufficient clearness. He did not intend to separate the army from the Government; either he would stand by. His expedition to the right bank was specially meant to defeat the main army of the Austrians before us. But he found, (Görgey said,) that the majority of us seemed inclined to a junction with the southern corps, and the other forces of the country. He would not, and could not, object to this; but he wished the junction to take place after a victorious battle, and for such a battle the enemy offered the best opportunity. Care ought to be taken to distinguish the retreat of the army from a flight. He consulted the wishes and arrangements of the Government, by making our retreat on the right bank towards Paks, and from thence to the counties on the Lower Danube. The concentration would thus be expedited, and we should moreover have the benefit of some 1000

recruits, whom we might levy on our march. He added, with a withering sneer, that he too thought it was easier and safer to skulk out of the back door, instead of turning our faces to the enemy and showing fight; but he would leave it to his hearers to decide which of the two alternatives was most likely to obtain the praises of the world, and ensure an honorable success.

This last sally touched the most sensitive point in the minds of a military audience. It made them believe that their honor was at stake. The officers concurred with Görgey's views. Nagy Shandor, too, assented to the plan of the expedition. He declared that he could not see any likelihood of its success, but that he would not object to it, if it tended, as the Commander-in-chief assured us it did, to effect a junction with the lower army.

I was outvoted; and after a short protest against the suspicions which Görgey had flung at my head, I had no choice left me but to subject my own conviction to the opinions of the other generals.

Up to this day I had had but vague misgivings as to Görgey's intentions. But his conduct in the present instance stamped my suspicions with certainty. The obstinacy with which he defended his own adventurous plan against the advantages of a well-grounded operation, proved to me that

he was resolved, at any price, to separate his own sphere of action from those of the rest of our forces, and to withdraw it from the influence of the Government.

Was this resolution the natural consequence of his former plans? or was it engendered and fostered by the late measures of the Government? Nothing is more difficult than to decide between these questions. A short sketch of his character, and of the part he played in the Hungarian War of Liberation, will perhaps serve to establish the limits within which a verdict may possibly be ventured.

Görgey was a *soldier* throughout. A Spartan education, an innate and carefully fostered stoicism, which at times ran into cynicism, and a manner of thought positive, and foreign to all ideal creations of the mind, impressed his character with that striking roughness which was at war with all forms, and which caused him to look with deep aversion on the "pomp, pride, and circumstance" of commonplace revolutions, and the unruly proceedings of an excited crowd. These sentiments, and his attachment to a legitimate power, remained in him unshaken, even amidst the overpowering storm of a Revolution. So long as the Hungarian Government of 1848 moved on a so-called "legal pivot,"—so long as their actions had the King's name and authority,

they found in Görgey one of their stanchest adherents, and one who was firmly resolved—as indeed he proved it by the execution of the Count Eugen Zichy,—to support them, with all the energy of his iron will, against the Austrians, whom he hated as the hereditary enemies of his country. But when, after the resignation of the Batthyany Cabinet, he received the commands of the Government, not from the constitutional Hungarian War Office—but from a Committee of whom the major part were civilians, who had no knowledge of military things, he appears to have become impregnated with the conviction, that the fate of the country could only be decided by a soldier. After the fatal battle at Shwechat (in autumn 1848) he was appointed to the command of the army on the Upper Danube. And when this appointment opened an unlimited field to his ambition—when he looked around, and found no military character that could vie with his, the thought was but natural, that fate had destined him to play that lofty part.

The contradictory dispositions which the Committee of Defence sent him in the course of his retreat, in December, 1848, and the undecided, nervous, and planless conduct of that board, prevailed at length against his patience, and incited him to a determined opposition. He betrayed that frame of mind in the course of his

march through the mountain cities (January, 1849,) by the following documents, which contain his own confession of faith and that of his corps:—

"*To the Hungarian Corps on the Upper Danube.*

"Waitzen, 4th January, 1849.

"The advantages which the overpowering forces of the enemy have obtained over the corps on the Upper Danube, and particularly the latest events, appear to have exerted their discouraging influence upon many among us to such an extent that they have shaken even that generous confidence in our own selves and our cause, which hitherto united us in the most righteous of struggles.

"It is the first duty of your leaders to strengthen this confidence, and to give new life to the courage which, in a manner, may be drooping.

"I discharge this duty by opening to the corps on the Upper Danube a hope of more favorable chances, by means of the impending diversion against the superior numbers of the enemy. But I trust I shall succeed in more particularly re-establishing the confidence of the corps, by candidly and honestly pronouncing my opinion and conviction respecting the events that are passed, as well as respecting those which we ourselves are called upon to make.

"I accepted the post which was offered me,

because I believe that the cause of Hungary is a *just cause.*

"And I mean to stand on my post, so long as it is left in my power, even though the best among us were to waver and to withdraw their arms from the support of the just cause.

"This feeling, and respect of my own powers, aids me in my judgment of the fact since the 1st November, 1848: it aids me in a candid confession of my own faults, by means of which I hope to give the corps the surest guarantee for the efficiency of my future measures.

"I committed a fault when I ceased to urge the Committee of Defence, with all unanswerable reasons, to abandon the fatal principle of the defence, or rather the locking up of the frontiers: for all other mishaps to which the corps has undeservedly been exposed, resulted from the demoralising fatigues of the outpost service, which paralysed the organisation of the army, its increase, and consolidation.

"I committed a fault when, in the head-quarters at Bitske, I obeyed the peremptory orders of the Committee of Defence, instructing me to withdraw my corps to the first line before Buda: for this unnecessary retreat placed the corps in the equivocal position of troops who avoid a decisive conflict, and with it, a decision of the just cause. I received these orders from a board of functionaries

which Meszaros, the responsible Secretary-at-War, (elected by the country and confirmed by our King Ferdinand V.), himself had acknowledged to be the supreme power of Government. For he himself obeyed the instructions of that board, by taking and continuing in, the command of the corps on the Theiss against the leader of the hostile troops, the General Count Schlick. And while I obeyed, I was conscious that my action was not illegal, and that the Royal Hungarian corps under my command was not induced to any such illegal action, so long as the Committee of Defence did not disavow its own leading principles.

"But on the 1st January, 1849, when the corps on the Upper Danube, in spite of the orders to fall back upon the first line before Buda, was still resolved on combat at Hansábegh, Tarnok, Soskut, Bia, etc., the Committee of Defence, instead of justifying our confidence in their loyalty by their heroic perseverance in the vicinity of the danger, most inexplicably and suddenly abandoned the capital: thus devoting us (and still more by the sending of a deputation to the Commander-in-chief of the enemy's troops, without our knowledge and consent) to a helpless and even equivocal position. This measure was calculated to make many of us suspicious, lest we had been caused to descend from the elevated position

to which we are entitled, as champions of the constitutional liberty of Hungary! to the humble condition of beings who are used as the means of promoting the egotistical interests of individuals. I will not here impugn the loyalty of the Committee of Defence, sorely though that board has, by its sudden disappearance from the capital, shaken our confidence. But I think it is my duty to preserve my corps from the most wretched lot of all—viz. from all hopeless, internal dissolution,—and therefore I call on you either to adopt the following declaration (which is intended to preserve us against any demand that might sully our honorable position), or, if any dissent from it, to make an open avowal of their views on the subject.

"GÖRGEY, General."

DECLARATION.

"The Hungarian army of the Upper Danube, of which the essentials once formed part of the Austrian military establishment, (that is to say, before the sanction of the Hungarian War-office placed the Hungarian regiments under the sole and exclusive direction of that office,) took, obedient to the will of the constitutional King of Hungary, their oaths to the constitution of that country. In the first instance this corps was placed under the command of the Archduke Palatine, and

opposed to the Imperial and Royal* troops under Jellachich.

"Notwithstanding the most melancholy political troubles, they have since remained faithful to their oaths, by yielding their obedience only to the commands of the Hungarian Responsible Secretary-at-War, or of the Committee of Defence, whose legality has received that Secretary's recognition and sanction.

"Leaning on this incontrovertible fact, the corps of the Upper Danube makes the most decided protest against any insinuations of its having served to promote the private interests of any party in Hungary, and the corps brands all such rumours as disgraceful calumnies. But this very incontrovertible fact of the unshaken loyalty with which the corps on the Upper Danube has, in the combat for the maintenance of the Hungarian constitution, cheerfully submitted to all orders of the Committee of Defence, in spite of the most unspeakable deprivations and disappointments, justifies this corps in its expectation, that the Committee of Defence will conscientiously avoid one thing—to wit, the placing this corps in any equivocal position.

"After the corps of the Upper Danube, obedient to the orders of the Committee of Defence,

* Imperialist troops.

had with the rarest self-denial, and by a most fatiguing out-post service, protected the frontier of the country; after having, in the battle of Wieselburg, prevailed against the superior numbers of the enemy; after dauntlessly maintaining its hopeless position at Raab until, out-flanked by the enemy's superior power, they had to make their retreat (which was necessary for the protection of the capital), by an obstinate fight with the enemy's flanking column; after this corps—without having found among the population of the country on the other side of the Danube the promised sympathies, and without having been assisted by any preparations of the Committee of Defence for preventing the enemy's advance on the highways and lines of Dotis, Banhida, Neszmély, Csakvar, Zamoly, Ondod, and Sarkany, remained partly in front and partly in the rear of the said places in battle array, until the victorious advance by move of the enemy's right wing caused us, in our turn, to take the offensive by way of Mártonvásar—and having, at the express command of the Committee of Defence, exchanged this offensive attitude for a defensive position in front of Buda—the corps had but one comforting prospect left to it—viz. the prospect of a decisive contest in the immediate vicinity of and in the capitals of Hungary.

"The peremptory tone of the orders of the

Committee of Defence, and the proclamations which that body addressed to the people, justified the expectation that in the long-wished-for and at length approaching decisive moment, an enthusiastic energy would be displayed by it.

"Instead of all that ought and might have been done, despatches were on the 1st of January, 1849, received at the head quarters at Promontorium, containing—

"Firstly—The news that the Committee of Defence had left the capital.

"Secondly—An order from that Committee instructing us to accept a decisive battle on the so-called first line—Buda, on the height of Teteny Bia, etc., without, however, sacrificing the corps or exposing the two capitals to a bombardment: that is to say, in case of a defeat, the corps was instructed—regardless of the sole safe transit, and of the pursuing enemy—to make its escape to the left bank of the Danube, without defending the town.

"Thirdly—An order to allow a deputation to pass to the Chief-commander of the hostile army.

"Each of these three facts would alone suffice to shake the confidence of the corps in the members of the Committee of Defence; but coming together as they did, they were calculated to create a suspicion of the corps having hitherto been, (to use the most lenient expression,) a useful

but a dangerous instrument in an unpractised hand.

"In order, therefore, amidst the political intrigues which are likely to prey upon our unfortunate country, to maintain an unshaken and legal position, the corps of the Upper Danube makes the following public declarative profession:

"Firstly—The corps of the Upper Danube, faithful to its oath for the maintenance of the constitution of Hungary, as sanctioned by King Ferdinand V., intends to defend that constitution against all foreign enemies.

"Secondly—But the corps of the Upper Danube intends likewise to oppose all those who, by untimely republican agitations in the interior of the country, would endeavour to overthrow the constitutional kingdom.

"Thirdly—The terms *Constitutional Monarchy*, which the corps on the Upper Danube proposes to defend to the last man, imply in themselves, that the corps cannot and will not obey any orders except those which reach it in a legal form from the responsible Secretary-at-War, or from the deputy appointed by that functionary (at present General Vetter).

"Fourthly—The corps of the Upper Danube, mindful of its oath to the constitution of Hungary, and mindful of its honor, has a perfect consciousness of its duties and its intentions; and

it declares, in conclusion, that it will not submit to the results of any negotiations with the enemy, unless such negotiations guarantee the Hungarian constitution on the one side, and the military honor of the corps on the other.

"GÖRGEY,

"Major General.

"Waitzen, 5th January, 1849."

This open declaration of Görgey and his troops caused serious apprehensions at Debrezin, and many members of the Parliament gave it the name of treason. For the purpose of successfully defeating the ambitious tendencies of the native chiefs, it was resolved to place the army under the supreme command of a foreigner, whose position was less likely to induce him to find fault with the measures of the Parliament and the Government, and who would confine his authority to the conduct of the war. But it was also necessary not to hurt the feelings of the native Chiefs. For this purpose a great historical name was sought and found. Dembinski, the old Polish General, was placed at the head of all the Hungarian armies, and Görgey, with all our other Chiefs, was subjected to him.

In the latter part of January, 1849, I with my troops joined with Görgey's, at Kashau. My corps came from the Theiss, while Görgey's troops had marched

from the mountain cities. We met at the Council house, and our meeting, after so many hot and well-fought combats, was cordial in the extreme. Görgey told me that the proclamations I mentioned above had been forced from him by the spirit and temper of his old officers, and that the various intrigues in the army compelled him to resort to such measures for the purpose of keeping them together. He added, that the Committee of Defence was not calculated to give us confidence, and that it was Kossuth alone, who, in some way, succeeded in giving that body a direction and a character.

Dembinski's appointment to the chief command seemed to hurt his feelings, for he ascribed it chiefly to the intrigues of his enemies. He was averse to seeing a foreigner at the head of the Hungarian powers. He evinced, what he afterwards displayed to a greater degree, his disgust of the Poles interfering in our affairs, for he protested that such an intervention was likely to lead to fresh difficulties. Even the gallant and devoted conduct of the Poles who fought on our side, failed to change his opinion on this subject, and he proved this in the last moment of the surrender of Vilagos.

The brutal manners of Dembinski, his ignorance of the character of the people and the country, his faulty measures after the battle of

Kápolna, estranged the minds of the leaders from him; while he lost the affection and the confidence of the troops by his want of attention to their necessities, and the gratuitous fatigues to which he subjected them. After his unnecessary retreat across the Theiss, and his ill-concealed suspicion of some Hungarian commanders, he was forced by a council of war at Tisza Füred, and especially by Görgey, to resign his command to General Vetter. It was about this time that Görgey made a journey to Debrezin.

The impressions which he received in that city were by no means favorable. He wrote to me—

"Do not ask me to tell you what I felt, surrounded as I was by the vanity of passion and the blindness of ambition. Kossuth alone is a classical and generous character. It is a pity he is not a soldier."

Görgey had by this time come to an understanding with Kossuth; they appeared to stand on the most friendly and intimate footing. We all were happy that it was so, for in Kossuth we saw a statesman who stood in need of the iron arm and will of Görgey; and who, united with him, was sure to work the salvation of the country.

General Vetter was suddenly taken ill, and Görgey, according to seniority, succeeded to the command about the end of March. Fortune favored him. From the banks of the Theiss we marched from victory to victory to Komorn and Raab. Kossuth joined the army, which on the 7th April was concentrated at Gödöllö. It consisted of the first, second, third, and seventh corps. The first corps was under my command, and the other corps were commanded by the Generals Aulich, Damjanitsh, and Gaspar. No intrigues, no agitations prevailed at that time against the union of the army. One single idea pervaded us all—the salvation of the country and the preservation of liberty. At Gödöllö, Kossuth held a conference with the commanders of the corps, and on this occasion he told us that the Austrian Government had of late proceeded in its fatal plans against Hungary—that the new constitution of the Austrian Empire did not recognise the ancient constitution of Hungary—and that our country was degraded to the level of a province, of a crown land of the Hapsburg dynasty,—that all hope of mediation was cut off by the despotic phrase: "*There is no treating with rebels;*"—and that it had become necessary, openly before God and the world, to confront this shameless perjury and unparalleled treason with a public and decisive act.

"A dynasty," Kossuth said, "which tramples on the most sacred rights of its most loyal people —a dynasty which takes delight in shedding the blood of our noble citizens—cannot expect to be reconciled to us; and unless we wish to expose the nation, for all time to come, to a constant repetition of equal and greater horrors, such a dynasty must cease to reign."

Damjanitsh, Aulich, and I, assented to Kossuth's views. Görgey was silent. But at Leva, when the news reached him that the Parliament had voted the act of repudiation, Görgey professed to dissent from this measure, which it was in his power to prevent if he had but spoken at the meeting at Gödöllö. His want of straightforwardness, and his mysterious character, showed themselves thus for the second time, though in this instance, too, they attracted only a passing attention. After the victories at Sarlo and Komorn, he accepted the post of Secretary-of-War in the new cabinet; this step of his implied his assent to the change in Kossuth's administration and policy.

When I asked him, on the 1st of May, to eschew the siege of Buda, and to concentrate the army on the Upper Danube, he returned the following reply to my letter:—

"The Camp at Buda, May 6th, 1849.

"My dear Klapka,

"For once I cannot concur with your views

about the raising the siege of Buda. The world, I am sure, would interpret such a step into a most unequivocal confession of our own weakness, and the enemy would still have (if I may be allowed to say so) his foot on the heart of our country, which might turn out a very awkward circumstance in our future operations.

"I intend to set about the siege with all possible energy.

"Pöltenberg's detachments are already in the vicinity of Wieselburg, where, it appears, the enemy proposes to make a stand, the same as at Pressburg, where I am told they are throwing up strong entrenchments.

"They have not yet given up the left bank of the Waag, though Colonel Horvath distresses them on the left bank of the Danube.

"Aulich has thrown a bridge over the Danube: he stands near the Blocksberg.

"Veszprim has been free these several days.

"Jellachich was, the day before yesterday, at Tolna. I understand he is going to hold out at Guta.

"My brother is at Arva. He would like to have a fling at Benedck, whose nine guns are likely to give him more trouble than he seems to anticipate.

"If the President had followed my advice, by sending Beniczki from Kashau, by way of Torna,

to Gömör, Benedck would now be in a scrape. As it is, we have gained little, if anything; and unless Dembinski were to convince me to the contrary, I must say that we have little hope of securing Zipsen and Gömör.

"To-morrow I mean again to write to Kossuth.

"Your faithful comrade,

"ARTHUR GÖRGEY."

His refusal to accept the rewards of the Government and the Parliament—his union of the War-office with the post of a Commander-in-chief—his arbitrary alterations in the plan for the defence of the country—have already been brought to the notice of my readers. But a short digression on Görgey's motives in doing what he did, will perhaps prove interesting and instructive.

When the siege of Buda drew to its close, the rumour of a Russian intervention became daily more distinct; in the commencement of June there could be no doubt as to the intentions of the Czar. Görgey, impelled by his fatal practical manner of viewing men and things, considered the forces of our enemies, and compared them with the means of defence which were actually at our disposal. But what he counted on either side were the bayonets, guns, and stores. His calculations led him to the mournful con-

viction of the certainty of the enemy's success, and of our own ruin. Görgey's calculations were those of a soldier, not of a politician—nor, indeed, of a Hungarian. All the moral advantages which in this war were on our side, appeared to him as mere illusions, and not worthy of notice. He misunderstood our national character, and cared little or nothing for the *sense*, for the *original strength* of the people. He counted his battalions.

In these erroneous views he was confirmed by certain officers of his staff, (who undoubtedly exercised a great influence over him,) and by a body of croakers which perched in his vicinity. While these persons directed his attention to the fate of his devoted Upper Army, and while they succeeded in inducing him, at a later period, to divorce the fortunes of that army from those of the nation; he was equally a prey to the importunities of the peace party, whose motives, though much more generous than the springs of action of the first-named coterie, still tended to the same end. They all co-operated in their attempts to persuade him that all resistance was in vain—that he alone could snatch the country from the brink of certain ruin, and restore it to peace. The enemy, they said, would never consent to treat with Kossuth or the revolutionary Government, but they would treat with *him*, and with him

alone, whose proclamations to the army had always adhered to the principles of legitimacy and monarchy.

It never struck Görgey that such assumptions stood indeed on an illusory basis. It never struck him that, in the Austrian bulletins and official publications, no mention whatever was made of "negotiations" with, but solely of the "*subjection*" and "*annihilation*" of the rebels. It never struck him that it was not in the nature of the Vienna Cabinet to miss so favorable an opportunity for the oppression of a free and hated nation; for the slaking of its thirst of revenge by means of the scaffold, and by confiscations. He listened to the secret voices which assailed his ear, and by so doing he brought himself to that equivocal and dishonorable condition in which he stands before this age, and in which he will go down to posterity.*

Had Görgey, in these days of danger, (if indeed he felt it within him so to do,) freely and boldly seized the extremest measures; had he grasped the dictatorial power, for the purpose of gaining an honorable peace for his mangled country; his nation and history would be compelled to honor

* The Austrians have never attempted to open negotiations. It is therefore impossible to say what Görgey would have done, if they had offered to treat. As for the commencement of the secret negotiations with the Russians, I know nothing about it.

him as a patriot and a man of great deeds. His true friends, and even Kossuth, if his confidence had been but responded to, would have thrown the whole weight of their influence into his scale. They would have silenced that weak and timid portion which was always prosing about military despotism and such like scarecrows. Fresh from victory, swaying the powers of the nation at his will, his might have been a proud position indeed; and proudly might he have offered the hand of reconciliation in the name of his heroic people. If not accepted, that hand might have been raised to wage the war of annihilation and a twofold vengeance, and an iron perseverance would have crowned that war with success.

Görgey ought to have risen to the height of Cromwell, to save the liberty, honor, and independence of Hungary, and with them the honor of his own name. But fate had not made him for such high things. Instead of acting openly, he was close and mysterious to his friends, and vindictive and inexplicable in his dealings with the Government. All his endeavours seemed to tend, by petty jealousies, to increase his popularity with the Upper Army, and to weaken the authority of the Government. It was his boast to display an iron character, but he wanted the courage to aim at supreme power—he wanted the boldness to grasp it. It was only when the battle

of Raab had been fought—when overpowering hostile forces were concentrated in the heart of the country, that he dropped his mask; but it was not to stand forth and take the lead of the nation; it was not to lead us to victory or death. No! it was for the purpose of a divorce of his own lot, and that of his troops, from the fate of his country; it was for the purpose of a disgraceful surrender of his victorious arms.

The request contained in the letter which he addressed to the Government of Raab, and in which he insisted on a credit of several millions of florins, betrayed his intention to continue the war on the Upper Danube in his own hands; his neglecting to inform the Government of the fact, that unforeseen events prevented him from redeeming his pledge, could not but lead to his destruction as Commander-in-chief.

When I and Nagy Shandor succeeded in removing the differences between the army and the Government, Görgey ought honestly to have renounced his views, which he could do without detriment to himself and his duty; but the reconciliation, as far as he was concerned, was but seeming. His hoard of old grudges was increased by the stores of his new hate against Kossuth; for it was Kossuth who deprived him of the chief command. He became confirmed in his resolution to act for himself and alone.

On the day on which the Council of War was held, Görgey fell ill with a violent fever. His state was alarming. Late at night a courier brought us the following letter:—

"The Governor of the Commonwealth to
"General Klapka.

"General Visocki arrived this day with his troops at Czegléd. To-morrow he will move upon Körös, Ketskemet, and Theresiopel.

"General Perczel, at whose disposition 10,000 men have been placed, crosses the Theiss the day after to-morrow. This day his outposts are at Arok-szállásh: part of his troops are at Török, Sz. Miklos, and Szolnok.

"The enemy stands across the Theiss in Debrezin.

"The general insurrection of the people is proceeding with great energy; and as soon as Perczel has crossed the Theiss, the whole mass of them will assist him in his operations. At Grosswardein we have an armed band of 5600 men, with 1200 honveds, 350 hussars, and eight pieces of artillery.

"I have no anxiety respecting the country on the other bank of the Theiss, since our affairs in Transylvania are so much more favorable now. The Russians, who broke from Herrmannstadt

into Haromszek, and who took Kezdivásárhely, have made a hasty retreat from that place to Herrmannstadt, and back over the frontier of Haromszek; so hasty, indeed, that they have left their provisions at Sepsi-szent-György. This, from an official report of the 3rd July. Bem, coming from Teke, advanced against the enemy at Bistritz, and drew up reinforcements; and now that his rear is no longer threatened, he hopes to be able to defeat the enemy before him.

"The salvation of the country depends upon your operations of this day, and upon the success of to-morrow's march. Above all, it is necessary to put a stop to the political and military intrigues in the army of the Upper Danube.

"I therefore desire, and in the name of the people I demand, implicit obedience and execution:—

"1st. Since the Council of War has to confine its attention to subjects which relate to the operations, you will limit their debates to this their legitimate sphere, and you will prevent Councils of War from criticising the decrees of the Parliament and Government—a course of action which would be in direct contradiction to the nature of military operations.

"You will attend to this measure and see it executed, under the heaviest responsibilities.

I regret that such has not hitherto been the case.

"2nd. The Government Commissioner, John Ludwig, is by virtue of this decree recalled from his post. The Secretary of State, Samuel Bonis, will take Ludwig's place. It will be his duty to attend the discussions of the Council of War, not, indeed, for the purpose of interfering in matters of tactics and strategy, but for the purpose of representing the Government at the head quarters of the army, and by this means to establish a harmony between the military and administrative measures.

"It is understood, that while the Commissioner will on the one hand see that merit has its due rewards, he will on the other hand see the laws of the country duly observed, and the decrees of the Government, the plans of operations fixed by the Ministers, executed, and the interests of general civil liberty preserved.

"You will consider Mr. Samuel Bonis as the representative of the Government, and your treatment of him will correspond with his position.

"The nation, and the Government which emanated from the national will, have a deep sense of honor, respect, and gratitude for heroism—for it is heroism alone which will save the country from our enemies. But the ruin of the country is not

likely to proceed from the enemy alone: internal dissensions may alike work our ruin. *Death from the enemy's hands is honorable; but if we fall by our own hands, it is a national suicide!*

"Yours, General, is a Roman character. I respect in you, not only a gallant warrior, but also a citizen enamored of freedom. And it is my firmest belief, that you will assist the Government, not only in defending, but also in maintaining liberty within the country.

"The Governor of the Commonwealth,
"LOUIS KOSSUTH;
"The President of the Cabinet,
"SZEMERE.

"Buda-Pesth, 6th July, 1849."

Had Kossuth, instead of sending this letter, made his appearance at head quarters, he might have succeeded in bringing matters to their proper level, and in enforcing the expedition. Görgey was, indeed, a favorite with the troops, but their affection for him was by no means equal to Kossuth's authority. Görgey could not have dared to confront the Governor of the Commonwealth, and to refuse to obey his orders. He would have been compelled, at least seemingly, to comply with Kossuth's commands, for such was the power of that extraordinary man, that his appearance gained him all hearts, and the Generals who

refused to listen to my voice, could not have resisted the imposing severity of his attitude, and the energy and persuasion of his words;—the troops, their enthusiasm once inflamed, would have regained courage and confidence for the impending struggle. Victory would have crowned our endeavours. But Kossuth wanted the energy; or the anxious friends who surrounded him prevented him from taking the only step which would lead to salvation. Neither he nor Meszaros appeared, and the management of affairs was left to me. I, who was under Görgey's commands, was suddenly expected to impose upon him, his staff, and the majority of the commanders, obedience and respect to the voice of the Government.

My first step was to send for Colonel Bayer. I showed him the decree of the Government, and told him that I would not be responsible for any prolongation of the stay of the army round Komorn. If General Görgey's state of health was such, that it prevented him from taking dispositions, it was clear that it was my duty, as the oldest general, after Görgey, to yield an implicit obedience to the commands I had to receive. I therefore ordered him to draw up the necessary instructions, to submit them to my inspection, and to make his arrangements in such a manner, that the first corps were to leave before daybreak on the

following morning; that the others were to follow after dinner; and that the garrison of Komorn were to stand in readiness, in the entrenched camp, as well as in the fortress. I added, that if the condition of the Commander-in-chief allowed of his taking cognizance of these instructions, it was my desire that they should be communicated to him before they were issued.

Colonel Bayer made none but trifling objections to these orders.

With respect to Görgey, he remarked that he was worse, and that the physicians would not allow him to interfere with things which might excite him.

At four o'clock, A.M., on the 7th of July, the first corps, under Nagy Shandor, marched quietly from the fortress to Batorkeszi, the first station on the road to Waitzen.

The left bank of the Danube was still free from the enemy. The outposts of the Russian army had not advanced beyond Erlau. There was no obstacle to our junction with Visocki and Perczel, and I was very happy that the first step had been taken. At nine o'clock that morning, I was just preparing to go to Görgey, and to ask of his state of health and the time of his departure, when the Generals Leiningen, Pöltenberg, and some staff officers entered, in a state of great excitement, and told me that Görgey had just written his

resignation—that he was resolved to resign the chief command of the army. His motive for this step was, the march of the first corps, which had taken place without his knowledge, and of which he had not even been informed. The Commander-in-chief had his feelings hurt, and his authority curtailed; and however painful to his patriotism, he could not consent to continue in the army. They added, that they had come to ask me to take measures to secure the fate of the army; that a rumour of negociations had gone abroad; that the news of Görgey's resignation could not fail to make a strong impression on the troops—that it would open a new field to intrigues and agitations, and that the discipline of the army was on the point of being undermined. Colonel Bayer entered at that moment. I asked him why, since it appeared that the state of the Commander-in-chief was not, after all, so dangerous, he had failed in showing the dispositions to him. He gave an evasive answer, and referred to the injunctions of the surgeon, who would not allow Görgey to be troubled with anything connected with the service. I was afterwards informed that no attempt whatever had been made, either by Bayer or anybody else, to bring the disposition to Görgey's notice, and that he knew nothing of the manœuvre until the first corps crossed the bridge of the Waag, under his windows.

I cannot undertake to decide whether this omission was owing to a deep-laid plan of Bayer and his coterie, or whether it must be ascribed to the negligence of those gentlemen. If Bayer intrigued, I must say that he acted his part very well, for he obtained all he could wish. Leiningen, Pöltenberg, Colonel Czillish—gallant and honorable men, but rather soldiers than patriots—had for some time past been gained over to Görgey's views. They staked their fate on his. They protested that their affection for their troops would induce them to continue in the bloodiest combats, but that they were also resolved to prefer the result of honorable negociations to dissensions among, and to the dissolution of the army. They therefore entreated me to stop the expedition, to induce Görgey to stay with the army, and to attempt to break through the lines of the enemy on the right bank of the Danube. If I yielded to their wishes, they promised the greatest devotion and perseverance of their troops; but if not, they declared that they would not be responsible for the consequences. This was the first occasion on which mention was made of "*negociations*." That word was first spoken by those ill-fated men whose courage remained undaunted to the last, and whose reward was death on the gallows, by the agency of the very man to whom they clung with such unshakeable fidelity.

I understood that matters had proceeded too far for a compromise; that to defend the Government's orders was to increase the dissensions, and that to resort to extreme measures would be hurrying the army to a fatal crisis.

Under these circumstances, I thought it advisable to submit to the will of the majority, and to consent to the desperate expedition on the right bank. Nagy Shandor and his corps were called back. The officers and commanders of the army assembled, and sent a deputation to Görgey, entreating him to change his resolution and remain at his post. His reply, though favorable to the wishes of the army, was by no means flattering to the Government. It was a fresh proof of his never-sleeping hate, and of his desire to root out all sympathies towards the Government among his troops. As for me, he met me when he spoke to the officers of the deputation, and at a later hour he saw me alone: still he made no remark about the events of that day.

After so many insults and disappointments, I resolved to resign my post, and to withdraw from the army. Up to this time, I had done my best to preserve friendly relations between the two bodies on which our national welfare depended; but the spirit which became rife in the army, gave me reason to fear that all my endeavours

would in future be in vain. I was loth to witness the secession of the army from the cause of the people, and its last struggle for existence. Still this eventuality was rapidly approaching, and the views of the party to which I alluded were spreading like an epidemic.

Görgey, my friend of former days, whose suspicions of me increased with my devotion to the Government, wished to gain me over to his expedition; and for this purpose, he offered me a command of our army in our attack upon the enemy's lines. By this manœuvre he compelled me to stay; and, since our late delays had caused the favorable time for a retreat on the left bank to pass, I devoted myself to the execution of Görgey's plan, though not without causing each individual leader to pledge his word, that in case our attempt were crowned with success, he would insist on a junction with the rest of our forces.

My wish was to see the attack come off on the 9th, because the sooner it took place, the greater were our chances, in case of a failure, to make good our retreat on the left bank, where the Russians, owing to their inexplicable slowness, seemed unable to proceed. But the Central Chancellery delayed the attack under a variety of pretences. They waited for the columns of Armin Görgey and Horvath; they waited for ammunition, and heaven knows for what they did not

wait! This trifling cost us two days, and with them the chances of a retreat on the left bank.

I take this opportunity of inserting a few letters, which arrived before the attack, because their contents are calculated to throw some light on the events of the war. Görgey sent them to me, with some marginal notes.

"To the Commanders of the Army on the Upper Danube.

"Pesth, 7th July, 1849.

"Since the favorable time is now past, since the right bank of the Danube at Neszmely is occupied by the enemy, and since it is but too probable that the heights surrounding that place are likewise in the enemy's hands: I give you my advice as a soldier, and my order as a superior officer, to keep the army of 40,000 men in Komorn, rather than expose them to the doubtful chances of a breach through the enemy's line, and a hasty retreat. At all events, since you cannot have large masses of cavalry at Komorn, you will send 3,000 horsemen to Paks, where a bridge has been made for them to cross.

"LAZARUS MESZAROS."

GÖRGEY'S NOTE.

"We are all eagerness to obey the dispositions

of the War Office; only, having made our preparations, we must make a grand attack upon the enemy, which will enable their execution."

II.

"To the Commanders of the Army on the Upper Danube in and around Komorn.

"Pesth, 8th July, 1849.

"My journey to Komorn, which I intended to make yesterday, has again been prevented, partly by the enemy's piquets in and around Neudorf, and partly by the burning of the bridge at Gran, of which facts I informed you by a former courier. In case that courier should not have been able to reach Komorn, I find it expedient to inform you of the following:—

"Firstly, The report of General Klapka gives but a general outline of the direction in which the army is to march to the Lower Danube. The troops which have been sent to cover Arad and Temeshvar, and to dislocate General Jellachich's besieging army in front of Peterwarasdine, have left Buda-Pesth without any garrison, especially since I expected the arrival of one of your corps. Some piquets of the enemy's have been seen, early on the morning of the 7th, near Bitski and Neudorf. Owing to these various circumstances, I have found it necessary to make the

suspension-bridge impracticable. This measure was executed in the course of this afternoon.

"Secondly, In aforesaid report it is stated that the army may, perhaps, direct its march to the Lower Danube. In consequence of this, Captain Wehle has been ordered to let the bridge at Paks stand, if it has not been broken off since Kmetty's corps crossed it. But if it has been broken off, he is ordered to float it down to Baja, and there to keep it in a place of safety. I write this for the purpose of informing you what means there are, and where they are, so that you may send officers to put them in readiness.

"LAZARUS MESZAROS."

III.

(66, Z.)

"The War Office to General Görgey.

"Pesth, 8th July, 1849.

"I summon you, in the name of the country which you pretend to love so much, to declare whether you mean to subject your will to the decrees of the Government, and whether you mean to conduct the army to this place? We ought to know what to think, and what to do. We have vainly looked for the arrival of your troops; if those troops do not come here, they must be employed in another direction.

"The country is in danger, and your delays

have increased that danger. If you wish to avert it, you ought to move your troops on the right bank of the Danube, for, according to the report of General Klapka, the bridge on the Buda side is already destroyed. This movement is still a matter of possibility, for the enemy's outposts were, on the 8th, not farther than Harsany, because, across the Theiss where the enemy's forces are at Debrezin, some demonstrations have been made by our troops. It is, therefore, advisable to reach Waitzen within the next three or four days, and also to take the battery of 18-pounders, which will do excellent service against the Russians.

"Our pontoons are at Baja, where Captain Wehle can throw a bridge within twenty-four hours. And if a bridge cannot be thrown, we have made preparations which will enable 15,000 men, with guns and baggage, to cross in the same time.

"Again I summon you to declare your intentions! General Nagy Shandor has been ordered to Waitzen and Gödöllö.

"*I expect your report in Czegled.**

"LAZARUS MESZAROS."

GÖRGEY'S NOTE.

"The more reason for not losing time—at

* In Meszaros' own handwriting.

them, and through them! But it wants resolution and boldness in its execution."

IV.

"The Governor of the Commonwealth to General Görgey.

"Nobody can be more sensible than I am of the peculiar necessities of the army. Nobody knows better than I know the unfavorable impression which is produced by not paying for the supplies, and the assistance of the people. But on the 29th or 30th of June you told me, by letter, that the Government ought to hasten away from Pesth. You protested there was no keeping the enemy back—that Russian corps were passing your flanks—and that the capital was totally unprotected. Under these circumstances it was our duty to bring the bank-note press to a place of security. It has been brought to such a place. But I cannot by any means procure you money within the next fortnight. This is the consequence of the sudden dissolution, and neither I nor anybody can do anything to remedy it. There is no other means for the next few days than to withhold cash payments wherever it is possible, and to cover the current demands with cheques and bills. Our cash must go to pay the troops.

"You will have the goodness to instruct the paymasters to draw their cheques on the War Office at Szegedin, and to make them payable on the fourteenth day from this date. I have attempted to raise a loan at Buda-Pesth; and 500 florins were paid in. Of these we sent 200,000 florins to Komorn, and paid the current war expenses for July.

"The chief paymasters, who ought to have known our situation, committed moreover the fault, instead of paying each battalion for ten days only, of giving to some battalions their pay for the whole month, while others were left without any pay at all.

"I ought also to remark that only part of the monthly accounts have been received up to this date. However, what man can do I will do.

"Czegled,
"8th July, 1849.

"The Governor of the Commonwealth,
"LOUIS KOSSUTH."

V.

"To the Commander of the Army on the Upper Danube.

"Szolnok, 10th July, 1 o'clock, A.M.

"Information has reached us that detachments of Cossacks have made their appearance at

Jaszbereny on the 9th. The enemy's army must therefore be at the distance of only a few days' marches in the rear; perhaps they are at Mezzökövesd. Part of our army under General Visocki is drawing towards Szolnok, to defend the line of the Theiss.

"I write this to caution you on your march, and to save the army from danger. The army is, in any case, to keep in the direction of Waitzen, from whence they ought immediately to march along the railroad to Szegedin, or if the safety of the troops should require it, they ought to retreat to Komorn.

"Inform me of the position of your troops.

"LAZARUS MESZAROS."

These letters show the anxiety which General Meszaros felt on the subject of the army on the Upper Danube, while they likewise show the confusion which the report of the Commissioner Ludwig had caused in the business of the Government.

After the last battle, General Haynau had taken his head quarters at Nagy Igmand, where he vented his rage upon the inhabitants of the surrounding districts. The clergymen who had taken part in the revolution were executed; others were subjected to the severest corporal punishment. He surrounded us on the right bank in

a semi-circle, from Atsh to Almas. His General, Schlick, stood at Atsh with the first corps. The fourth corps was at Csem and Mocsa. The Russian reserved division stood at Kiss and Nagy Igmand. The third Austrian corps, under General Ramberg, had separated from the main army and marched upon Buda, where the vanguard arrived on the 11th of July.

The Government, its functionaries, and the members of Parliament, had, some days before, left the capital for Szegedin. At length, on the 10th of July, all the divisions of the Upper Danube were concentrated at Komorn. They were provided with the necessary ammunition, and the attack was appointed for the following day. The dispositions were distributed in the course of the evening, to wit—

"The troops to be in marching order at seven o'clock, A.M. No vehicles shall follow the army, except those destined for the wounded and the surgeons. The divisions of Janik and Rakowszky, forming the right wing, under the command of Colonel Assermann, to advance at eight o'clock, A.M., to Atsh, to force a passage through the forest, to drive the enemy over the Czonczo rivulet, where they take up a position, and wait for farther orders.

"Their advance is to be assisted by the seventh corps, under General Pöltenberg, which, at half-

past eight, proceeds to take up the space between the division of Rakowszky and the cavalry under General Pigetti. This corps will send a division against the forces at Herkály, if it is found that the enemy opposes an obstinate resistance to our right wing. This corps will afterwards stand on the Czonczo rivulet, to the left of Rakowszky's division.

"At two o'clock, A.M., General Pigetti will concentrate the second, fourth, ninth, and sixteenth hussars within the camp, and form them in a division. While the right wing advances to the Atsh forest, Colonel Pigetti will proceed to Puszta Herkály, where he will try to break the Austrian cavalry in a sudden attack, and turning to the flank and the rear of the left wing, he will, by forcing that wing to retreat, support the attack on the forest. When the enemy's centre is broken and pressed upon Igmand, this cavalry division is to pursue them, and towards night to retreat to the Czonczo.

"The third corps, under General Leiningen, commences its advance in the centre at eight o'clock, A.M. This corps will keep up its communications to the left with Pigetti, and the first corps; and when the engagement is at its height on the right wing, this corps is to attack Puszta Csém.

"The manœuvres of this corps depend upon

the successes of our right wing. In that case it will drive the enemy from Nagy Igmánd, it will endeavour to gain the high road from Raab to Bitske, and it will take a position in front of Nagy Igmánd. It will secure this position by sending strong detachments in the direction of Bábolna, Csanak, and by means of picquets it will communicate with the first corps on the road to Tömösd.

" The first corps marches at eight, A.M. In its advance, it will keep on an equal height with the third corps, and it will drive the enemy from Mocsa, and support the advance of the third corps. From Mocsa, General Nagy Shandor will send a detachment to reconnoitre the Dotis road; with the rest of his corps he will strike a decisive blow against Tömösd, where he will take up a position. He will occupy Kocz with a strong detachment of cavalry; but if the enemy were to keep to that place, he will place detachments on the road to the right, to keep up the communication with the third corps.

" Major Armin Görgey's division will follow the second and third corps as a reserve. Whether or not it takes part in the engagement, will depend upon these corps; but if not engaged, this division will, after the battle, occupy the camp at Mocsa—if engaged, it will bivouac with the corps which it supported.

"Esterhazi's division leaves O-Szöny at eight o'clock, A.M. It makes a demonstration against Almás, and at night it falls back to its former position. The enemy's movements and positions, from Almás to Dotis, to be reported to head quarters.

"The garrison of Komorn is, in the course of the night, to be distributed among the various works, and to stand in readiness at any moment in the course of the battle."

The following additional instructions and remarks were added:—

"The want of success of any corps may lead to a general defeat. Each corps will have to strain all its energies, and to combat with the utmost perseverance.

"The line of the Czonczo is our most important point.

"The enemy muster strongest at Atsh. Their head quarters are at Bábolna.

"It is of the greatest importance to gain the highway to Nagy Igmánd. If this succeeds, the enemy's centre is broken. The enemy's weakest points are Mocsa and Dotis. At those points it is difficult for them to attract reinforcements.

"The baggage, provisions, and ammunition reserves, will remain in the entrenched camp until victory is decided, and until all the corps have taken up their positions.

"The wounded and captives are to be sent to Komorn.

"Each soldier to have a ration of bread and bacon.

"If the battle turns against us, all the corps and divisions will retreat to the entrenched camp.

"The Commander will, during the battle, remain with the third corps, in the centre of our line.

"After all the positions have been taken, and the decision is turned in our favor, the head quarters of the Commander-in-chief and of the Central Chancellery will be at Kis Igmánd, to which place all the divisions will send an officer at eight o'clock, P.M., for the purpose of receiving our instructions."

Such were the preparations for the

Battle of Komorn.

At seven o'clock, A.M., on the 11th July, the divisions of the army assembled in the entrenched camp, where they stood protected and unobserved by the enemy. After some delay, owing to the late arrival of the reserves and ammunition, the advance commenced at nine o'clock. The right wing, the first and second corps, and the cavalry division, debouched at the same time. The weather was dark and foggy, and a strong mist which descended, veiled our movements from the enemy. Some patrols which had been pushed

forward to Csém informed us that but few of the enemy were in that place, and that their forces were moving towards Atsh. The artillery opened at eleven o'clock, first at Almas, and immediately after on our right wing, where Assermann had led his columns through the vineyards of Uj-Szony, and to the left of that place on the broad road to the Atsh forest. It was there he commenced his attack. Pigetti advancing with his cavalry in a line with the former division, deployed opposite to Herkaly; but instead of breaking upon the enemy in a *Razzia*, and thus supporting our attack upon the forest, he committed the fault of commencing a lengthy, and, as the enemy was covered, a useless cannonade.

I accompanied the third corps, which advanced on the Igmand road, until we met the enemy at noon, in front of Csem. This village, with its fenced farms, and the heights in its rear, was the key to the enemy's centre, who, when we attacked, occupied it with a brigade. After a short fight, in which we silenced the enemy's artillery, we carried the place at the point of the bayonet, and drove the enemy before us. But before my reserve columns could press to the charge and follow up our advantage, the gap in the enemy's battle-line was filled by the whole of the Austrian reserve and by the Russian division Paniutine, who received the fugitive

brigade, rallied it, and sent it, with a strong support, back to the charge, while eighty field-pieces opened upon us from the neighbouring heights. For an hour the earth trembled with the roar of the cannon, which, assembled on one point, were to decide the fate of the day. The effect on either side was ruinous. The field was strewed with corpses. Batteries were dismounted; powder carts exploded. We kept our position. So did the Imperialists. Some of their divisions retreated for a time without range of the fire, but they either returned or were replaced by fresh troops. If, according to the dispositions, Nagy Shandor and Pigetti had advanced and joined the attack of the third corps, they would have secured the victory: for the enemy, wavering as it was, could not have resisted the impetus of their charge. But Nagy Shandor advanced slowly, and Pigetti did not move at all. The favorable moment passed, and the Austrians, who were strongest in the centre, seemed to prevail. Leiningen, who saw his battalions lose ground, placed himself at the head of his reserves, and led them onward to another bayonet charge. The whole of his corps followed; before I could manage to support this hasty and disorderly attack, they were exposed to a raking fire, and, after several unsuccessful charges, they were compelled to fall back. Leiningen

was so far advanced that his retreat lay for a thousand yards within bearing of the enemy's guns. His troops suffered proportionably. The courage of his corps (at other times the bravest in the army) was seriously shaken, and without greater successes on either wing, another attack in the centre was not to be thought of. While Leiningen rallied his troops, under shelter of the heights along the Igmand road, I hastened to the right wing to direct the battle in that quarter. I found the troops in full retreat, and the Atsh forest, which was thrice lost and won in the course of this day, was again given up by our troops.

Another unsuccessful assault convinced me of the certain loss and little gain which would result from a continuation of the attack. It was late in the day, and I ordered the whole line to retreat, under the protection of the batteries.

I could not expose the army to severe losses, which would have maimed it in its future operations.

In the course of the retreat, the enemy made several attacks with the whole of his cavalry, which were brilliantly repulsed by General Nagy Shandor, whose irresolution had hitherto prevented him from taking part in the battle, but who advanced to cover the retreat of the left wing. His hussars of the first and eighth regi-

ment drew up for the protection of our artillery and foot, who fell off and retreated *en échiquier*, and ranging in a line and with their horses at rest, they allowed the enemy's horse to approach them to within the distance of a few yards, when they fired their carbines, and then commenced the onset. When repulsed, they retreated round and disappeared amidst the squares of foot, who meanwhile, presented their front to the enemy; and rallied, while the enemy was being raked by a harassing fire of musketry and cartridge, which occasioned a severe loss, and compelled them to turn and fall back.

The retreat was executed with the greatest order. Our centre and right wing remained unmolested by the enemy, and we returned to the entrenched camp, where our fatigued troops went into bivouac.

Pigetti, whose inactivity was the principal cause of the failure of our attack on the enemy's centre, excused his conduct by protesting that, just in the decisive moment, his batteries were short of ammunition, and that a new supply was not sent early enough to enable him to support his advance by his artillery.

Our loss in killed and wounded was considerable, and amounted to one thousand five hundred men. The loss of the Imperialists was equally severe.

The discharges of the Russian artillery at Csem did much execution in our ranks. Not less than five officers of my staff were disabled within a few minutes. Leiningen lost three officers of his staff. But our loss of officers and men would have been still greater had not the broken ground in many places protected our retreating battalions.

Görgey, who was still suffering, had witnessed the battle from the heights of the entrenchments. He became at length convinced of the impossibility of his plan, and of the necessity of resigning all thought of the expedition.

After all these fruitless contests on the Upper Danube, no alternative was left us but to stay with the army in Komorn, and to make our retreat on the left bank. Görgey chose the retreat.

In the course of the evening the commanders of the corps met at his quarters. It was thought that a few forced marches would give us the Russian army, and that we should have to fight only its vanguard on the Pesth-Erlau road, or near Waitzen.

The corps which Haynau had sent to the capitals was for the most part engaged in the pursuit with Kmetty, and only a small part of that corps could be expected to form a junction with the Russians by way of Pesth. All the commanders protested they would prefer the most desperate struggle to the danger of being cut off and sur-

rounded in Kômorn, where the want of provisions and ammunition would soon compel them to make a disgraceful surrender.

The faction which, in the course of the last few days, had been so eager to refer to the word "negociations," was silenced by the conduct of the enemy, who exulted in the pride of their power, and never thought of treating.

The dispositions were consequently issued, and the march was fixed for the evening of the twelfth.

At one time I had an idea of accompanying the army, and of giving my command to Colonel Assermann. But the altered relations in which I stood to Görgey, and the difference of our views, induced me to reverse my resolution and to remain at Komorn.

I could not, indeed, look without anxiety on the leaning of many commanders. But I considered that I could do nothing to change their convictions, but that in Komorn it would be in my power to be useful to my country. Thus I separated from this fine army, and its distinguished leaders, who were so soon hurled into the abyss of a dishonorable surrender.

I recommended to Nagy Shandor, in the strongest expressions, to defend the sacred interests of the country against the intrigues of the military clique which surrounded Görgey. I entreated

him to repress their overbearing recklessness wherever it was necessary, for Nagy Shandor, himself a devoted adherent of Kossuth, numbered some of the sincerest patriots among his commanders.

On the evening of the twelfth I took my leave of Görgey. Our former friendship had within the last weeks resigned its place to the coldness of ceremony, and cold and ceremonious was our last leave-taking. On that very evening I shook, for the last time, the hands of the two friends who were so soon to die on the scaffold.

Early on the morning of the 13th, Görgey's army, consisting of the first, third, and seventh corps, marched from Komorn in the direction of Batorkeszy. At noon their last luggage-vans crossed the Waag bridge. All was quiet at Komorn.

On that very day I sent a report to the Government, informing them that the army had left the fortress, and that I remained. The following extracts from this report will throw some light on the events of the time :—

"The garrison consists of the second and eighth corps. Their joint numbers amount to twenty-two battalions, twelve escadrons, and forty-eight field-pieces.

"After completing the battalions, the garrison

is strong enough, not only to keep the fortress and its *rayon*, but also to make sallies in support of the army which operates in the lower countries. When the main army of the Austrians withdraws, we shall be enabled to make diversions against Raab and the Platten Lake.

"The army has marched on the left bank. It is uncertain whether it will ever reach the Theiss; but if it does, it will have to encounter and conquer a great many obstacles. The late fatal delays were caused by Colonel Bayer and Görgey, who could not be brought to resign their plan of breaking through the lines.

"Nagy Shandor and I did everything to promote the wishes of the Government. But it was in vain. May this be the last melancholy consequence of a dissension which, if continued, must lead our poor country to ruin!

"Nagy Shandor remains with the army. He is a faithful advocate of the interests of the Government, and he will take care to preserve this, its strongest support, to the country.

"Görgey, I hope, will at length understand that only a union of forces and mutual confidence can lead to an auspicious end. May the thousands which have fallen within the last weeks be the last price he pays for this conviction!"

In the same letter I asked Kossuth to join the

army as soon as it approached the Theiss, and regenerate the spirit of the troops by the power of his words; and in conclusion, I entreated him again to offer the hand of friendship to Görgey. I do not know whether this letter reached Szegedin in time. All I know is, that Kossuth did not go to the Theiss, and that his not going was attended with the most disastrous consequences.

After the army had left, I devoted myself entirely to the preparations for the defence of the fortress.

Komorn, the mightiest bulwark against, and strategetically the most important point in the case of, any invasion from the west, lies on the eastern end of the Shütt island on the conflict of the Waag Danube, with the so-called old or larger sister. The fortifications of Komorn are of great extent, and exhibit a great variety in their plan and execution. *The old fortress* forms their centre. It was built in the sixteenth century, and lies on the extreme point of the island. The works of the new fortress protect it against the Shütt. In the old fortress are the dépôts—viz. the steam engines, mills, baking establishments, a factory of weapons, a cannon foundry, and the stores of gunpowder and ammunition. The new fortress contains quarters for the commander and officers, and some barracks all bomb proof. The walls of these mighty works rise, as

it were, from the waters, and command the crossings to the right bank of the Danube and the left bank of the Waag. *Têtes-de-pont* have been constructed on either side opposite to the old fortress.

The *tête-de-pont* on the Waag consists of a series of redoubts, communicating with one another, and beginning several hundred yards above the conflux of the Waag, from whence they extend in a semicircle to the banks of the Danube, opposite to O-Szöny.

The *tête-de-pont*, on the left bank of the Danube, is between O-Szöny and Uj-Szöny. It is of the same construction with the former, but its fortifications are in a better condition. In spring, 1849, the Austrian besieging army directed its chief attack against this *tête-de-pont*.

The city of Komorn lies in front of the new fortress, from which it is separated by a narrow glacis. It numbered at one time two thousand houses and twenty thousand inhabitants, but the great conflagration of 1848, and the bombardment afterwards, have converted it into a heap of ruins.

These were the parts of Komorn which existed in the commencement of the present century. Of late years, however, the Austrian Government resolved to construct a more extended line of outworks, and to make Komorn a fortress of the first rank. Eight battalions and several thousands of workmen were incessantly employed in

the construction of these works; and though only partly completed, they command the respect of all military engineers by the high finish and perfection of their system.

That part of the works which is completed lies to the west of the town, which it protects. It draws a line across the Shütt, and is known by the name of the Palatinal line. In its front extends the rich but moory and inundated plain of the larger Shütt, towards Pressburg. For the purpose of putting this line into a complete state of defence, it was necessary to supply its deficiencies by earthworks.

Opposite to the conflux of the Danube, and opposite to the Palatinal line, lies the Monostor-hill, the key of the entrenched camp. Between the town and O-Szöny is the Danube Island, extending to the length of two thousand yards, and covered with breastworks and batteries; and lastly, there is in the Waag, within the *rayon* of the fortress, the Apalia Island, which is likewise covered with breastworks and batteries.

The works and lines of Komorn which I had to occupy and defend were consequently the following:—

The Old fortress,
The New fortress,
The *Tête-de-pont* on the Waag,
The *Tête-de-pont* on the Danube,

The Palatinal line,
The Danube Island,
The Apalia Island,

and the ten sconces and redoubts of the entrenched camp on the right bank of the Danube.

The forces which we had for occupying these extensive works and redoubts were the second and eighth corps.

The second corps, under Colonel Kaszonyi, had decreased by half its number by the malaria of the Waag and the battles round Komorn. It consisted of—

	men	hrs.	guns.
10 batt. of 400 men each	=4000	„	„
6 escad. Würtemberg huss. of 100	= 600	600	„
2 escad. Boczkai hussars of 100	= 200	200	„
1 escad. Károly hussars	100	100	„
4 batteries of 6 guns each	360	„	24
Making a total of	5200	900	24

The eighth corps, under Colonel Assermann, consisted of—

	men	hrs.	guns.
12 batt. of 600 men each	=7200	„	„
5 escad. hussars of 100 men	= 500	500	„
4 batteries of 6 guns each	= 360	„	24
1 batt. sappers and miners	= 800	„	„
8 companies of artillerymen	=1200	„	„
Making a total of . . .	10,060	500	24

A few days before Görgey's march I received a transport of 3000 recruits, to complete the battalions. Their number, added to the two corps, made a total of

18,200 men, with 1400 horses, 48 guns.

On the bastions and in the entrenchments I had

300 pieces of ordnance.

40 to 50 field and battering pieces were just mounting.

I had from 4 to 5000 muskets, and a supply of

Flour, peas and beans	for 4 months.
Meat	for 3 months.
Wine	for 3 months.
Oats	for 6 months.
Hay and straw	for 2 months.

There was an unlimited store of salt.

Factories of muskets and caps, and powder-mills, were partly constructing, and partly were at work. One thing only was wanting—to wit, a sufficient store of gunpowder. I had no more than one thousand cwt., which was scarcely one-fourth of what I required for a siege of long duration. There were, however, about a thousand cwt. of saltpetre in the dépôts.

Görgey's withdrawal from the fortress was published to the troops on the 13th, in a proclamation in which I exhorted them to be persevering, courageous, and devoted in the cause of the country.

The following dispositions were taken for the occupation of the works:

Colonel Kaszonyi commanded in the entrenched camp, and the *tête-de-pont* of the Danube. He had with him the divisions of the Colonels Janik, Rakowszki, Kosztolanyi, and Mandi, making a total of thirteen battalions, six escadrons, and six field-batteries.

The Palatinal line was occupied by five battalions, three escadrons, and one field-battery.

In the old and new fortresses and the *tête-de-pont* of the Waag was Colonel Count Esterhazy with four battalions, three escadrons, and one field-battery.

Colonel Szilany was chief of the staff. Colonel Pragai was adjutant of the staff. Colonel Jungwirth commanded the artillery of the fortress, and Colonel Krivacsi directed the operations of the field batteries and outer works. Colonel Thaly acted as local director.

All the divisions were ordered to be on their posts and in readiness, for it was to be expected that the Austrians, after hearing of Görgey's retreat, would repeat their attack upon the entrenched camp. I took my quarters in the redoubt number 8, expecting every moment to be informed of the enemy's advance. But no advance was made on that day, nor indeed on the 14th or 15th of July.

On the afternoon of the 16th, the news came at last that a great stir was perceptible in the Austrian camp. I hastened to the bastion of the old fortress, and with the aid of a good glass, I soon discovered that the *gros* of the Austrian army was wheeling round upon Dotis. Their long columns, as they passed along the heights of Csem, offered an imposing spectacle, with the Austrian and Russian colors fluttering gaily on the breeze.

It gave me pain to see these black masses singing and shouting as they marched against my poor bleeding country.

The last Austrian columns left Igmánd on the 17th; on that day their head-quarters removed to Dotis.

General Haynau left the second Austrian corps behind to besiege Komorn. This corps was under the command of Lieutenant General Csorich, and stood in the following positions:

On the right bank:—At Atsh, Herkály, Csém, and Mocsa; Barko's brigade of six battalions.

In the Shütt island:—At Lél, Aranyés, Guta, and Köszegfalva; Liebler's brigade of five battalions.

On the left bank:—In the commencement, in communication, by way of Guta, with the Shütt Island, and at a later period, in the line of Martos, Ogyalla, Sz. Peter, Hetény, and Kurtakeszi; Pott's brigade of five battalions.

The besiegers had forty field-pieces and thirty battering guns. Their grand artillery train was then composing at Pressburg.

They had, moreover, six escadrons of horse, and their whole force mustered about 16,000 men.

At an earlier period, and while the *gros* of the Austrian army was still before Komorn, the Austrians had begun to throw up entrenchments near the Atsh forest at Csém, and in the Shütt at Aranyos and Köszegfalva. Part of their entrenchments were completed.

At Lovad, the Austrians had thrown a bridge, which established the communication between the Shütt and the right bank of the Danube. Their *tête-de-pont* at Nagy Lél was of excellent construction, and strongly armed with battering-guns. All these works were eagerly continued after Haynau's advance, and they were completed about the end of July.

On the evening of the 19th, information reached the fortress, from various quarters, of a grand victory of the Hungarians at Waitzen. Our former sadness disappeared, and gave place to the boldest hopes and illusions. But disappointment followed on the heels of joy. The following day the first fugitives from Görgey's army arrived, wayworn and hungry. They were followed by others to the number of one hundred. Some

officers, too, made their way to Kòmorn, and brought detailed news. Görgey had fought a two-days' battle at Waitzen. On the third he was compelled to retreat before the superior numbers of the Russian army. He hastened to the Theiss by way of Rétság, Losontz, and Miskoltz.

This retreat after an unfortunate rear-guard fight, with the enemy in hot pursuit, and on roads where little could be done for provisioning the troops, continued to Tokaj, and cost the Hungarian army one-fifth of their men. The garrison of Komorn became sad and sullen. The hussars especially, who were out of temper at being confined in a fortress, were eaten up with grief, and loud in their complaints. They were convinced that, locked up as they were, they must certainly perish; that I and their officers would eat their horses, and force the hussars to do service as foot-soldiers. They were, moreover, natives of the plains on the banks of the Theiss, and these plains, their homes, were just then overrun by a cruel and devastating enemy.

The hussars wanted employment, to make them merry, and I was resolved that they should not lack it long.

On the 25th I was informed of the weakness

of the Austrian garrison at Dotis, of the large stores that had been collected in that place, and the unsuspecting ease with which the Austrian officers lived in Esterhazy's castle. I ordered Colonel Kosztolanyi to take eight honved companies, four field-pieces, and one division of hussars, to capture the garrison of Dotis, and to transport the stores collected in that place, to the fortress. The "*raid*" was eminently successful. No garrison whatever was found at Dotis, but merely the escort of a transport which had just arrived. A mere show of defence was made, but the Austrians were soon compelled to surrender to Kosztolanyi's troops, who captured eight officers, an Austrian hospital, and a large quantity of provisions. But the most interesting part of the booty was the Imperial mail, loaded with letter-bags and newspapers.

It contained a great number of proclamations, and among them one which General Haynau addressed to the inhabitants of Buda and Pesth, before he marched from those towns. The terms of this proclamation are those of a cannibal addressing his victims when gagged and bound. Language more revolting to the feelings of humanity never issued from the lips of a Duc d'Alva, and this language was in the nineteenth century, to the generous sons of a free nation;

to the inhabitants of the capital of our own beautiful Hungary. It was to the following effect:—

"To the inhabitants of Buda and Pesth.

"I have scarcely made my appearance within your walls, when I leave you with the greater part of my army, to carry my victorious arms onward in pursuit, and to the annihilation of a rebellious enemy. But before I depart, I will express an expectation which I entertain respecting your conduct, and the non-fulfilment of which will certainly be attended with the most grievous consequences for you. I expect that you will zealously and unanimously labor to maintain order and tranquillity in the cities of Buda and Pesth. I expect that you will give that religious observance to all the points of my proclamation of the 19th and 20th inst. which you would give them if they were continually enforced among you. I expect that you will provide for the safety of all and any of the officers and soldiers whom I leave behind, as well as for the safety of the gallant army which is allied with us for the sacred purpose of restoring order. If you allow these my warnings to pass by unheeded, if only some of you, in arrant depravity of heart, should dare to scorn them, your fate, the fate of you all, would be *annihilation!* I will make you responsible

one for all, and all for one; your lives and properties shall be forfeited in expiation of your crimes. Your beautiful city, ye inhabitants of Pesth!—your city, which partly bears the traces of a just chastisement, I will turn into a heap of ruins and ashes, as a monument of your treason, and as a monument of my revenge. Do you doubt my word? Am I the man who fails in punishing outrages or rewarding merits? Look to the faithless inhabitants of Brescia! They, too, deceived by the leaders of the rebellion, made themselves accomplices to treason. Their fate will show you whether or not I know how to pity rebellious subjects. Look to the chastisement they suffered, and beware, lest by scorning my warning, you will force me to award a similar fate to you.

"Pesth, 24th July, 1849."

In the same bag with this remarkable document I found other official papers, which related to the combined movements of the Imperialist armies, and copies of which I despatched to Görgey and Kossuth. The most important document, as far as *I* was concerned, was a set of instructions for the besieging army round Komorn, from which I learned what troops, and to what number, they were opposed to me. I learned also, that the opinion of my garrison consisting

only of 6000 to 8000 ill-disciplined troops, was prevailing in the Austrian head-quarters. My resolution was taken. I was resolved to drive the Austrian brigade from the left bank, and next to turn round upon and annihilate their troops on the right bank of the Danube.

A letter from Kossuth arrived at that time from Szegedin. It was his last letter which reached the garrison of Komorn. It excited a joyful sensation among the troops. His own glow of enthusiasm pervaded this letter; it was fraught with that mysterious power which enabled him, in spite of misfortunes and wretchedness, to instil fresh courage and fresh hopes into the hearts of his countrymen; it breathed that devotion to the sacred cause of our country, that conviction of their ultimate success, which alone could nerve him against so fearful an array of dangers. His letter concluded as follows:—

"Victory is ours and certain, if we are but united, and confident in the justice and greatness of our cause. But dissensions must surely destroy us, and if Görgey's suspicions of the Government end as they began, we must, indeed, be prepared for the worst. But I trust that our common danger will unite us and teach us to forget what is past."

The 30th of July was fixed for our attack on the Austrians on the left bank. On the preceding

day I issued the following instructions for our expedition :—

" Colonel Rakowszky leaves the camp at two o'clock, A.M., with three battalions, six field-pieces, and one division of Lehel's hussars. He crosses the Zsitva river at Kurtakeszi, expels the Austrians from that place, and, directing his march to Sz. Peter, he outflanks the enemy's left wing.

" Colonel Kosztolanyi, with a force equal to the former, leaves two hours later. He advances on the high road to Sz. Peter, attacks the enemy at Heteny, and effects a junction with Rakowszky.

" Colonel Schulz, with two battalions, six field-pieces, and one escadron of hussars, acts as Kosztolanyi's reserve force, and, if necessary, he protects his principal's flank towards Gyalla and Martos."

On the 30th, at six o'clock, A.M., Kosztolanyi engaged the enemy at Heteny. He expelled the Austrians from that place, and drove them on the high road towards Bajcs. The Austrian columns which advanced from Martos and Gyalla were kept back by Colonel Schulz, who finally drove them across the Neutra river.

At this juncture, Kosztolanyi ought to have followed up his advantage with moderation. He ought to have given Rakowszky's corps time to

outflank the enemy; and in this case, there is no doubt but that we should have succeeded either in routing or capturing the enemy's columns, which had taken up a position on the Neuhäusel road, towards Bajcs. But Kosztolanyi's impetuosity saved the Austrians, who were merely driven back upon Neuhäusel, to which place they were pursued by our hussars and some of our field-pieces.

We captured 150 Austrians. The forces which we engaged consisted of five battalions, six field-pieces, and one division of lancers.

While this battle was fighting, I sent Colonel Horvath with two battalions, four guns, and one division of hussars, to make a demonstration against Aranyos, in the Shütt island. He drove the Austrians back, but was at length compelled to retreat to the fortress, as the troops which he engaged were reinforced from other quarters.

In the course of the night the Austrians continued their retreat to the Waag river, and the left bank of the Danube was thus freed from their presence.

Communications were immediately opened with the cities and villages on the left bank, and large quantities of provisions were purchased and brought to the fortress.

In the night of the 1st of August we attacked

Köszegfalva, and compelled the Austrians to take flight to Guta.

These successful expeditions regenerated the spirit of my troops. The hussars forgot their sorrows, for they were now in possession of a territory on which to gallop their horses about, and annoy the enemy by patrolling in their immediate vicinity.

END OF VOLUME I.

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